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Abstract 
The Tractatus Logico Philosophicus is primarily the expression of a 
transcendental perspective with respect to language and the world -"viewing the world 
sub specie aeterni" ( 6.45) - that has an aesthetico-ethical aspect to it -"feeling the 
world" sub specie aeterni (6.54). Interpreting the Tractatus in this way enables me to 
explain, in a way that no other interpretation of his early work has (1) why Wittgenstein 
regarded the Tractatus as an "ethical deed" or has having an "ethical point"; (2) how his 
'propositions' about the connection between language and the world are nonsense but at 
the same time intelligible; (3) how his 'propositions' about value, ethics and Das 
Mystische are nonsense but at the same time intelligible; (4) why he identifies ethics with 
aesthetics and what this means; and (5) why "resolute" or "austere" readings of the 
Tractatus are fundamentally wrong. Viewing or contemplating the world "sub specie 
aeterni" or as a "limited whole" ( 6.45) is to view it as a collection of all the facts and at 
the same time to take an aesthetico-ethical perspective with respect to the world. It is in 
this sense that Wittgenstein regards ethics and aesthetics as identical. The aesthetico­
ethical aspect of this perspective amounts to our "feeling the world as a limited whole" 
(6.54). What it means to "feel" the world in this way cannot be given any descriptive 
meaning, and is indeed characterized by Wittgenstein as" the mystical", but there are 
certain experiences that point toward it. According to Wittgenstein, it is our sense of 
wonder that the world is that is the quintessential mystical experience. And it is in virtue 
of taking the transcendental perspective on language and the world that the mystical 
"shows" itself (6.522) in this way. Thus, "seeing the world aright" (6.54) is to see it from 
the "right" perspective both logically and aesthetico-ethically. 
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INTRODUCTION AND OVERVIEW 
The early work of Ludwig Wittgenstein is designed to enlighten us not so much 
with any philosophical theses, but by bringing us to a perspective that transcends (in a 
way to be characterized shortly and fully developed in this work) the world and the 
language we use to represent or describe the world 1• The chief aim of Wittgenstein's TLP 
is to get us to see the "world aright" (6.54). I argue that seeing the world in the right way 
is to see it from its limit, according to Wittgenstein. The transcendental perspective is the 
view of the world "sub specie aeternitatis", or, synonymously, "as a limited whole" 
(6.45). 
This perspective with respect to the world has an aesthetico-ethical dimension to 
it that is, in the end, quite mysticaI2 . On my view, the aesthetico-ethical aspect of this 
perspective is a concomitant of our seeing the world as being comprised of facts-and 
these being all the facts. Indeed, to see the world as a "limited whole" or "sub specie 
aeternitatis" is to take up an extra-perspectival view with respect to both descriptive 
1 For brevity I shall refer to this world when talking about Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective, but it 
must be kept in mind that his view is a view of all possible worlds. Thus, Wittgenstein's perspective 
transcends all possible worlds and all representational or descriptive language. By "possible worlds" I mean 
every possible collection of facts in this world - the different ways in which the actual world might be. I am 
not reifying possible worlds. 
2 Wil1iam James gives four characteristics of mystical experience, but only two of these features are 
relevant to the experience of Das Mystische in the Tractatus: (]) "Ineffability" and (2) '"Noetic quality". 
Wittgenstein makes clear that "the mystical" is inexpressible, or, in James's language "ineffable". But there 
is also a quality of knowing in Wittgenstein's mysticism, a quality that makes such a state more than purely 
emotional. Indeed, if a mystical state is merely an emotional state, then it is nothing more than a 
psychological fact about us, and thus is a fact in the world like any other. James Writes: "[Mystical] states 
are states of insight into depths of truth unplumbed by the discursive intellect. They are illuminations, 
revelations, full of significance and importance, all inarticulate though they remain" (Varieties of Religious 
Experience� pp. 414-415). Although I am uncomfortable with the idea that we are apprehending 
"unplumbed truths", there is something right about the idea that our experience of the mystical must be 
more than just an emotional state for Wittgenstein: "There is indeed the mystical, it shows itself'. The 
mystical "shows itself' in our "feeling" the world at its limit. We have insight into something about which 
nothing can be said according to Wittgenstein. 
language and the world. Precisely what this perspective comes to, and how and why 
Wittgenstein thought that an aesthetico-ethical attitude emerges from a treatise on the 
logic of our language is the central topic of my dissertation. 
Both the logic of any possible language and ethics are, according to Wittgenstein, 
"transcendental" ( 6.13 and 6.421 ). And in his NB he remarks: "ethics does not treat of the 
world ... ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic" (p. 77). One of the 
implications of ethics being transcendental and a condition of the world is that it seems to 
have almost nothing to do with what we usually take ethics to be about-that is, with our 
actions in the world. Instead, ethics appears to be tied up with a perspective or attitude 
toward the world. There is in the Tractatus a disconnection between the facts in the world 
and ethical value. And this disconnect appears to tum ethics and value into something 
wholly irrelevant to our lives. There is some truth in this on Wittgenstein's admittedly 
peculiar view of ethical value. 
On the other hand, Wittgenstein claims that "the good life is the world seen sub 
specie aeternitatis" (NB, p. 83). The problem, then, is reconciling how it can be the case 
that ethics "does not treat of the world" while at the same time "the good life" results 
from what I am calling Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective with respect to the 
world. How, given the disconnection between ethics and the world, are we to understand 
the expression "the good life" here? Is it a way of living or merely seeing the world? Or 
is it perhaps both? 
2 
Absolute Value and Ethics versus ethical Judgments in the World 
There is a distinction that needs to be made immediately, and that must be kept in 
mind throughout this work. When Wittgenstein's says that ethics is transcendental he 
does not have in mind particular actions and behaviors we deem "good" or "bad" in our 
everyday conversations; he is not referring to ethical judgments made about facts in the 
world. We can obviously talk about ethics in this sense; in fact, Wittgenstein frequently 
(and sternly) moralized to his favorite pupils (Drury and Malcolm for example). It is only 
when it comes down to the very nature or 'essence' of ethics or more generally value that 
we cannot speak. Wittgenstein comes closest to capturing the way in which he 
approached the ethical in his TLP in his "Lecture on Ethics"3• There he talks about value 
in an "absolute" versus a "relative" sense. We will fully investigate what he is driving at 
by this distinction in part (b) of chapter three. Whatever else it might be, value in an 
"absolute" sense cannot be contained in the world, and is itself mystical. For now, it is 
enough to notice that when he speaks of ethics and value in his TLP he has in mind 
something like the "absolute" sense he refers to in his LE; ethics and value in this sense 
cannot be articulated. 4 In short, when I talk about Wittgenstein's view of "ethics" I mean 
the stance that he takes in the Tractatus regarding what I have been calling the 
transcendental perspective on the world: it is ethics and value in this sense that is shown 
and cannot be said. 
3 Which was delivered to the Heretics Group in 1929/30. 
4 To say "this sense" makes it sound as ifhe defines it- he doesn't; rather, he a1Judes to it via certain 
mystical experiences. 
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I contend that Wittgenstein's "good life" amounts to a kind of quietism in the 
world that results from our seeing the world from the transcendental perspective. This is 
why he says: "the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis" (Ibid). This way of 
seeing the world is primary, and results in a renunciation of just this or that collection of 
facts in the world being significant, important, or having value in an absolute sense. But it 
is not a complete resignation, since it involves a working on oneself; one strives to accept 
the world just as it is. 
The practical 'ethic', if this is what it can be called, that falls out of Wittgenstein's 
perspective is for us to fit into the mold of the world and not to attempt to mold the world 
to fit our life. In the end, the transcendental perspective results in an attitude to the world 
as a "limited whole". This attitude is a kind of stoic asceticism. This is an 
oversimplification, but it at least begins in the right direction. 
Wittgenstein is not making descriptive ( or quasi-descriptive) claims about the 
nature of value or ethics in the "sixes" of his TLP5; rather, he is imploring, inviting6, and 
directing us to see that the right perspective on any language-world relation 'leads' to an 
aesthetico-ethical attitude toward the world. The perspective that Wittgenstein is trying to 
get us to appreciate cannot be said because it does not consist of truths; it is not 
propositionaI7. The 'propositions' of the TLP that deal with Das Mystische are not 
5 Many years later, in a conversation with Friedrich Waismann, Wittgenstein said: "In ethics, one 
constantly tries to say something that does not concern and can never concern the essence of the matter" 
(Wittgenstein and The Vienna Circle, p. 68). 
6 Alan Dunne suggested that it is perhaps more appropriate to see Wittgenstein's pronouncements about 
ethics, value, and the mystical as "invitations", not imperatives, to see the world in a different light. I think 
he is right here. 
7 This is not quite correct. On a contemporary view many of Wittgenstein's remarks (especially concerning 
his "model theory" of language) can - and I think should- be interpreted as metalinguisitc truths. For 
example, Wittgenstein's talk about what a name means: "A name means an object. The object is its 
meaning" (3.203). Now if this is 'true', it is not a truth that can be articulated within our picturing language 
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gestures toward truths that cannot be said, but instead serve as directives or invitations 
whose function is to get us to take a very particular attitude toward the world. 
"Ethics and Aesthetics are One" (6.421): The View "Sub Specie Aeternitatis" 
In what follows I take seriously Wittgenstein's suggestion that "ethics and 
aesthetics are one" (Ogden, 6.421) and try to make sense of his oracular pronouncement 
that "contemplating the world as a limited whole" is to view it "sub specie aeternitatis" 
(6.45) and that ''the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis" (NB, 7.10.16). 
Indeed, I try to connect Wittgenstein's view of the ineffability of semantics with what I 
call his aesthetico-ethical perspective on the world. Wittgenstein's TLP was taken by "his 
family and friends as an ethical deed, which showed the nature of ethics"8 (p. 24) .9 But 
at all. Such remarks are closer to being metalinguistic truths about the function of certain terms or 
expressions within Wittgenstein's picture theoretic view of descriptive language. The same can be said 
about Wittgenstein's pronouncements on the nature of the proposition: "A proposition is a picture of 
reality" ( 4 .0 l ). Clearly Wittgenstein thought that this latter claim was right or true, but it cannot be said in 
an object language (which, for Wittgenstein, consists only of contingent propositions that picture possible 
facts in the world). 
8 Janik and Toulmin, Wittgenstein's Vienna: Simon and Schuster; NY: 1973. 
9 There are some who think that quoting what Wittgenstein's "family and friends" had to say about the 
book is a mistake. Richard Gale, for example, thinks this is a dangerous business because such lay-people 
are not qualified to comment on what Wittgenstein's work does or does not express. After all, how can they 
know what it is all about given that they are not trained in Philosophy? I would say, and I think that 
Wittgenstein would agree, that rather than impeding their judgment, this better qualifies them to judge the 
ethical point of the book. This is not to say that an analysis of the more technical parts of the work such as 
a discussion of the nature of "simples" or "objects" is not better left to academic philosophers. This is also 
not to say that one can get the ethical thrust of the work without having a clue about what Wittgenstein 
means by meaningful language- i.e., his ''picture theory". Be that as it may, there is independent evidence 
that Wittgenstein thought that he had written an ethical book (not a book on ethics): Wittgenstein wrote to 
von Ficker that the "point of the book is an ethical one". Finally, one should keep in mind that Wittgenstein 
thought that Paul Engelmann, an architect by trade, best understood the main thrust of the Tractatus. 
Engelmann was not a trained philosopher, and understood the book to be deeply ethical (Letters from 
Ludwig Wittgenstein, With a Memoir, 1967). 
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exactly what is the 'nature' of ethics on Wittgenstein's view and just how is its nature 
shown in his Tractatus? Janik and Toulmin never make this clear.10 
Now if Wittgenstein's work is (in some sense) an ethical deed and if ethics and 
aesthetics are (in some sense) one, then it is plausible to take the TLP as an aesthetic deed 
or has having an "aesthetic point" as well. So the book is an aesthetico-ethical deed? But 
what can this mean? 
First, the identity of ethics with aesthetics is not an identity of subjects, but is 
instead best interpreted as an identity of perspectives. I argue for this in Chapters Three 
and Four. The "steps" of Wittgenstein's ladder are all designed to make "manifest", 
"show", or "indicate" that the proper perspective with respect to the world - the vista 
from which the world is seen "aright" - is one that contemplates the world from the 
outside, as it were. 11 It is this perspective that I will sharpen and defend throughout this 
work. On my view, the main point of the Tractatus is to get the reader to "view" and 
"feel" the world as a "limited whole" ( 6.45). Second, I argue that according to 
Wittgenstein it is this perspective that imbues the world with value, meaning, or 
significance in something like an absolute sense. And it is in virtue of this perspective on 
the world that the Tractatus can be considered an aesthetico-ethical "deed". But how, 
exactly, does Wittgenstein lead us to this transcendental perspective in the first place? 
10 To be sure, Wittgenstein's Vienna is a fine book. It shows that Wittgenstein's was concerned with far 
more than just figuring out the foundations of logic, the meaning of logical propositions, and how language 
is able to say anything about the world. And Janik and Toulmin do so by fi1ling in his Viennese heritage. 
But nowhere do they satisfactorily explain how a treatise on logic is at the same time an ethical deed 
11 The idea that Wittgenstein is taking us to a transcendental perspective reflects on the way in which vision 
or visual immediacy works as a metaphor in the Tractatus. The visual immediacy of this extra-perspectival 
view overleaps abstract reasoning with a non-inferential apprehension - we are instead "shown" how to 
look at, see, or contemplate the world. Thanks to Alan Dunne for his help in bringing this point to the 
foreground. 
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I contend that the 'propositions' of the Tractatus function in one of two ways: 
either as meta-linguistic assertions about the connection between descriptive language 
and the world or as directives or invitations to see and feel the world in a certain way. 
Most of the 'propositions' of the TLP (from the "twos" to the "fives" roughly) are best 
interpreted as meta-linguistic assertions as to how to see the connection between 
language and the world in the right way. This perspective is, in the end, the most literal 
kind of meta-view one can take because it is at the very limit of any possible descriptive 
language and any possible world. Moreover, on my view the ultimate function of these 
meta-linguistic assertions is to pave the way for seeing "the world aright" (6.54) from 
both a logical and an aesthetico-ethical perspective. 
We will discover that the best way to interpret the role that language plays in the 
"sixes" of the TLP is to compare it to the way in which an aesthetician or an art critic 
uses language. One of the ways in which an aesthetician or an art critic uses language is 
in an exhorting, directive, 12 and invitational manner, so as to focus our attention on 
certain features of an object, thereby causing us to see it as having value in something 
like an absolute sense. Analogously, Wittgenstein uses language in the."sixes" to direct 
our attention to the limits of the world, thereby enabling us to see the world as having, if 
anything does, absolute value. The details on the two ways in which the 'propositions' of 
the TLP function will be fleshed out in chapters two and four, respectively. 
12 I recognize that an art critic might very well use language in other ways as well .  She might simply 
describe a work of art. But a directive or invitational use of language is common as a way of getting 
someone to look at an object (be it a painting or a mountainside) in a different light. 
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It should be clear that on my reading of the TLP Wittgenstein is attempting to 
express more than merely the negative conclusion that language cannot say (describe) 
what it is that's really important. A major part of my project is to determine not just why 
he regarded logic and ethics as "transcendental" (6. 1 3  and 6.42 1 respectively), but why 
he thought that a treatise primarily on the connection between descriptive ( or 
representational) language and the world is simultaneously an aesthetico-ethical view on 
the world. 
A proper understanding of Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective entails 
investigating his distinction between saying and showing. On my view whatever is ' seen' 
from the transcendental perspective is "shown", and cannot be said in anything like a 
descriptive sense. Indeed, all of the 'propositions' of his work serve to show or 
"elucidate" (6.54) his transcendental view on language and the world - a "view" which 
cannot be communicated in anything like an ordinary way (witness Wittgenstein's 
despair that no one would understand him, p. 3, preface). 
Recall that Wittgenstein regards both logic and ethics as "transcendental". It 
appears that both ethics and logic are shown in the generic, uncontroversial, but 
somewhat technical sense that their nature cannot be articulated because neither of them 
are 'subjects' that describe states of affairs in the world that can be "pictured" or 
"modeled" (gebildet). 13 But do they have more in common than that? In answering this 
13 A.B. Worthington rightly points out that the "usual interpretation" of why ethics is inexpressible is "not 
the argument presented in Wittgenstein's text." According to Worthington the "usual interpretation" goes 
something like this: "Sentences acquire meaning by picturing facts and . . .  ethics is therefore . . .  incapable of 
expression in language because it is non-empirical and therefore non-factual" (p. 1 5). Worthington points 
out that the ''non-factual" status of ethical claims is not what renders ethical propositions "inexpressible", 
but is instead Wittgenstein's identifying ethics as being "non-accidental" (at 6.4 1)  that renders ethics 
inexpressible. Worthington argues that the "non-factual" status of ethics is not a reason to think that we 
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question we will need to discover why Wittgenstein thinks that "logical form" or the 
"form of reality" (2. 1 8), a key feature of his picture theory of language, can only be 
"exhibited" and "cannot [be] expressed by language" ( 4.121), and then consider whether 
the "mystical" is "exhibited" or made "manifest" in a similar or very different way. 
To anticipate, "logical form", dealing as it does only with those features that any 
descriptive language capable of representing facts in any world must share, is shown by 
Wittgenstein's metalinguistic assertions. As a result of the "unsayability" of the 
connection between descriptive language and the world, Wittgenstein draws us to the 
very limits of what can be said regarding the connection between any descriptive 
language and all possible worlds. The ethical or aesthetical aspect of this perspective is 
then brought into relief by our sense of the total disconnection from the world of facts 
that this perspective engenders. All of our feelings and attitudes in the world are just so 
many facts that make up the world. As a result of being projected out of the world and the 
cannot express ethics. Indeed, he holds that we might ''tum Wittgenstein upside down and use the semantic 
system of the Tractatus as an argument for [ethical] . . .  objects". (He has in mind something like Moore's  
"non-natural properties"). He suggests that we "would then start with the common sense assumption that 
ethical propositions do have meaning and argue a posteriori, on the strength of the semantic system of the 
Tractatus, that this can be explained only if there are ethical objects" (p 16). First, I have no quarrel with 
Worthington's point that nowhere in the TLP does Wittgenstein explicitly argue that the inexpressibility of 
ethics is the result of their non-factual status. He is right in thinking that Wittgenstein's argument for the 
inexpressibility of ethics occurs in 6.4 1 : The non-contingent or "non-accidental" nature of value (ethics) is 
why we cannot express ethical propositions. All and only contingent or "accidental" propositions can be 
pictures of states of affairs in the world. But ethics, whatever else it is, is necessary and "non-accidental", 
and necessary propositions ( of whatever kind) cannot picture states of affairs in the world. However, it 
seems obvious (to me anyway) that a consequence of the "non-accidental" status of ethics and value is the 
impossibility of there being ethical 'propositions' that picture reality. And since it is only contingent facts 
that can be pictured by propositions, it follows that ethics does have a "non-factual" status. So the "usual 
interpretation", even if it is not explicitly stated in the TLP, is at least a consequence of ethics and value 
being, according to Wittgenstein, non-contingent; that ethical propositions cannot picture facts is a 
consequence of the "non-accidental" status of value. Second, and more obviously, it seems perverse to 
attribute to Wittgenstein anything close to Moore's "non-natural properties". "Turning Wittgenstein 's 
(Tarctatrian semantics) upside down", although possible, is surely far from a charitable reading of the TLP. 
Moreover, why Worthington would criticize an interpretation on the grounds that it is nowhere explicitly in 
the text, and suggest, in its place, a possible interpretation of the text that is not even implicit in it is beyond 
me. 
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language we use to describe or represent the world, we apprehend that value in an 
absolute sense cannot belong to anything in the world, but can only attach - if indeed it 
can be said to 'attach' to anything - to the world seen under the aspect of eternity. What 
gives the world its meaning, significance, value, sublimity is our feeling it as a "limited 
whole." This is the paradigmatic experience of the mystical according to Wittgenstein. 
Logical form or the form of representation is shown via Wittgenstein's 
metalinguisitc assertions. And what is shown is the purest connection between descriptive 
language and the world. The aesthetico-ethical aspect of the perspective on the world is 
in tum shown via his directive and invitational use of language near the end of the 
Tractatus as a result of our having seen how the picture theory of language takes us to the 
very limit of descriptive language and the world. 
It is essential that the reader appreciate that I am ultimately concerned with 
demonstrating that Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective encompasses both the logic 
of our language and ethics/aesthetics/value. In addition to being a thinker who took ethics 
very seriously, Wittgenstein was a logician. To focus only on the cryptic 'claims' he 
makes on value, ethics, and the mystical, and ignore his obsession with how language is 
able to picture the world, is just as lopsided as focusing solely on Wittgenstein the 
logician, brushing aside the "ethical point" of his work. 
Indeed, Janik and Toulmin are guilty of focusing too much on the ethical 
dimension of Wittgenstein's early work, to the exclusion of investigating why he thought 
that logic is also "transcendental" and inexpressible. 14  To be fair, however, given just 
14 This point is made nicely by Hodges in his Transcendence and Wittgenstein 's Tractatus ( 1 990); see 
especially pages 1 1 - 12. 
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how lopsided the treatment of Wittgenstein had been in the other direction (the "Frege­
Russell" direction), Janik and Toulmin's focus on the Viennese Wittgenstein is 
excusable. 
To be sure, I think that tracing the influence of Karl Kraus and, to a lesser extent, 
Leo Tolstoy, is important as a way of demonstrating that before he wrote the Tractatus 
the idea that value is best shown through silence (Kraus) and that the inexpressible is 
more than mere nonsense (Tolstoy) was very much a part of Wittgenstein's way of 
approaching anything having to do with the significance, value, or meaning of life and 
the world. I argue for this in chapter one. 
But even more important than the idea of giving equal weight to logic and value 
in the Tractatus, is to understand that Wittgenstein regarded his rather peculiar stance on 
value as a concomitant o/his perspective on language and its relation to the world. Put 
differently, Wittgenstein thought that getting clear about how the logic of any descriptive 
language is shown ( or reflected) in any world is what brings out the aesthetico-ethical 
point of the TLP. 
At any rate, while it is true that there is throughout Wittgenstein's Tractatus an 
unbridgeable gap between fact and absolute value, this is better put as a gap between ( 1 )  
facts and (2) the logic of any language and absolute value. And it is the latter that can 
only be shown. Both seeing and feeling the world in the "right" way requires a kind of 
meta-view; a view of the world "sub specie aeternitatis." And, at least according to 
1 1  
Wittgenstein, when we view the world from this perspective, we see also feel it as having 
absolute value. 1 5  
The transcendental perspective encompasses the ultimate way in which any 
language is able to represent any world. A complete model of the actual world is nothing 
more than a catalog of all the facts there are: "The world is everything that is the case" 
( 1 ). But if any world is no more than a collection of all the facts there are, and if none of 
these facts can have value in an absolute sense, then the only place for absolute value to 
as it were take hold is at the very limit of any possible world. The aesthetico-ethical 
aspect of the transcendental perspective is appreciated only when we contemplate 
language and the world at their limit (6.632 and 5.633). Such contemplation includes both 
"viewing" and "feeling" the world "sub specie aeternitatis" (6.45). 
In chapter two I argue that Wittgenstein's perspective on the ultimate language­
world relation requires interpreting many of his 'propositions' as a kind of meta­
language. His assertions say in a metalanguage what cannot be said in the language of 
contingent propositions that picture reality. But wouldn't this be a transgression of the 
saying/showing distinction? Only if we think that what can be shown cannot be said in 
any type of language at all ! Of course on Wittgenstein's view a higher-order language is 
an attempt to say what can only be shown according to the letter of what is to count as 
meaningful language in Wittgenstein's Tractatrian semantics. 
15 But "must" we feel the world as having value at all? Can't someone (like Bertrand Russell for example) 
see the limits of language and the world without also feeling the world in this peculiar way? The answer 
has to be ''yes." There is certainly nothing in the transcendental perspective on language and the world that 
causes us to marvel at the existence of the world or feel the world as a "limited whole." I am not even sure 
that we could say that someone who doesn't feel the world in this peculiar way is missing something. But I 
am pretty confident that Wittgenstein thought that seeing the world from its limit ushers in this feeling for 
some ofus - it did for him at least! 
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But wouldn't Wittgenstein reject outright any higher order language as 
impossible? Let me say for now that Wittgenstein is using a higher-order language to say 
what, in the end, he thinks can only be shown; though Wittgenstein would not put it this 
way. 
For now it is enough to note that on this interpretation what can be said about the 
world must be said in a single language consisting of all contingent propositions; 
propositions that picture the world, truly or falsely, and which are all "of equal value" 
(6.4) - which is to say that contingent propositions that picture possible facts are equally 
valueless. Within the Tractarian framework there is no "sayable" meta-language. 
According to Wittgenstein nothing can be said outside of the one language; that is, 
outside of propositions that are pictures of the way the world is or might be: "A 
proposition states something only insofar as it is a picture" (4.03). To think that we could 
say something meaningful outside this language is tantamount to claiming that we can go 
beyond language and the world. Thus, on my view his meta-linguistic assertions are quite 
literally a way for him to show or make manifest what language (picture) and the world 
(pictured) must have in common in order for the former to be able to say anything at all 
about the latter. 
Now the fact that the only things we can say are contingent propositions implies 
that any value that we find in the world, i .e. in some state of affairs obtaining or not 
obtaining, whichever the case may be, must be contingent and hence "accidental" (6.4 1 ). 
And this shows us, Wittgenstein thinks, that there can be no place for absolute value in 
the world. The meta-linguistic view shows us that the proper way to view the world as 
being ethically significant and meaningful is to see it as a "limited whole" (6.45). And 
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this just means that in taking such a perspective we come to see that the world as a whole 
is "limited" in the sense that a list of all the contingently true propositions is all that there 
is to �he world regarding its descriptive meaning. There is nothing more to say about the 
world and thus there is nothing to say about the value or meaning of life and the world. 
In chapter three I argue that Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective does not 
require a subject that stands as it were at the limit of language and the world. 
Wittgenstein colorfully refers to the metaphysical subject as being at the limit of the 
world in terms of both the logic of our language (5.632) and ethics - with respect to 
ethics he refers to the subject as the "willing subject" (NB, p. 79). The influence of 
Schopenhauer's talk of both the "pure" and the "purely knowing subject" is evident in 
Wittgenstein's view of the "limits" of the world and in establishing the aesthetico-ethical 
aspect of this perspective as one that is will-less and timeless. 
On my view neither the metaphysical subject nor the willing subject need to be 
reified, but are instead better thought of as two different aspects of the transcendental 
perspective. My view does not commit Wittgenstein to a subject that stands outside or at 
the limit of language and the world. One might think that a transcendental perspective 
requires a transcendental subject. It does not. Too many philosophers refer to something 
like a "metaphysical self'16  when they try to explicate Wittgenstein's view from the limit 
16 James C. Edwards, for example, writes: "the metaphysical self that proceeds from the world viewed sub 
specie aeterni is the willing subject" (Ethics Without Philosophy, 1982, p. 89). Now Wittgenstein, 
especially in his early NB, does write as if there were a willing subject over and above individual subjects 
in the world, but I think that this is his way of talking about an attitude that we, as individual or empirical 
subjects, can take to the world as a whole, an attitude that, in the words of Edwards, "infuses [the] world 
with an ethical aspect" (p. 89). And Allan Janik writes: "the subject as willing . .  . is the noumenal in 
Wittgenstein's early writings" (Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger, p. 43). Finally, Michael Hodges 
thinks that Wittgenstein is committed to a ''transcendental subject" or what he sometimes calls an "ethical 
subject" that lies outside the world and "makes ethics possible" (Transcendence and Wittgenstein 's 
Tractatus, pp. I 08- 109). 
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of the world. Such an approach is not in keeping with Wittgenstein's Spartan ontological 
commitments. 
But a huge problem still remains : even if we interpret Wittgenstein's 
'propositions' as meta-linguistic instructions and assertions as to how to look at the 
relation between language and the world, what sense can we make of Wittgenstein's 
transcendental perspective manifesting or exhibiting "Das Mystische?" How does his 
perspective point to the world's having value, meaning, or significance in an absolute 
sense? Put differently, how do his meta-linguistic descriptions of language and its 
connection with the world (if that is what they are), illuminate his perspective on ethics 
(value) and the world? Is any attempt to say anything about what he is trying to get us to 
see regarding value impossible? And how does this perspective show that "there is indeed 
the inexpressible?" ( 6.522) 
I must admit that the insights about value and meaning in the TLP are veiled in a 
way that the insights regarding language and its connection to the world are not. Put 
another way, the things that are "shown" about the logic of language and the world are 
not nearly as mysterious as how Das Mystische is supposedly manifested in the world. I 
have said that the ethical aspect of Wittgenstein's perspective is a concomitant of his 
view on the ultimate connection between the logic of our language and the world. Simply 
stated, the ethical dimension of Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective is made 
manifest once we see that nothing in the world can have value in an absolute sense. But 
how does this work? And what does it mean to say that the world as a "limited whole" 
has value in an absolute sense? Can any sense be given to this? This is by far the most 
difficult and tenuous part of my thesis. In seeing the world as a "limited whole" we are 
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also brought to "feel it as a limited whole" ( 6.45) according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein 
identifies the mystical with a "feeling" or sense of the world: It is to sense the existence 
of the world as a miracle. To appreciate that there is something rather than nothing is 
ultimately what confers absolute value, if anything does, on the world: "aesthetically, the 
miracle is that the world exists" (NB, p 86). In his LE he writes: "If I want to fix my mind 
on what I mean by absolute or ethical value . . .  one particular experience presents itself to 
me which . .  .is . . . my experience par excellence . . . [and that] "when I have it J wonder at 
the existence of the world'' (p. 68). And in the Tractatus he writes: "It is not how things 
are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists" (6.44). 
In chapter four I say more about what these remarks are meant to illuminate, and 
suggest that the mystical experience par excellence results from our taking up the 
transcendental perspective with respect to the world. For now it is enough to see that 
Wittgenstein points us toward what absolute value 'means' by relating particular 
experiences of his. This suggests that some will come to feel the world as having absolute 
value and some will not depending on whether or not the transcendental perspective 
' leads' them to "feel" the world in the way characterized. Indeed, regarding such 
experiences, Wittgenstein says that "this is an entirely personal matter and others would 
find other examples more striking" (LE, p. 68). Thus, this leaves room for those people 
who do not "feel" the world in any way at all. 
In ord�r to see that the transcendental perspective has an ethical aspect to it we 
must understand the connection between "viewing the world as a limited whole" and 
"feeling the world as a limited whole" (6.45). There is both an objective (but not 
conceptual, more like a pure seeing) and a subjective (affective) aspect to the 
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transcendental perspective. My suggestion here is that seeing or viewing the world as a 
"limited whole" is that aspect of the perspective that deals with the logic of our language, 
and that feeling the world as a "limited whole" is the ethical aspect of the perspective - it 
is the attitudinal dimension of the perspective. But both aspects are tied up with seeing 
the world "sub specie aeternitatis" (6.45). It is my contention that Wittgenstein is 
suggesting that there is something about seeing or viewing the relation between t_he logic 
of our language and the world from "the point of view of eternity" that simultaneously is 
- at least for some - an experience of the mystical. We marvel that there is a world at all. 
As Wittgenstein says in his LE: "I wonder at the existence of the world" (p. 68). The 
Transcendental perspective, then, incorporates both an objective (pure seeing) and a 
subjective (affective) view of the world as a "limited whole". The best way to make sense 
of this is to interpret such a perspective as being a kind of aesthetico-ethical perspective 
on the world. 
Nonsense is Nonsense: 1 7  Or is it? 
Many philosophers have seen more than an air of paradox in Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus. Philosophers like Cora Diamond ("Throwing Away the Ladder; How to Read 
1 7  In Chapter Five we wiJl see that that some commentators (Cora Diamond and James Conant especially) 
divide nonsense into two categories: "resolute ( or "austere") nonsense" vs. "substantial nonsense". The new 
Wittgensteinians (Conant, Diamond, and Warren Goldfarb) think that Wittgenstein's early (and late) work 
is concerned primarily with demonstrating that all nonsense is resolute, and that Wittgenstein engages his 
readers in disguised nonsense to get them to stop misusing language in the way that metaphysicians before 
the TLP did. There is absolutely no room in a 'resolute' reading of the TLP for the distinction between 
saying vs. showing, or for gleaning from the text an aesthetico-ethical view of the world. With some 
qualifications, my own view is that the TLP is engaging in "substantial nonsense". And for now this means 
only that Wittgenstein is trying to show us something about both language and the world that cannot be 
expressed by contingent propositions. 
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the Tractatus" 1 8) think that the book cannot be read at face value. 
Wittgenstein claims, on the one hand, that the ''thoughts expressed" in his work 
are "unassailable and definitive" (Preface, p. 4), and, on the other hand, claims th<:1t his 
propositions are "nonsensical" to those who have "understood" him (6.54). But how can 
we understand anyone who is speaking nonsense? How can thoughts be "definitive and 
unassailable" but nonsensical at the same time? 
Even more generally, if what "can be shown cannot be said" (4.1212), how can 
anyone say anything at all about what Wittgenstein is trying to show us? One might 
wonder how any project that purportedly gives an account of a perspective that is at the 
very limit of language and the world, and that somehow points toward the inexpressible 
and absolute value, can even get off the ground. 
On their view ( e.g., Cora Diamond, James Conant, and Warren Goldfarb) 
Wittgenstein is not trying to get us to appreciate some sort of aesthetico-ethical 
perspective on the world as a whole: any interpretation of the TLP that pretends to be 
more than the clarification of scientific claims broadly construed is just plain nonsense. 
Such a vi�w is pretty popular and chapter five is devoted to showing that it is mistaken. 
I argue against those Philosophers (above) who think that Wittgenstein' s 
'propositions' are, quite literally, nonsense, and that Wittgenstein himself was mainly 
trying to demonstrate that nothing is retained (no ultimate perspective on the world) by us 
once the ladder has been discarded. Their shared view of Wittgenstein's early work is 
variously termed "resolute" or "austere" in that they think that he was determined to 
demonstrate that nonsense is nonsense, pure and simple: there is no such thing as 
18 Printed in Diamond's The Realistic Spirit: 1 99 1  
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"substantial nonsense". Diamond and Conant argue that the saying/showing distinction 
itself - thought by many to be crucial in understanding Wittgenstein's Tractatus ( and 
indeed by Wittgenstein himself �n my view!) - is just another bit of nonsense that 
Wittgenstein wants to see "thrown away". Unlike these so-called "new Wittgensteinians, 
I do not regard the task Wittgenstein set himself as purely negative: Wittgenstein was not 
only concerned with drawing a limit to sense and nonsense. Once the ladder has been 
discarded, we are to take away with us an aesthetico-ethical stance or attitude toward the 
world, and this stance results from our seeing the world "as a limited whole". It is this 
affective aspect of his perspective that it is the ethical point of his work. 
There is an immediate problem that faces anyone interpreting Wittgenstein in an 
"austere" way. In order for their position even to get off the ground, they need to suppose 
that certain of Wittgenstein's statements are not straightforwardly nonsensical; Diamond 
and Conant ·distinguish the "frame'� - i.e., the preface, and the concluding remarks - as 
instructions on "how to read" the Tractatus. 19  "The frame" is not nonsense. I will show 
that helping themselves to some of the claims of the Tractatus as meaningful, while 
rejecting (most) of the others as disguised nonsense, is, in the end, arbitrary and 
eccentric. 20 Indeed, Diamond argues that Wittgenstein is trying to get the reader to 
engage with him in "imaginative nonsense" in order to ultimately reveal that nothing has 
been said, shown, or in any way pointed to, other than the negative claim that all of 
traditional philosophy is disguised nonsense. This is all that Wittgenstein intended by his 
19Diamond in her article "Ethics, Imagination, and Nonsense in The Tractatus, printed in New Wittgenstein 
(2000), and Conant in his paper "Kierkegaard, Wittgenstein, and Nonsense", printed in Pursuits of Reason; 
Essays in Honor of Stanley Cavel/ ( 1 993). 
20 P.M.S. Hacker makes a similar point in his "Was he trying to whistle it?"(New Wittgenstein: 2000). 
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pseudo-propositions according to Diamond and Conant. 
Their reading of early Wittgenstein makes much of what he says ironic or tongue 
in cheek: a view not at all in keeping with the gravity with which Wittgenstein 
approached ethics and life generally. What's dismissed is a serious effort to interpret 
Wittgenstein's early work as an ethical perspective on the world. This project consists, I 
shall argue, in putting forward a transcendental perspective on the world "as a limited 
whole". 
I contend that there is something that he is trying to show us, but it is something 
about which nothing can be said in descriptive language. And nothing can be said not 
because Wittgenstein is pointing us towards ineffable truths, but rather because his whole 
ethical project is geared towards getting us to view the world at the limit of what can be 
said. My position is that there is a perspective that Wittgenstein is leading us to in 
the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus. He is attempting to acquaint us with something 
ineffable; but it is not "truth" (for truth, if we have it, can be said).21  He is putting 
forward a perspective that is at the very limit of the world, and he attempts to bring us to 
this perspective through the use of a one-time metalanguage. 
The main benefit of my interpretation, even if it is ultimately wrong, is that it tries 
to give an account of both Wittgenstein's view of the logic of our language and his 
2 1  If the "new Wittgensteinians" are committed only to the conclusion that Wittgenstein does not leave us 
with any unutterable truths once we have thrown away the ladder, then I agree with them, but with this 
qualification: such truths are unutterable once we apply Wittgenstein's picture theory of language since 
nothing can be said that is not a picture of a possible fact. But this leaves open the possibility of truths in a 
higher order language; and they are ineffable according to the picture theory of language (I discuss this 
point in chapter five when 1 consider Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka's view that Wittgenstein's picture theory 
is an ineffability theory of semantics. At any rate, the "new Wittgensteinians" never consider that perhaps 
Wittgenstein's notion of seeing the world "aright" is more than simply seeing what we can and cannot do 
with descriptive language, and that it is the view of the world as a limited whole - the world seen under the 
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perspective on value ( and the mystical more generally) by taking seriously his claim that 
both are shown (4. 12 1  and 6.522, respectively) and that both are transcendental (6. 1 3  and 
6.42 1 ,  respectively). It also takes seriously his 'claim' that "Ethics and aesthetics are one" 
(6.42 1 ). 
Other approaches have been rather lopsided in one of two ways: either one adopts 
too positivistic an account, like the "New Wittgensteinians", whose views I critically 
examine in chapter five, which is really out of character with the spirit of Wittgenstein's 
work and cannot even account for the "sixes", or one attempts to make sense of his very 
oblique and cryptic comments on ethics and the meaning of life (what' s  really important 
for him) exclusively within the framework of his views on the relation between language 
and the world, ignoring what he has to 'say' about "ethics", and anything having to do 
with absolute value generally. 
The first alternative entails ignoring all the mystical elements of the Tractatus, 
what he has to say in certain passages of his early NoteBooks (] 914-1916) that made their 
way into his Tractatus, and his avowal that what is most important is what "cannot be 
said". 
The second alternative - what I will call the "logician's approach" (the Hintikkas, 
for example) - is respectable as far as it goes, but it does not go far enough in that it 
leaves the "Sixes" of Wittgenstein's Tractatus completely empty of all content. 
Furthermore, it requires extending the saying/showing distinction to the point of vacuity, 
and, in the end, still leaves us wondering how that which is outside of language and the 
aspect of eternity - which we are to take away with us once the ladder has been discarded Such a view of 
the world (a "world·view" quite literally) is not truth·valued at all. 
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world - what's "higher" (ethics, and value generally) - is made manifest in any way, 
even through a perspective on the world. This second alternative does provide a way of 
showing how ethical language is senseless, but it does so based on the more general 
theme that Wittgenstein regards all semantics as ineffable (Hintikka, Merrill and Jaakko: 
1986). On this view the ultimate ineffability of the language-world relation merely 
encompasses any purported 'claims' about the meaning or value of life and the world as a 
whole.22 Since ethical language or the language of value falls under the purview of the 
ineffability thesis of how language is connected to the world, the claim is that ethics, 
value, etc., are 'subjects' about which we must remain silent. While it is not incorrect to 
interpret Wittgenstein so conservatively, it cannot give any positive account of how the 
mystical shows itself in the world. It leaves us wondering: "What reasons do we have for 
thinking that the mystical manifests itself in the world at all?" ( 6.522) 
And so I hope to demonstrate how my interpretation of what Wittgenstein is 
attempting to get us to see is an improvement over those commentators who attribute 
some meaning to his mystical pronouncements, but fall short of finding anything close to 
a perspective that ties together his view of ethics and the logic of our language. Again, 
22For now, it is enough to note that it is only those attempts to try to say wherein the ultimate sense of the 
world or the meaning of life consists that he regards as hopeless On the other hand, there is no trouble 
grounding particular valuings in the world. For example, the intrinsic value of an object or an event for a 
particular individual can always be explained by reference to a person's own inclinations and desires, 
which will include relevant bits of the individual's history and psychological make-up. Moreover, even 
something as general as the value of having experiences can be accounted for in the world. Perhaps one 
values those· experiences that afford pleasure. Or, more likely, what we value are lived experiences, as I 
think Nozick makes clear with his example of the "experience machine" (Anarchy, State, and Utopia, 
pp.42-45: 1974). But we can always ask, again and again, why we should value anything? And the answers 
to this question will be something like "it is a brute fact about human beings that we value life" or "we are 
simply the kind of beings that find "living" life - having a range of experiences - to be worthwhile". The 
spade is turned here; and it turns in the bedrock of the world. Such valuing is not what Wittgenstein has in 
mind, for it can be articulated and ultimately reduced to facts about us. Absolute value and meaning, 
however, cannot be explained by appeal to the facts in the world, however brute they are. 
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the reason why so many have fallen short here is because they have failed to connect 
"showing" in the logic of any language to Wittgenstein' s admittedly peculiar sense of the 
ethical via seeing the world under the aspect of eternity. Attributing the transcendental 
perspective to Wittgenstein is an attempt to do just this. My interpretation is therefore an 
improvement over other philosophers who regard Wittgenstein's saying/showing 
distinction as key to understanding his theory about how the logic of our language 
connects to the world, and who attempt to wrest some meaning from his mystical 
pronouncements, but who, relying so heavily on logic, language, and its relation to the 
world, ultimately fail to capture the real spirit of Wittgenstein's early work. 
Wittgenstein' s ultimate vision in the Tractatus is to show us that "seeing the 
world aright" (6.54) is very closely tied to willing it in the right way. (I will explain what 
I mean by "right willing" in chapter three.)23 Put another way, when we see the world in 
the right way we are led to take up the right attitude toward the world. This is yet another 
way of saying that the transcendental perspective has two aspects: a kind of pure 
objectivity or seeing the world under the aspect of eternity and an affective aspect - a 
sensing or "feeling the world as a limited whole" ( 6.45). And for Wittgenstein the right 
perspective on language and the world is absolutely essential in getting us to adopt the 
23 My interpretation of Wittgenstein's perspective as will-less is rather paradoxical. To anticipate a problem 
that I deal with fully in chapter three, let me say that on my view Wittgenstein's perspective is, in part, 
aimed at getting us to want in the right way. He seems to be committed to a cessation of wil1ing in the 
world, will that is attached to some object or fact in the world. In this sense his transcendental perspective 
is will-less. However, he also, at least on my view, is trying to instill in us an attitude toward the world as a 
whole. This requires will, but it is will directed at the whole world, not some part of it. Thus, with respect 
to this or that aspect of the world or some fact in the world, Wittgenstein's  perspective is will-less, but 
insofar as he is trying to bring about a particular attitude in us toward the world as a whole, will is required. 
Finally, there is a sense in which willing can never vanish, for to attempt to cease willing or to try to be free 
of desire, requires will. 
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right ( ethically speaking) attitude toward the world. Thus, one might say that seeing and 
feeling the world in the right way are two sides of the same coin for Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein's theory of just how language is related or connected to the world is 
at the same time the vehicle by which he expresses his mystical outlook on, if you like, 
what is "higher" ( 6.42). As he says, his model theory of language "draws" a "limit . . .  to 
the expression of thought . . .  in language" and "what lies on the other side of the limit will 
be simply nonsense " (TLP; p 27, my emphasis). 
Notice that the last sentence is ambiguous: it can be given either a positivist or 
"new Wittgensteinian" (we will see that there's not much difference between the two) 
spin or it can be given a more Kantian (via Schopenhauer) interpretation. I think that the 
latter is more in keeping with the spirit of Wittgenstein, in both his work and his life. 
Notice Wittgenstein writes that "what lies on the other side of language will be simply 
nonsense", and not, more resolutely or austerely, that "nothing lies on the other side" or 
"there is nothing that lies on the other side" of language. One would think that a thinker 
as fastidious as Wittgenstein would have made it clear that there simply is nothing about 
which nothing can be said. But instead we have the suggestion that "that which lies" on 
the other side of language cannot be expressed through language. 
It is this more natural - albeit far more mysterious - reading that is ignored by the 
positivists and the new Wittgensteinians. And if we take Wittgenstein to mean what I 
think he means then his entire project looks more like an attempt to draw the limit of 
language in order to make room for Das Mystische. Again and again we will see that 
there is far more evidence, from Wittgenstein's own mouth, from those who knew him 
best (Engelmann), from pre-Cambridge intellectual influences (especially Kraus), and 
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from an examination of all that is quintessentially Viennese in him, that he is far closer to 
Schopenhauer than he is to Schlick or Carnap. In his attempt to show that the most 
significant features of life and world are those about which we must remain silent, 
Wittgenstein has been seriously misinterpreted. I am sure that the following aphorism 
from Kraus's Beim Wort Genommen ( 1 955) would have resonated with Wittgenstein: "It 
is better not to express what one does mean than to express what one does not mean" 
(p. 1 2 1 ). The logical positivists and the new Wittgensteinians have taken Wittgenstein to 
"express" what he "does not mean", instead of leaving what he was trying to show us as 
both vital and inexpressible. 
Now whether Wittgenstein would have approved of my calling his ultimate 
perspective on the logic of our language and value a "transcendental perspective"24, 
likening his use of language in the "twos" and "threes" to a meta-language, and 
suggesting furth�r that the use he makes of language in his veiled references to ethics, 
value and Das Mystische is similar to the directive use of language in aesthetics I cannot 
say-he probably wouldn't have liked it. (He might j ust hate it!) In any event, the really 
substantive part of this thesis is to make perspicuous such a perspective. And I cannot 
help believing that such a perspective best expresses, in so far as anything at all can be 
'expressed' here, Wittgenstein's ultimate stance once the rungs of the ladder have been 
discarded. 
24 I have already remarked (see p. 2) that Wittgenstein considered both logic and ethics to be 
"transcendental" (6. 1 3  and 6.42 1 ,  respectively). So perhaps Wittgenstein wouldn't have thought that I am 
that far off the mark. 
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Let us now attempt to discover where Wittgenstein first got his idea that value is 
something that can only be shown, and not said, and that value demands silence. He most 
certainly did not derive such ideas from Frege or Russell. 
From Frege and Russell he got the tools to demarcate the line between sense and 
nonsense and lighted on a method to forever ( so he thought) draw a line between factual 
language and everything higher. But for the initial insights into silence, showing, and the 
inexpressible we need to tum to Karl Kraus and Leo Tolstoy. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Silence, Showing, and Value; 
The Influence of Karl Kraus 
and Leo Tolstoy 
Wittgenstein' s  Tractatus is both an enigmatic and bold treatise on the limits of the 
expression of thought as well as being, on my view, (an even more enigmatic) expression 
of an ethical outlook with respect to the world.25 It is enigmatic because the reader has to 
fill in the arguments for himself. In fact, 'arguments' is too generous; the claims made in 
it are more like oracular pronouncements than anything resembling reasoned positions. 
This is especially true when it comes to anything having to do with value or, as 
Wittgenstein writes, with what is "higher'' (i.e., ethics, aesthetics, value, the meaning of 
life, God, and Logic-although he does ' say' a good bit about the latter). The work is 
audacious because in it Wittgenstein takes himself to have shown, once and for all, that 
"the problems (of philosophy) have in essentials been solved" (preface, p 29). 
He believes that his own theory of how language "pictures" the world provides 
the solution by drawing the boundary between sense and non-sense. Pre-Tractatus 
metaphysicians were really producers of problems and confusions since they would try to 
articulate views (whether ethical, religious, or philosophical) that were quite beyond the 
bounds of sense or meaning, but not because such claims transgressed our knowledge, 
but rather because they sinned against the logic of our (any) representational language. It 
25 C.K. Ogden's translation of the Tractatus is considered to be the most accurate. Indeed, Wittgenstein, 
Ramsey, and Moore all helped him with it. In addition, it has the German text on the left, so that the 
English can be checked against it. Finally, I like the fact that Ogden renders ''unsinnig" as "senseless", and 
not as "nonsense". The importance of this will be seen later, when I critically evaluate Diamond's (and 
other's) "austere" interpretation of the Tractatus. For these reasons I shall pri�arily use the Ogden text. 
However, the Pears and McGuiness translation is also excellent and I will occasionally use it as well. 
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is no wonder Wittgenstein is referred to as a "Kantian with a vengeance. " 'Claims' that 
do not fall under Wittgenstein's model theory of language are pseudo-propositions : this 
includes propositions of logic, ethics and aesthetics (and value generally), as well as the 
propositions of the Tractatus that talk about these 'subjects' . For Wittgenstein, the really 
important areas are those that fall under the "mystical" - under what cannot be said, but 
only shown. His letter to von Fricker (October 1919) makes abundantly clear the two 
main points of his TLP: 
. . .  My work consists of two parts: the one presented here plus all that I have not 
written. And it is precisely this second part that is the important one. My book 
draws limits to the sphere of the ethical from the inside as it were, and I am 
convinced that this is the ONLY rigorous way of drawing those limits. In short I 
believe that where many others today are just gassing, I have managed in my 
book to put everything firmly into place by being silent about it . . .  (LLW, pp. 143-
4, my emphasis). 
No doubt these comments and Wittgenstein's recommendation to Von Fricker to 
first read the preface and conclusion of the Tractatus made everything clear to the editor ! 
At the very least we have Wittgenstein's testimonial that the importance of the work lies 
in what cannot be said. And what cannot be said ( described is better) is anything having 
to do with value and the very means by which Wittgenstein tries to get us to see the world 
"rightly" (6.54); that is, the very 'propositions' of the Tractatus itself are - on his own 
theory - not genuine propositions. Such 'propositions' do, however, show us something 
about the nature of the language-world connection and what it is to take an aesthetico­
ethical view of the world. 
A key point here is to appreciate that Wittgenstein' s propositions reveal or 
"show" what they do in virtue of what they try to say. P.M.S. Hacker is right when he 
says: "The Tractatus does not show what it is to make sense - it tries to say what it is 
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(namely to agree and disagree with the possibilities of the obtaining and non-obtaining of 
states of affairs: TLP 4.2). And since, according to the Tractatus, one cannot say what 
cannot be other than it is, the endeavour to spell out the essential nature of sense 
inevitably transgresses the bounds of sense" ("Wittgenstein, Carnap and the New 
American Wittgensteinians", p. 1 ). Ethics, aesthetics, and philosophy itself (including the 
very claims made by the author of the TLP) are simply areas about which nothing can be 
said, and Wittgenstein's  propositions reveal that nothing can be said here by 'saying' 
what it means for a proposition to make sense. On my view Wittgenstein's  propositions 
are higher order remarks that say a great deal. Wittgenstein's propositions, then, are not 
pure nonsense. He is able to do much with them. But I anticipate myself here. 
My thesis is that Wittgenstein' s early work, by drawing a limit to what can be 
said, reveals that the "right" way to view the world, both logically and ethically, is from a 
transcendental perspective. The topic of this work is precisely what this appreciative view 
or stance is and how he arrives at it. 
Avoiding Missing the Forest for the Trees (specifically the branches of logic and 
math): The Importance of Pre-Tractatus Influences 
Wittgenstein's  "picture" (or "model") theory of how language reaches out to the 
world is fairly intuitive (even if the details are not). According to Wittgenstein, in order 
for language to be meaningful it must represent, model, or "picture" reality: "A picture is 
a model of reality" (2. 1 2); "A picture depicts reality by representing a possibility of 
existence and non-existence of states of affairs" (2.20 1  ); and, "a proposition states 
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something only insofar as it is a picture" (4.04). What we can glean from these 
pronouncements is that meaningful propositions are pictures of possible facts. 
Wittgenstein is talking only about descriptive language, and whatever can be described 
could be other than it is. What's pictured, then, is a contingent fact and is thus either true 
or false (4.023). Thus, all meaningful statements are bivalent. 
Finally, a meaningful statement or proposition must represent a possible state of 
affairs. This permits Wittgenstein to accommodate meaningful false propositions. A 
statement need not be true in order for it to be a picture of reality: The picture can be 
right or wrong, true or false, and yet still be a "model of reality" (2.12). What is excluded 
from counting as meaningful language is the language of ethics and value generally 
(6.42), as well as the propositions of the TLP (the significance of these 'propositions' is 
discussed in chapters two and four). Thus, the propositions of the Tractatus and ethical 
propositions are nonsense (" . .  . it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics" 6.42) 
because such propositions cannot picture a possible state of affairs. 26 
We can straightaway see that Wittgenstein's "model theory" of representational or 
descriptive language goes some way in formally explaining why he thinks that some 
things cannot be said- they cannot be pictured. However, his model theory of language 
26 This needs some clarification. To say that normative claims cannot be expressed by propositions means 
that when we utter a normative claim the resulting proposition cannot be a picture of the way the world is 
or the way it might be, and thus is not, on Wittgenstein's view, a proposition at all. This does not imply, 
however, that people cannot attach a sense to our words. This is a psychological matter and not a ]ogical 
one. For example, in c]aiming that "torturing puppies for fun is wrong", I have not expressed a proposition 
because no fact is depicted (according to Wittgenstein). But this does not mean that no sense at all can be 
attached to my utterance. A utilitarian will take the claim in one way, an emotivist another way. But for all 
that, no proposition has been expressed. Wittgenstein would reject any such normative 'theory' as telling us 
what ethics comes to. 
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does not explain the smattering of cryptic remarks he does make about those areas that 
cannot be touched by his critical philosophy.27 As Yanik and Toulmin ( 1 973) aptly note: 
After some seventy pages apparently devoted to nothing but logic, theory of 
language and the philosophy of mathematics or natural science, we are suddenly 
faced by five concluding pages (propositions 6.4 on) in which our heads are 
wrenched around and we are faced with a string of dogmatic theses about 
solipsism, death and 'the sense of the world' which 'must lie outside the world. '  
(Wittgenstein 's Vienna, p. 23) 
Thus, to begin with the Tractatus leaves more than an air of mystery as to why 
Wittgenstein thinks there is anything to be gained by discovering that what is really 
important is beyond sense, and that his ensuing silence is meant to put his ethical point in 
sharp relief. Indeed, it is too easy to dismiss the mystical bits of the Tractatus as poetic 
fluff (witness logical positivism), thereby dismissing all that Wittgenstein thought to be 
really important as trivial, insignificant, and even vacuous. To be sure, it is enough on the 
picture theory of meaning to respond to those who try to say something about the 
meaning of religion or ethics with the admonishment that they have failed to "give sense" 
to the words they use (6.53). But a reproach such as this is too negative in that it leaves 
one wondering what the point of all of Wittgenstein's strained and torturous gesturing 
amounts to. It leaves one puzzled as to why Wittgenstein's road to ultimate silence is so 
elaborate. Most importantly, with such a simple silence, how can we ever get at the 
ethical point of the Tractatus? Thus, it is absolutely essential to say a great deal about 
Wittgenstein's strained gesturing if we are ever to see what he is attempting to show us. 
27 "Model" theory is better than ''picture" theory for the following reason. According to Wittgenstein, he 
acquired the idea of how language connects with the world when he read about a court case in Paris 
concerning a car accident. Small models of cars and people were used to show the relative positions of the 
cars and the people that were involved in the accident. "Model'', unlike "picture", suggests that language is 
projected onto three-dimensional situations in the world, whereas the latter tenn intimates a flat two-
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The gestures and what they reveal is the really important part of Wittgenstein's early 
work. Stressing the difference between Wittgenstein and the logical positivists, 
Engelmann aptly notes: 
Positivism holds -and this is its essence -that what we can speak about is all that 
matters in life. Whereas Wittgenstein passionately believes that all that really 
matters in human life is precisely what, in his view, we must be silent about. 
When he nevertheless takes immense pains to delimit the unimportant, it is not the 
coastline of that island which he is bent on surveying with such meticulous 
accuracy, but the boundary of the ocean (LL W, p. 97). 
It is the mystical seas that we must attempt to navigate if we are to do justice to 
his work. And the best way to do this is to closely follow Wittgenstein's voyage. If we 
begin with the Tractatus we will not see the need to understand why Wittgenstein thought 
that anything of any importance is shown by our need to try to say what cannot be said. 
And we can get a better understanding of how showing is Wittgenstein's answer to what 
cannot be said by investigating the tremendous influence of Kraus, and, to a lesser extent, 
Leo Tolstoy. Moreover, we must keep in mind that Wittgenstein regarded the urge to say 
what cannot be said as a tendency in human beings that is very important (this is clear in 
his LE). 
That Wittgenstein thought that our tendency to attempt to say what can't be said is 
important can be seen in his remarks about solipsism in his TLP and in his Lecture on 
Ethics. At 5.62 Wittgenstein writes that what "solipsism means is quite correct, only it 
cannot be said, but it shows itself'. This suggests that Wittgenstein thought that some 
nonsense leads to valuable insights without our being able to directly state what those 
insights are. For example, the notion that the only thing that exists is my mind and the 
dimensional inert image. Moreover, the German "Bildung" can be rendered as either ''picture" or "model". 
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contents of my mind is shown in the sense that the world is through and through not only 
representation - "the world is the totality of facts, not things" ( I ), and it is the proposition 
or thought that represents facts - but my representation, and thus "my world" (5.62). 
Solipsism, then, gives us the world as pictured. 28 And it is clear from his LE that he 
thinks our attempts to get at the essence of ethics is really an attempt ''to go beyond the 
world and that is to say beyond significant language", and that he "respects deeply such a 
"tendency" and "would not for [his] life ridicule it" (p. 296). 
Two points are in order here: first, it is clear that Wittgenstein thinks that 
something important is achieved in trying to say what cannot be said; and, second, the 
nonsense that results from our trying to articulate the very thing that is ethics shows us 
that the nature of value or the meaning of life cannot be put into words at all. And he 
intimates that this is as it should be: ''I see now that these nonsensical expressions [ e.g., 
the feeling of being absolutely safe or wondering at the very existence of the world] were 
not nonsensical because I had not yet found the correct expressions, but that their 
nonsensicality was their very essence" (Ibid, p. 296). And so it is at least apparent that he 
So "model" seems best. 
28 What Wittgenstein thought solipsism "shows" goes beyond the scope of my project, but I should like to 
draw the readers' attention to a passage that suggests that Wittgenstein thought that solipsism leads 'us' to 
the world as pictured or represented when he says . . .  "Solipsism, strictly carried out coincides with pure 
realism. The I in solipsism shrinks to an extensionless point and there remains the reality co-ordinated with 
it" (5.64). Here we see that the "I" about which Wittgenstein speaks or rather doesn't speak, is, on some 
understandings of solipsism, a receptacle for all my thoughts, disappears on Wittgenstein's view. It 
vanishes with the world as pictured, since it cannot be characterized, represented, or pictured at all. It just 
disappears, and is like Schopenhauer's "clear mirror of the world" (WWR, Vol. 1 ,  p. 1 52). I should like to 
investigate Wittgenstein's remarks about what his brand of"pure realism" amounts to. I suspect that it is 
fairly close to Schopenhauer's transcendental idealism. But this is a future project. 
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does think that some very profound things can be meant or pointed to or in some sense 
"shown" by our attempting to say what cannot be said. 29 
Without understanding the importance of trying to say what cannot be said it is 
difficult to understand and appreciate why Wittgenstein thinks th�t in our attempt to point 
beyond language we are pointing to something rather than nothing. It is no wonder that 
the logical positivists thought that the reason why there is nothing to say is because there 
is nothing there to say anything about. But this is not Wittgenstein's view. Rather, 
Wittgenstein's position is that the limits of our language show us something that cannot 
be articulated. And all of what he writes in the TLP is designed primarily to elucidate th.is 
important insight. All of this is missed if one begins with the Tractatus. 
Indeed, Janik and Toulmin advise us to investigate "the issues which occupied the 
center of (Wittgenstein's) mind by looking, rather, at the ideas and writers he was already 
familiar with, before he ever turned to Frege for help and advice" (P. 28). By taking such 
a tack we will be better equipped to understand the Tractatus as having primarily an 
29 Indeed, many of the valuable insights that Wittgenstein makes in his later philosophy (in the BB and Pl, 
for example) are the result of his showing us that what we are tempted to say in many cases - at least when 
doing philosophy - is wrongheaded. But in order to appreciate what Wittgenstein is doing in his later work 
we must.first be tempted to investigate certain problems in the wrong way (as Wittgenstein himself thought 
he had done in his Tractatus). We cannot fully understand or appreciate why Wittgenstein claims that 
description must replace conceptual analysis without first seeing that conceptual analysis leads to a 
disconnection between language and the world: "language goes on holiday." For example, unless we are 
first tempted to provide an analysis of what it means to be in pain, we cannot see the value of describing the 
various contexts in which we say "p is in pain". Wittgenstein was himself aware that people would read 
him as denying that pain is an inner state, and even Ryle's  "logical behaviorism" is an attempt to articulate 
Wittgenstein's insights about what it means to be in pain or some other mental state in terms of behavioral 
dispositions, and thus into a philosophical theory of mind. The idea that pain is an inner process or event 
that is in need of a public criterion or that pain behavior is more often than not the expression of an inner 
state is Wittgenstein's way of saying that we cannot talk about pain, as some inner, occult state, 
independent of the expression of that state. So Wittgenstein is neither a Cartesian nor a logical behaviorist. 
The point of this rather long digression is that Wittgenstein' s  insights here cannot be grasped without our 
first being moved by a philosophical urge to provide a theory of, in this case, mind and mental states or 
processes. The result of this urge is, in the end, confusion and nonsense, according to Wittgenstein. But it is 
necessary to travel down that road. And this in itself is a valuable insight. 
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ethical point. There is simply no way to make sense of this reading if we begin and end 
with him as an admittedly strange Cambridge philosopher of language and logic. This 
point is made again and again in Wittgenstein 's Vienna. And it is a point that is succinctly 
made by his friend Paul Engelmann, who knew Wittgenstein as well as anyone could 
know the man: " . . .  We do not understand Wittgenstein unless we realize that it was 
philosophy that mattered to him and not logic, which merely happened to be the only 
suitable tool for elaborating his world picture"30 (LLW, p. 96, my emphasis). 
The fact that Engelmann reads the Tractatus as "elaborating a world picture" is 
yet more evidence that Wittgenstein is trying to get us to appreciate a Weltanschaung and 
not simply and only drawing the line between sense and nonsense. We want to discover 
not only why Wittgenstein thought that drawing the line between sense and nonsense 
(and between what can be said and what can only be shown) makes his work an "ethical 
deed", but what significance the smattering of cryptic remarks on ethics and value is 
supposed to have. What is the point of these remarks? Wittgenstein thought that through 
his work he could satisfy what Engelmann calls the "eternal metaphysical urge" by 
showing us that what we want to say cannot be said (Ibid, p.96). In a letter to Engelmann, 
thanking him for the poem by Uhland3 1 , Wittgenstein writes: "The poem by Uhland is 
really magnificent. And this is how it is: if only you do not try to utter what is unutterable 
30 Here I think Engelmann exaggerates slightly, for the logic of language was a central concern of 
Wittgenstein's. For Wittgenstein, coming to see the nature of the logic of our language and its relation to 
the world is what constitutes a worldview (and one that involves an aesthetico-ethical perspective as well). 
But is it wrong to say that Wittgenstein used logic (or the logic of language) simply as a tool to elaborate 
this world-view. The logic of any language is constitutive of such a perspective. 31 Monk summarizes Uhland's poem nicely: "['Count Eberhard's Hawthorn' recounts] the story of a soldier 
who, while on crusade, cuts a spray from a hawthorn bush; when he returns home he plants the sprig in his 
grounds, and in old age he sits beneath the shade of the fully grown hawthorn tree, which serves as a 
poignant reminder of his youth. The tale is told very simply, without any adornment and without drawing 
any moral" ( Wittgenstein: The Duty of Genius: 1990). 
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then nothing gets lost. But the unutterable will be - unutterably - contained in what has 
been uttered" (LLW, p.83). So my job is really to discover, if l can, what is "unutterably 
contained" in the TLP. 
Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin: The Tractatus as an "Ethical Deed" 
Allan Janik and Stephen Toulmin formed an alliance in their masterful work, 
Wittgenstein 's Vienna ( 1 973). In it they paint a picture that is very different from the 
(then) standard view of the author of the Tractatus as a rather eccentric Viennese logician 
whose main (only ! )  influences were Frege and Russell, and whose chief concern was to 
articulate the meaning of the propositions of logic and demonstrate how the logic of any. 
language is related to the world. This is indeed a very lopsided view. 
The notion that Wittgenstein's early work was an "ethical deed" was either 
completely missed or simply ignored by most thinkers until the publication of 
Wittgenstein 's Vienna ( 1 973). Wittgenstein was seen as being chiefly concerned with 
how language manages to represent states of affairs or situations in the world. The idea 
that the main purpose of his book was to provide a critique of the logic of any language in 
order to forever stop the mangling of ethics, aesthetics, and value generally, by showing 
that any purported analysis of such 'subjects' could only result in nonsense, was missed 
by most thinkers. Although this is less true of Russell , it is certainly true of Frege32, the 
logical positivists, and many others. It wasn't until Paul Engelmann published his Letters 
32 Frege, according to Wittgenstein in one of his letters to Russell, did not "understand a word" of the 
Tractatus (Ludwig Wittgenstein; Cambridge Letters: von Wright: 1 995). 
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From L. W with a Memoir ( 1 967) that both Janik and Toulmin got some hard evidence 
that Wittgenstein's philosophical problems concerned cultural and philosophical issues in 
Vienna, as much as they did Russell and Frege's concerns with logicism. Janik, in 
Chapter One of his monograph Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger ( 1985) writes that 
it was Engelmanm who "convinced us more than ever that our alternative Wittgenstein 
was the Wittgenstein that Paul Engelmann actually knew, a figure who was as 
passionately involved in Hertz's33 mechanics as much as he was Tolstoian religion" (p 
1 9). Janik and Toulmin write: 
The letters to Engelmann gave us . . .  sufficient data to: 1 )  confirm our views about 
Wittgenstein's general philosophical preoccupations and their link with his 
personal beliefs and attitudes; 2) establish the centrality of Hertz's Bildtheorie for 
the understanding of the Tractatus beyond question; and 3) provide us with 
information about just which aspects of Viennese culture we ought to consider in 
order to set Wittgenstein into the proper Milieu, i .e. he directed our attention to 
Karl Kraus. After Engelmann's memoir, Kraus clearly had to be the focal point 
for any study which would linkfin de siecle Vienna to Wittgenstein's concern for 
language and ethics in the Tractatus (p 19). 
Chapter One of Janik's Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger is in fact both an 
explanation of how he and Toulmin came to write Wittgenstein 's Vienna, as well as a 
summary of that groundbreaking work: 
33 We do know that Wittgenstein was greatly impressed by the work of H. Hertz, and that Wittgenstein was 
planning on studying with Boltzmann, Hertz's student, before Boltzmann killed himself in 1 906 (see 
Hacker's  Insight and Illusion ( 1 972) here, pp. 2-5). In The Principles of Mechanics (Translated by D.E. 
Jones and J.T. Walley; Macmillan, London, 1 899), Hertz explains that the logical structure of a scientific 
theory is always to picture reality: ''the necessary consequents of the images in thought are always the 
images of the necessary consequents in the nature of the things pictured" (Intro., p. 1). Also, Hertz's 
method of reducing the number of terms in order to give an account of how any scientific theory should be 
set up greatly influenced Wittgenstein as well. The emphasis is on reducing conceptual confusions by 
showing that many of the problems scientists set for themselves are, as Hacker says, "pseudo-problems": 
"Hertz intended to eliminate the concept of force from mechanics as anything other than an abbreviating 
convenience. The only primitive notions he employed were space, time, and mass. By displaying the 
logical structure of the theory, he dispelled the illusion that physicists had not yet been able to discover the 
true nature of force" (Insight and Illusion, p. 4). The parallel to Wittgenstein's method of showing us that 
many philosophical problems are conceptual confusions and thus "pseudo-problems" is striking. 
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Our central thesis is presented in Chapter Six, "The Tractatus Reconsidered: An 
Ethical Deed". That chapter aims at establishing the connection between 
Wittgenstein, the committed Viennese intellectual, and Wittgenstein, the 
philosopher who wrote the Tractatus. What precedes, Chapters Two to Five, 
consists of continually narrowing foci which helped to establish that there was 
indeed a Viennese context in which writing a book about what could only be 
shown and not said could be construed as an ethical deed (p 2 1 ,  my emphasis). 
Much of my first chapter, then, is an analysis of the work of Karl Kraus with a 
view to understanding what it means to see value as something that is shown and that the 
apprehension of it demands silence. It is hard - almost impossible - to see how the so­
called 'doctrine' of showing in the TLP is connected to value in anything like a positive 
way. Ultimately, I want to see if I can unify Wittgenstein's saying and showing theme in 
both logic and ethics. Wittgenstein certainly thought that both logic and Ethics (including 
value, aesthetics, and the Meaning of life) were shown. Did he think that they were both 
shown in the same way or are they just lumped in the same category by dint of their 
unsayability? That is, are there very particular ways in which each is shown or are both 
logic and ethics shown only in the general sense that neither can be said? If they are 
shown in particular ways, how different are the ways in which each is shown? Such 
questions are not, to my mind, resolved by the work of Janik and Toulmin. 
I begin with Karl Kraus for the following reasons. First, Kraus continually tried to 
keep separate factual discourse from anything having to do with value ( ethics, aesthetics, 
etc.). Second, it was Kraus who made so much of the idea that the best way to make an 
ethical point was to remain silent. Finally, Kraus tried to live his life in such a way that 
his insides matched his outsides. He tried to live as he wrote: simply and honestly, 
without pretense or hypocrisy. In this respect, he was a living example for Wittgenstein 
as well as for many other Viennese intellectuals and artists. 
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Wittgenstein and Karl Kraus 
The influence of Karl Kraus on the early Wittgenstein is seen in both the form 
(aphoristic and spartan) and the content (separating value from facts) of the Tractatus. 
Indeed, Janik and Toulmin write: "the central notion that unifies the life and work of Karl 
Kraus is . . .  the 'creative separation' of the two spheres of factual discourse and literary 
artistry" (pp. 87-88). The same can be said of Wittgenstein's  approach to fact and value, 
only the separation is an absolute separation of factual discourse from both the logic of 
any descriptive language and value. At any rate, given that Wittgenstein' s early work was 
read, at least by those who knew him best, as an "ethical deed", we can get a better 
understanding and appreciation of just what this means by examining the work of 
Vienna's foremost critic of culture, character, and language (most especially language). 
J. P. Stern has written of Kraus's  Die Fackel ("The Torch"), the journal that the 
latter wielded with such consummate skill against all forms of moral hypocrisy that "to 
delimit the intellectual region in which to place the journal, one would have to think 
of . . .  the early Wittgenstein' s equation of 'language' and 'world. '"34 And in his work, 
Lichtenberg: A Doctrine of Scattered Occasions, Stem suggests: 
In appraising the intellectual link which exists between Karl Kraus and 
Wittgenstein it would be necessary to consider . . .  their determination to build, 
each from his own vision of language, a fortress that should stand inviolate 
against the corruption of words and morals all around them (pp. 1 63 - 164). 
34 "Karl Kraus's Vision of Language", Modern Language Review, LXI, Vol. 73, p. 69: 1 966 
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Stem leaves this suggestive comment for others to pursue. Stem is right in his 
claim that both Wittgenstein and Kraus consider the corruption of language as a 
corruption of morality. But how does this happen? What is the connection between messy 
language and a messy moral character? 
For Wittgenstein the real problem is thinking that we can express "what is higher" 
in descriptive language. Even Kraus, as we shall see shortly, thinks that we err when we 
try to say, what, through our silent actions, we show. Indeed, both thinkers hold that 
when anything ofreal value is taken as a fact or is thought of as some state of affairs to 
which facts are adduced, the spoiling of language and value has begun. For Kraus, the 
corruption of language is seen more in the hypocrisy of what men say over and against 
what they do. The hypocrisy goes unnoticed, Kraus thinks, because people no longer see 
the essential distinction between the language of facts and commerce, and everything 
trivial, on the one hand, and the world of art, morality, and value more generally, on the 
other hand. 
Die Fackel was far more than a satirical journal, but was instead an uncommon 
· tool, sharpened to a razor's  edge in the hands of Karl Kraus, with which he tried to affect 
change in the world. Karl Kraus, like Wittgenstein, was warning people who would 
listen. And the way he warned them was through his satire, which was always a critique 
of language. Indeed, Harry Zohn points out that Wittgenstein himself, in his TLP, "comes 
to the conclusion that all philosophy is a critique of language" (Karl Kraus: 1 97 1 ,  p. 62). 
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With some misgivings, we can conclude that Wittgenstein most likely regarded Kraus as 
a kindred spirit. 35 
For Kraus, as for Wittgenstein, a person' s  character was exhibited by his use of 
language. For Wittgenstein, ornament of any kind, especially in philosophy, was taken as 
a sign of, at best, muddle-headedness and, at worst, rottenness. Kraus was also concerned 
with preventing the egregious error of confusing factual language with the expression of 
art, "fantasy", and value generally. Kraus thought it a great mistake to mix and conflate 
the language of facts with the expression of value or anything higher. This confusion is 
seen, Kraus thinks, in the smallest details of a culture: 
Adolf Loos [a Viennese Architect] and I - he literally and I grammatically - have 
done nothing more than show that there is a distinction between an um and a 
chamber pot and that it is this distinction above all that provides culture with 
elbow room. The others, those who fail to make this distinction, are divided into 
those who use the um as a chamber pot and those who use the chamber pot as um 
(Kraus, Werke, Vol. III, p. 34 1 ). 
Janik and Toulmin note that "Kraus here expresses his deep conviction that the sphere of 
values is altogether distinct from the sphere of facts" (Wittgenstein 's Vienna, p. 89). 
The distinction between a chamber pot and an um was, undoubtedly, carefully chosen by 
Kraus. Kraus most likely chose the distinction between the urn and the chamber pot to 
prevent people from fouling objects de art. 36 
35 It is far more likely, however, that Wittgenstein is thinking about Russell's logical critique of language 
than Kraus's  idea that a critique of language is also an ethical deed (though I think that Wittgenstein was 
committed to something like this). For in the Tractatus at 4.003 1 Wittgenstein says "all of philosophy is a 
critique of language (though not in Mauther' s sense)". And all of this is said in the context of applauding 
Russell for being the first to show that "language disguises thought" ( 4.002). Still, I believe that 
Wittgenstein is committed to something very close to Kraus's  idea that a critique of language results in the 
proper perspective on the world. But perhaps this is only suggested in Wittgenstein's work and can only 
come at the end of the Tractatus. 
36 The um and the chamber pot are just symbols for Kraus. Throughout his work and life he was concerned 
with keeping art (including literature, architecture, painting, sculpture), ethics, and value more generally, 
free from muddy factual discourse. We will see why shortly. 
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Presumably, then, the cultural "elbow room" that Kraus has in mind requires, at 
the very least, keeping art (and value generally) separate from factual discourse: refrain 
from befouling culture and value with factual knowledge. Kraus uses language as � 
means and method of trying to make people aware of such a distinction: 
Kraus' s insistence that he is trying to effect, by a polemic analysis of grammar 
and language, the same 'creative separation' between the sphere of reason (or 
fact) and that of fantasy (or value) as Adolf Loos was doing in his critique of 
bourgeois Viennese taste, by distinguishing merely functional artifacts from 
genuine objects of art, should be taken quite literally (Ibid, p.89). 
Wittgenstein's overriding aim in his Tractatus is to keep separate the sphere of 
facts from the sphere of value ( and all that is "higher"). Wittgenstein, unlike Kraus, 
attempts to do so once and for all, by drawing the limits of language "from the inside", 
and thus showing that anything we try to say about value cannot have any factual 
meaning ( or cognitive content) or that anything that has factual sense cannot have 
absolute value. 37 Wittgenstein tries to accomplish this by drawing the distinction between 
what can be shown vs. what can be said. Indeed, his model theory of language is itself a 
theory that shows that all meaningful language must be a model or picture of some 
particular state of affairs in the world. His model theory captures the essence of the 
language of science. Thus, an analysis of the logic of descriptive language must come 
first in Wittgenstein's treatise; for it is the nature of descriptive language (the nature of 
the proposition) that shows that ethics and value cannot be represented at all. Kraus's use 
of language is limited to a critique of (then) contemporary Viennese culture only, 
whereas Wittgenstein has a formal method for demonstrating that nothing can be said 
37 However, value in a "relative" sense can be reduced to facts in the world. I discuss this sense of value in 
part (b) of chapter three. 
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about value. For Wittgenstein this project is a full stop, but for Kraus it must be an 
ongoing activity. What's clear, however, is that Wittgenstein is carrying out this Krausian 
project ( of keeping a "creative separation" between facts and value) by using philosophy 
(in a unique way), the area in which Wittgenstein excelled. 
1 97 1 ): 
In terms of personal character, Harry Zohn has written about Kraus (Karl Kraus : 
[He] tried to lead an exemplary life, a kind of "public life" that was intended to· be 
blameless, wholly consistent, and almost ascetic, a life that would serve the work 
he was trying to do and be entirely in keeping with it . . .  Karl Kraus' s life was his 
work and his writings constitute his biography. With rare courage and 
consistency, and in marked contrast to the "timelessness" of ivory-tower poets, 
Kraus made himself the measure of the unworthiness of his age, of his era' s moral 
bankruptcy. He strove to be a shining light of integrity in a morass of dubious 
morality, a beacon of genuineness in a sea of spuriousness (p. 1 8) . 
At the very least, Wittgenstein would have admired such a man. Indeed, Wittgenstein' s 
own character, whether or not he was emulating Kraus, is strikingly similar. Their moral 
perfectionism is evinced by their constant efforts to improve themselves, the 
identification of their work with their own moral character, their dislike of "ivory-tower" 
academe, and the earnestness with which both thinkers sought to stand out from what 
might be considered popular morality. On this last point, one need only think of the 
opinion held by Wittgenstein toward the superficiality and the irreverence of his fellow 
students at Cambridge. Wittgenstein wanted no part of the slick and clever "Disciples" in 
1 9 1 3, nor could he stomach the vogue Bloomsbury bunch. 
It seems to me that Ludwig Wittgenstein was no more emulating Karl Kraus than 
he was Adolf Loos, but rather that they were all grown in the same soil. Interestingly, von 
Wright notes that he and Wittgenstein discussed what Wright calls the "morphological" 
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or "physiognomic" similarities of thinkers; where any direct or indirect causal influence 
is irrelevant as far as our apprehending and appreciating such similarities. As a method in 
biography, Wittgenstein found such an approach "interesting" according to von Wright 
(Wittgenstein: A Life, 1 982, p. 2). In fact, they discussed it frequently. So whatever 
similarities we find between Kraus and Wittgenstein, we can at least be confident that 
Wittgenstein would not object to such a method. (But still it is likely that Wittgenstein 
was influenced by Kraus, just as Loos was). 
At any rate, turn of the century Vienna was filled with brilliant artists who used 
their respective crafts both as tools to criticize popular morality and art while at the same 
time trying their best to separate value (art, ethics, etc.) from facts. Indeed, the attack on 
popular morality and art, as well as the separation of value from facts, are two sides of 
the same coin. 
This is best illustrated by Loos' s architecture. Here form and function were really 
one. Loos saw Decorative cornices and baroque vaulted ceilings as de trop and wholly 
without value. Here the value of a building is evinced solely in its functionality. 
Everything unnecessary to form and function is left out. The baroque and the fanciful are 
separated from the value of the architecture. We can think of everything that is 
unnecessary to form as extraneous/acts that detract from the building's value. (Couldn't 
the same thing be said about the compressed and unadorned style if Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus?) The value in architecture is streamlined: all that is unnecessary to function is 
excised. This removal of the unnecessary, the inessential and the irrelevant is a very 
"Krausian" endeavor. Kraus, owing to the different medium that he worked in, separated 
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fact from value in a very different way than did Loos. Let us see how Kraus 
accomplished this task. 
The best evidence of Kraus' s consummate skill in separating fact from literary 
pretensions is his attack on the French "feuilleton", a style of journalism that blends 
factual reporting with literature. It is a journalistic style that Kraus thought well at home 
in France, but anathema to Vienna and the German language generally. Reporting and 
intellectual creativity are distinct types of literary skills according to Kraus. Harry Zohn 
aptly notes: "Kraus objects to the blending of intellectual with informational elements, to 
journalists brazenly encroaching on literature" (p. 54).38 This is exactly what the 
"feuilletonists" practice. Heinrich Heine, the German poet and feuilletonist responsible 
for bringing this form of journalism to Vienna, is credited with having "provided a great 
inheritance on which journalism has drawn to this day: its function as a dangerous 
intermediary between art and life and as a parasite on both" (ibid, p. 54). So what, 
ultimately, is the real danger of the feuilleton? Is it just that value, art, and intellectual 
creativity vitiate, good, accurate reporting? It is far more than this :  "False literary 
material is introduced into journalism, and emptiness and corruption are given a high 
gloss" (ibid, p. 55). Kraus thought that the feuilleton was dangerous to language and 
society. Why? 
38 Similarly, we can say of Wittgenstein that he did not like philosophers "encroaching" on ethics or value. 
Of course, ordinary people are less inclined to think that there can be a science of values, but philosophers 
needed a lesson here. The Tractatus is, in part, that lesson. 
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It appears that Kraus' s chief complaint against the feuilleton is that it creates a 
mode of expression, by combining journalism and art, which forbids an accurate 
appraisal of truth. Such a literary style dresses up the facts so fancifully that it is no 
longer clear what facts are being reported. Too much 'art' is infused into the reporting to 
say what has happened. The feuilleton, Zohn writes, "has led to a confusion of linguistic 
values. Everything is talked to death. If there is a streetcar accident in Vienna, they write 
atmospherically about the nature of streetcars, the nature of streetcar accidents, the nature 
of accidents in general, all viewed from the perspective 'What is man?"' (p. 54) 
The Austerity of Language and Ethics: Stop All the "Gassing"! 
In his epoch play entitled "The Last Days of Mankind" Kraus provides a synoptic 
and satirical view of the cultural climate of Vienna during the whole of WWI. There are 
about a thousand characters, most of whom represent the prevailing, and, according to 
Kraus, ridiculous view of moral progress in a time of complete horror. And Kraus's entire 
critique of tum of the century Vienna is accomplished by looking not at what men do, but 
what they say and how they say it. Max Spalter has written about this play that in it 
"Kraus carries through brilliantly his aim to make language the moral index of a dying 
way of life. A world literally talks its way to perdition" (Brecht 's Tradition : 1 967; p. 
149). Similarly, Wittgenstein's letter to Ficker expresses the idea that silence is the best 
way to get at what is really important: "where most people today are simply gassing, I 
have expressed what's most important by being silent about it" (Brenner Studien, Vol. I , 
p. 28). Kraus's play, like Wittgenstein's Tractatus, expresses the implicit idea that when 
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hot air and wind - "gassing" - is taken for something more, then all hope of discovering 
value and meaning in life is lost. This is why Kraus's characters are characterized as 
ta�king their "way to perdition". Both Kraus and Wittgenstein are telling us, Kraus 
indirectly through his noisy wind-making characters, Wittgenstein directly in the last line 
of his Tractatus, to shut up! Their message to us is simply that the best way to rediscover 
value and meaning in life is to see that nothing we can say about value and meaning can 
have any sense. 
Both Kraus and Wittgenstein regard simple and unadorned speech as the mark of 
a good mind and a good character. More precisely, both considered "gassing" as 
intellectually and morally reprehensible. Their shared position is nicely characterized by 
Jaakko Hintikka in his masterful little essay "What Does the Wittgensteinian 
Inexpressible Express" (The Harvard Review of Philosophy, Vol. XI: 2003 ). 
Wittgenstein's leading idea was the same as Karl Kraus's. For both of them, the 
test case of ethical authenticity was the authenticity of language. Here, for 
Wittgenstein, the inexpressible internal boundaries of language that exclude what 
cannot be said do not have only an intellectual significance. They also have an 
ethical significance. They mark the limits of honest, unaffected discourse (p. 1 6). 
Now in the context of Hintikka's work, the ethical silence is really just a result - a 
"corollary", as he says - of the inexpressibility of semantics. (Much more will be said of 
his work regarding language as the "universal medium" and the saying/showing 
distinction as fundamentally a theory used by Wittgenstein to demonstrate or explain his 
view of how the logic of our language connects with the world in chapter five). For 
Hintikka, both logic and ethics are inexpressible because they mark the "limits of 
language" (p. 1 6). And, according to Hintikka' s Wittgenstein, we have a moral duty not 
to transgress those limits. Hintikka asks: 
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Isn't the Tractatus at bottom nothing more than a sermon on the text, ' let what 
you say be simply "yes" and "no"; anything more than this comes from evil" 
(Mathew 5:37)? Isn't this biblical injunction echoed by Tractatus 4.023 : 'A 
proposition must determine the reality so that one only needs to say "yes" or 
"no"'?  (pp. 16- 1 7). 
I think that Hintikka is right here. He expresses very nicely the connection between 
intellectual and moral integrity in Wittgenstein's silence. 
Hintikka, ever the conservative logician, makes no attempt to say anything more 
than what logic calls for. He doesn't characterize the pregnant silence of Das Mystische 
as being any different from our futile attempt to say what both language and the world 
must have in common in order for the one to be able to mirror the other. Language as the 
universal medium entails the impossibility of articulating the ultimate connection 
between language and the world. Hence, on Hintikka' s view, the reason for 
Wittgenstein's silence concerning the mystical is no different in principle from the 
silence that's entailed by the view of language as the universal medium. And perhaps he 
is right in this. He thinks the "the semantical theory of the Tractatus serves ipso facto 
ethical purposes . . .  [and that] . . .  both (i .e. semantics and ethics) are inexpressible for the 
same reason" (p. 16). Both "mark the limits" of language. However, there is a problem 
with Hintikka' s interpretation of Wittgenstein's silence (which will be addressed in 
chapter four). For now it is enough to say that Hintikka has no way of explaining what 
Wittgenstein means when he says that "there is indeed the inexpressible . .  . it is the 
mystical" 6.522. His approach cannot give any positive account of how the mystical is 
"shown." Furthermore, Hintikka cannot account for Wittgenstein's ( admittedly bizarre) 
remarks about value and "seeing the world under the aspect of eternity". This last remark 
seems to require some explanation. I think that more sense can be given to Wittgenstein's 
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aesthetico-ethical attitude. On my view, this perspective is the ultimate expression of 
Wittgenstein' s silence. That aside, Hintikka is definitely right in seeing the similarity 
between Kraus and Wittgenstein as regards our intellectual and m<?ral duty to stop 
blathering, (the present writer excepted). 
Good Journalists Show, and do not Say 
I believe that the more practical reason why Kraus denounced the feuilleton so 
completely has to do with the fact that it both permits moral hypocrisy to go unnoticed, 
and generally leads to the trivialization of value. Conflating and confusing the language 
of fact with matters of value can bring about not only moral hypocrisy, but it also leads to 
moral rhetoric. The implication here is this: if one is unable to distinguish journalism 
(reporting) from literature (and art), then one cannot avoid hypocrisy. For the hypocrite 
condones in a single breath what he disapproves of in another breath, only because of the 
mix of "linguistic values" he is not aware of it. On the other hand, ifhe is aware of what 
he is doing, then he can be accused either of not caring about what happens or about what 
ought or ought not to be happening. The feuilleton facilitates this by mixing facts and 
value (art, ethics, etc.), so that it is all one fiction, and no harm is ever really done, for no 
events are being reported. The following example best illustrates what I think Kraus has 
in mind. A reporter on the frontlines in WWI ought (on Kraus' s  view) to write only about 
the number of wounded, dead, the strength and plan of the enemy army, the men's morale 
or lack thereof, the outcome of particular battles, and whatever else constitutes relevant 
events related to the war. But the reporter who fancies himself an artist is apt to confuse 
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issues ifhe talks about the honor in meeting death bravely, or the men's morale flagging 
though they are jightingfor a noble cause. Attempts to be fanciful or literary here 
obscure the events, and end up painting them, in. this case, in too rosy a light (or just a 
light that is more than what is happening). After reading such an account one might well 
be left with the sense that the death and destruction of war is not such a bad thing in 
itself. Perhaps the feelings and emotions elicited by the above account are similar to what 
one feels when reading a novel. After all, not much good or bad can happen to characters 
in a novel ! It was this kind of thing that Kraus was vehemently opposed to. With a 
literary tum of phrase one could make an awful state of affairs seem not so bleak or vice 
versa - one could make the event other than it is. 
This should not be taken as an attack on editorializing, for Kraus did plenty of that 
himself. Such a blend of fact and fancy is different from an editorial in that in the former 
case the writer does not say that she is giving her opinion or view about what's 
happening, but simply characterizes it in more literary terms. In the case of our war 
reporter, this mixture of reporting and purple prose is like wrapping a pig in fur. We lose 
the pig! 
Closely connected to Kraus' s desire to see the feuilleton's popularity perish in 
Vienna is his own method of"showing" moral hypocrisy. Kraus would "juxtapose . . .  two 
or more newspaper items without comment, one of [his] most frequent and most effective 
techniques" (Zohn, p. 5 1 ). In one of his articles, entitled "White Culture, or Why Roam 
Far? From a Berlin Newspaper", published in his book Die Chinesische Mauer ( 19 10) :  
50 
The left-hand column carries an item from a newspaper deploring the 
correspondence between German girls wishing to add to their stamp collections 
and natives of German colonies in Africa to whom they send photos and other 
mementoes. The right-hand column contains a number of marriage ads from the 
same paper, all from men desirous of dowries or of marrying into a business (Ibid, 
p. 5 1 -52). 
Nothing needs to be said here. The hypocrisy stands out-it is shown. Kraus's method of 
showing moral hypocrisy is to use the very words that were written or spoken by the 
principals against them. Blathering about "ethics" is entirely useless and devalues value: 
"Again and again Kraus castigates the deleterious mixture of intellect and information, 
reportage and literature, Tach/es (brass tacks) with Schmonzes (trivia), fact with fancy" 
(Ibid. p. 57). And I suggest that his preferred way of doing this is through saying 
absolutely nothing, but instead showing the distinction between fact and value by being 
silent about the distinction, while gesturing in this direction by carefully placing the 
words of those he considers to have transgressed this distinction in their 'proper' context. 
And by 'proper' here I simply mean a context in which what is said is clearly seen to be 
hypocritical . As Janik and Toulmin note, "less and less effort was required to expose the 
duplicity in the language of the corrupt: often, it was enough to quote that person's  own 
words in Die F ackel without comment, and the context was enough to reveal the truth 
about its author" (p. 90). 
Perhaps for Kraus the key element in showing is having one' s words jibe with 
one's actions, so that one's words become, at best, otiose. Certainly one method of 
battling hypocrisy is to get people to stop talking about what' s right and what's wrong: 
for then their actions cannot contradict what they have not tried to say. Zohn holds that 
"Wittgenstein's  concept of "mystical silence" is akin to Kraus' s wartime invitation to 
those who really had something to say in the cacophony of "patriotic" verbiage to step 
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forward and - be silent" (Ibid, p. 63). I believe Wittgenstein was doing just this (and 
more) when he joined the Austrian war effort and repeatedly sought to be stationed at the 
front -There were, of course, other reasons for Wittgenstein' s desire to be put into the 
thick of the fighting, but at the very least we see here an extreme example of action, of 
doing, and a total silence. Interestingly, Wittgenstein never discussed with anyone his 
'reasons' for going to war. There are only oblique references to finding meaning in his 
life by risking it in his Notebooks (1914-1916). 
In some of Kraus' s poems and aphorisms we see his overarching goal to restore 
language to a kind of purity; to make it suitable as an expression of what is higher. 
Perhaps even, like Wittgenstein, to gesture towards what cannot be expressed within 
language, but what we can sense and feel through language. Janik and Toulmin are of the 
opinion that the purpose of Kraus' s "language mysticism" was to "show the world how 
every statement had an unspoken moral dimension, by virtue of what might be termed its 
'pre-established harmony' with morality" (pp. 90-91 ). What is this but Wittgenstein' s 
notion that what is most "important" in his book is what is "not said"? And Zohn writes: 
"Wittgenstein learned from Kraus how to think in and through language, yet he thought 
against language-which, for him was an obstacle to thought that had to be painstakingly 
surmounted-whereas Kraus fought for language, mystically discovering thought 
through it" (pp. 62-63 ). It is true that Wittgenstein was guarding us against illicit uses of 
language-guarding us against speaking nonsense, and so was in this sense fighting 
against language. Wittgenstein, however, regarded language and thought to be of a piece. 
Hence, he would reject the very idea that there are "mystical thoughts" that could be 
"discovered" by "fighting for language": there can no more be mystical "thoughts" for 
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Wittgenstein than there can be a mystical "language". There are, however, mystical 
experiences, feelings, and perhaps even an attitude. Indeed, on my view of Wittgenstein 
there are certain mystical experiences that result from his transcendental persepctive. (In 
Chapters three and four, where I develop the aesthetico-ethical aspect of Wittgenstein's 
transcendental perspective, we shall see that a kind of mystical experience does seem to 
be part of - or perhaps a consequence of - the perspective. Experiences such as "feeling 
absolutely safe" in his LE and "feeling the world as a limited whole" in his TLP ( 6.45) 
seem to be consequences of his transcendental perspective on the world. But this 
discussion will have to wait). 
It is in the unsayable or unutterable that Wittgenstein finds value and meaning; it 
is in the silence. What Wittgenstein is fighting for is a philosophy of language that reigns 
in language in such a way that we can see that there is more to meaning and value than 
what can be expressed. This is what he is getting at when he says at 4. 1 1 5 :  "It 
(philosophy, as practiced in the Tractatus) will refer to the unspeakable by clearly 
displaying the speakable". 39 And this mystical appreciation is enjoyed in silence. Both 
Kraus and Wittgenstein are drawing a line between sense and nonsense; and, with this, 
keeping the language of fact separate from value. Wittgenstein is doing it systematically40 
and Kraus is doing so piecemeal, with one hypocrite at a time. 
39 I have changed the Ogden translation somewhat: The German is "Sie wird das Unsagbare bedeuten, 
indem sie das Sagbare klar darstellt" ( 4. 1 1 5). Ogden translates "bedeuten" as "means" here, and I think that 
this is somewhat misleading. I have translated it as "refers to", given that throughout his work Wittgenstein 
suggests that the "mystical", the "inexpressible", and the "unspeakable" are shown or pointed to by 
drawing a limit to the thinkable or speakable. What Wittgenstein thinks he is pointing us towards cannot be 
articulated. 40 An Important distinction needs to be made between Kraus and Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is not the 
activist that Kraus was, but not because Wittgenstein didn't feel strongly about certain things. 
Wittgenstein' s  ethical perspective is tied to "seeing" the world in a particular way, and is not concerned 
with an evaluation of our actions. Kraus had nothing like an ethical perspective - a "seeing" the entire 
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Good Philosophers Show and Do Not Say: The Aphoristic Form of the Tractatus 
Kraus writes: "An aphorism need not be true, but it should overtake truth. It must 
get beyond it in einem Satz" (Beim Wort genommen, p. 1 1 6). Is Wittgenstein attempting 
to "get beyond" or "overtake truth" in his early work? Did he choose the aphorism as his 
mode of gesturing at what is most important because the aphorism "need not be true", or, 
by parity of reasoning, false? Such questions cannot be answered definitively, but it is 
plausible that Wittgenstein chose an aphoristic style because the truth or falsity of an 
aphorism is never what' s most important in it ( even if one thinks that an aphorism is, 
once fully analyzed or fleshed out, true or false). But given the riddling and metaphorical 
nature of Wittgenstein's aphoristic writing style, it is highly doubtful that anything is 
gained from focusing exclusively on whether his aphorisms are true or false. They serve 
as a kind of metaphorical splash of cold water, directly in the face. They are the perfect 
means for communicating indirectly what one wants someone to see. We are not to stare 
only at the aphorism, but beyond it. And it seems that too many philosophers have been 
like fetching dogs: following the pointing finger of their master not in the direction of the 
pointing, but back up the length of the arm of their master. Wittgenstein is imploring us 
to "look beyond" what he says for the most important part of his work is what is "not 
said" (Letter to von Ficker, 1 9 1 9). At any rate, Wittgenstein's Tractatus is composed 
primarily of aphorisms. 
world in a particular way - in mind, and was concerned only to make men's lip service to value (in art or 
ethics) jibe with their actions and how they lived (or so it seems to me). Note that the person who lives 
honestly won't need to talk all that much about how and why his life is an honest one. (And this latter point 
is true for Wittgenstein and Kraus). 
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For example, his work begins with the avowal that ( 1 )  the world is everything that 
is the case. Is this true? Well, he spends a good bit of time filling in why we should 
accept his model theory of language. Here we will see (in chapter four) that . 
Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' are in some respects more like directives as to how to see 
the world from the outside, as it were. But it is also true, ( as we shall see in chapter two) 
that many of Wittgenstein's 'propositions' are best interpreted as metalinguisitc 
assertions, and that with them he builds his picture theory of meaning. Still, his 
metalinguistic assertions serve a "higher" purpose: to project us out of any picturing 
language and so out of the world. In one sense, then, he gives a defense of this 
'hypothesis' that the essence of language is to picture reality. But in another sense, it 
matters little if the model theory is ultimately justified because the oracular 
pronouncement here is designed to cut across or jump over the reasons why this is so.4 1  
Perhaps the purpose of Wittgenstein' s aphoristic writing style is, at least in  part, 
to get us to see the world in a different way. One might say that in terms of content, the 
numbered passages have to be carefully analyzed in order to understand what 
Wittgenstein is saying, as is true in any work; but in terms of form, the aphoristic style 
invites us to look beyond what's said, to keep our eye on the horizon which is not, strictly 
speaking, part of the work. 
41 In a letter to Lady Ottoline Russell writes: "I told Wittgenstein he ought not simply to state what he 
thinks true, but to give arguments for it, but he said that arguments spoil its beauty, and that he would feel 
as ifhe was dirtying a flower with muddy hands" (BR to OM, 1 5.3 . 1 2). Perhaps this only demonstrates 
Wittgenstein's contempt for laying out the reasons why he thought this or that claim true (which is evident 
in his TLP). But perhaps he thought that ifhe gave detailed arguments that the ethical point of his work ­
what is not said - would be lost (as it was anyway). In any even, an aphoristic style is perhaps the best way 
of getting us to appreciate his gestures. (My hands might be a little cleaner if Wittgenstein had not been so 
averse to getting his dirty). 
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Is this not why Wittgenstein says to von Ficker "the book will say a great deal that 
you want to say. Only perhaps you won't see that it is said in the book" (Brenner Studien; 
Vol I, p. 28). The reason why Ficker (or, for that matt�r, anyone) wouldn't "see" what's 
"said in the book" is not because it is hidden, but because it is not said. Wittgenstein is 
showing von Ficker and the rest of us that what we "want to say" about what gives life its 
value and meaning cannot be said, but it can be shown. And if we will just look beyond 
what's  said in the TLP or take what is said there as pointing to what is most important, 
we will see that what we want to say is shown by Wittgenstein. 
Wittgenstein and Tolstoy 
I want to trace another key influence on Wittgenstein: Leo Tolstoy. Indeed, 
Tolstoy's approach to the felt problem of finding meaning and value in life and the world 
helps to illuminate why Wittgenstein regarded his own task - drawing a limit to thought 
and language - as an ethical deed, and as something that is shown in his work. 
That Wittgenstein thought of Tolstoy as a kindred spirit is evident in a letter to 
Malcolm (Ludwig Wittgenstein: A Memoir: 1984). Wittgenstein writes about what he 
most likes in Tolstoy: 
You see, when Tolstoy tells a story he impresses me infinitely more than when he 
addresses the reader. When he turns his back on the reader then he seems to be 
most impressive . . .  It seems to me his philosophy is most true when it' s latent in 
the story (p. 4 3 ). 
Isn't this passage a way of saying that Tolstoy's 'philosophy' about life is more 
"impressive" when it is shown? It seems so. 
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Recall Wittgenstein's cryptic pronouncement: "It (philosophy) will mean the 
unspeakable by clearly displaying the speakable" (TLP, 4. 1 1 5). Now of course the 
"unspeakable" includes not only the mystical, but, for example, logical form 42 as well. 
Still, what is unspeakable relative to ethics and value is "the mystical." At any rate, when 
Tolstoy "turns his back on the reader" he is doing just this - he is showing, not saying. It 
is in the silence, in what is left unsaid, that gives Tolstoy's  work acquires its ethical 
significance or 00mph. 
I believe that Wittgenstein' s comments about the "mystical" or the 
"inexpressible" being made "manifest" ( 6.522) can be made more pointed if we compare 
Tolstoy's failed attempt to find meaning in the world of facts. Let us turn now to A 
Confession ( 1 882). 
Although there is no direct evidence that Wittgenstein ever read A Confession, it 
is unlikely that he was unfamiliar with it. In fact, Wittgenstein was very familiar with 
William James' Varieties of Religious Experience ( 1 899), and in that work James 
frequently refers to Tolstoy's  account of his despairing at ever finding meaning in life as 
a paradigmatic example of the "sick soul" (pp. 1 67- 1 69). Moreover, even if Wittgenstein 
somehow overlooked such passages there are still important parallels between the two 
thinkers that are brought out by an examination of Tolstoy's search for the meaning of 
life in this short work. 
42 But as we shall see, Wittgenstein does 'say' a good deal about the connection between language and the 
world with his metalinguistic assertions. 
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The TLP and A Confession: Some Parallels 
Caleb Thompson offers up a view of Wittgenstein that "embraces Tolstoy the 
confessor, for whom the meaning of life falls away, and rejects Tolstoy the Christian 
proselytizer. There is a part of Wittgenstein that is Leo Tolstoy, but there is also part of 
Wittgenstein that is Karl Kraus" (p. 106). 43 (Thompson also speculates that "'what can be 
shown cannot be said' . .  . is an idea that. . .  originated with Kraus" (Ibid.). Obviously I 
think this is right.) 
The urge to discover the answer to the meaning or value of life in the world is 
rejected by Wittgenstein as impossible. Thompson sees both Tolstoy's Confession and 
Wittgenstein's Tractatus as an attempt to show us that life's value and meaning is not a 
question of knowledge. Thompson thinks that both of their projects end in silence 
because nothing can be said about the value, meaning, or significance of life. 
Wittgenstein's silence is rather more austere than Tolstoy's. Thompson reads Tolstoy's 
dream at the end of his confession as Tolstoy's way of telling us not to look for the 
solution to the problem of life in the facts. For Tolstoy, the solution to the problem of life 
- which for Tolstoy as for Wittgenstein was "why go on living?" - requires that we 
embrace a Christian faith that is stripped of anything that cannot be reconciled with 
reason. This includes miracles, theological Dogma, etc. 
Caleb Thompson sees both Tolstoy and Wittgenstein as attempting to show us 
that the difficulty we have in finding meaning and value in life is not a question of our 
43 "Wittgenstein, Tolstoy, and the meaning of life" (1 997) 
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lacking this or that piece of knowledge. The fact that Tolstoy is at great pains to discover 
the meaning of life, should not be interpreted as an attempt on Tolstoy' s  part to find some 
bit of knowledge that will put an end to the question of life's meaning. In fact, following 
Anthony Flew,44 Caleb interprets Tolstoy as rejecting from the outset the whole idea that 
propositional knowledge could provide us with an answer. Flew regards Tolstoy' s  
incessant questions about life's meaning ( and why one ought to go on living rather than 
committing suicide) as an "arrest of life" (Flew, p 1 1 1 ). This sense of befuddlement on 
the part of Tolstoy is meant to indicate his hopeless state of ever finding any answer to 
such a question. And it is just this looking in the wrong direction that is the real problem. 
He is not really looking for some piece of knowledge that will settle his concerns about 
what meaning, if any, life has. Thus, "what he learns is not that the meaning of life is 
such and such, but how to live in such a way that these questions no longer arise" (Caleb, 
p 1 03). 
For Tolstoy, then, there could be no knowledge of "mystical truths" that could 
give his life meaning. Similarly, Paul Engelmann notes that Wittgenstein's mysticism 
was not a "Gnostic-mysticism" where fanciful pictures of "another world" are painted (p. 
79). There is no "bluish hue surrounding" the mystical, as Wittgenstein once quipped to 
Engelmann (p. 98). 
In the end Tolstoy' s  approach to the solution to the problem of life is to cease to 
ask questions about life's  meaning because there can be no answer - no piece of 
knowledge can be "the thing". For Tolstoy there is only a purified faith - the very 
essence of Christianity without all the religion - that manifests itself in loving others. 
44 "Tolstoi and the Meaning of Life"; Ethics, Vol. 73 ( 1 963) 
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Of course, Wittgenstein 's  solution is far more austere: he thought that there could 
be no answer where no question can even be asked. He sees the "problem" of the 
meaning of "life" being solved by the "disappearance" or "vanishing" of the problem 
(NB, p. 74 and TLP 6.52 1). It is when life's meaning or value is called into question and 
one begins to look for an answer to it that the problem arises. There never was a problem 
about meaning in the sense that abstract, conceptual (i.e., propositional) knowledge could 
solve it. 
However, The problem of life as felt is very real for both Tolstoy and 
Wittgenstein. But the "answer" is to turn away from any purported explanation - from 
any intellectual attempt - to solve it. Instead, one needs to learn how to live so that the 
problem is no longer felt as requiring an answer in the form of this or that bit of 
knowledge. The question will no longer nag at us when we see that knowledge is not 
what 's  needed (nor is it even possible) here. But, unlike Tolstoy, Wittgenstein's ends his 
discussion of this felt problem with total silence. 
It is significant that immediately after discussing the "solution" to the problem of 
life that Wittgenstein asks, parenthetically at 6.52 1 ,  "is not this the reason why men to 
whom after long doubting the sense of life became clear, could not then say wherein this 
sense consisted?" 
One wonders if Wittgenstein had Tolstoy in mind here. That such "men" could 
not say anything here is not because the saying is so very esoteric, but rather because the 
"sense of life" cannot be said. But it can be felt. 
Immediately after his suggestion that the sense, meaning or value of life cannot be 
put into words by those who have become "clear' about its meaning, he writes: "There is 
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indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical" (6.522). One of the 
implications here is that the meaning or value of life and the world as something "felt" is 
the mystical, and so is shown through a kind of experience. Another implication is that 
there is something that such men are acquainted with - for it has become "clear" to them. 
For Tolstoy it becomes clear through faith. How does it become clear to Wittgenstein? I 
suggest that for Wittgenstein the dawning comes when one sees "the world aright" (6.54). 
The Limits of Reason and The Limits of Language 
According to Tolstoy, reaching the limit of reason or the explicable is essential for 
seeing that life without faith cannot have any meaning or value. For Wittgenstein: on the 
other hand, the limit of"language" or (what comes to the same thing for Wittgenstein) 
"thought" results in certain experiences of the world that amounts to an experience of 
Das Mystische (I examine these experiences in chapters three and four). Both Tolstoy and 
Wittgenstein regard being brought to the limit of reason or language, respectively, as a 
path that is essential for appreciating the inexplicable, the unutterable - the mystical. Let 
me close with a quotation from A Confession that is strikingly similar to the value or 
significance of the inexpressible in Wittgenstein's Tractatus: 
I know that the explanation of everything, like the commencement of everything, 
must be concealed in infinity. But I wish to understand in a way that will bring me 
to what is inevitably inexplicable. I wish to recognize anything that is inexplicable 
as being so not because the demands of my reason are wrong (they are right, and 
apart from them I understand nothing), but because I recognize the limits of my 
intellect. I wish to understand in such a way that everything that is inexplicable 
shall present itself to me as being necessarily inexplicable, and not as being 
something I am under an arbitrary obligation to believe (pp. 80-8 1 ,  my emphasis). 
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Isn' t  Wittgenstein also showing us that the unutterable or unsayable is such not 
because it is pure nonsense, as the new Wittgensteinian's claim (and the logical 
positivists before them claimed), but because the logic of our language shows us that 
there are inexplicable and so unutterable mysteries that cannot be described in language? 
But how are we to be led to the "inexpressible", the mystical, or, to use Tolstoy's 
expression, the "inexplicable"? According to Wittgenstein - at least on my view - the 
mystical is made manifest by a perspective that is at the very limit of descriptive 
language and the world. 
Seeing the World "Aright" 
Ultimately, what Wittgenstein is trying to show us is how to see the world 
"rightly" (7). And in part this means that if we take the right perspective with respect to 
the world we will also take the right attitude toward the world as a whole - we will come 
to see it as sublime or as having absolute value. Of course, what exactly this consists in 
and how we take up such an attitude is the subject of the rest of my dissertation. Let me 
now state, without argument, how such an attitude is acquired and what it amounts to for 
Wittgenstein. It begins, as we shall see in the next chapter, with Wittgenstein's view of 
how any meaningful (descriptive) language is able to say anything at all about the world. 
Something very important is shown by the shared structure of language and world. And 
Wittgenstein shows the connection with a meta-language. It is a God's eye perspective 
inasmuch as it is at the "limit" of the world of representation. In the logic of our language 
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this perspective is reflected in positions that take semantics to be ineffable; that regard ( a 
'la the Hintikkas) language as the "universal medium" (Investigating Wittgenstein: 1 984). 
With respect to the ethical (including the meaning of life, aesthetics, etc.) this 
perspective takes quite literally the Tractarian notion that what has value cannot lie in the 
world of facts. The similarity, then, between showing in logic and showing in ethics is 
that both require taking this transcendental perspective. But the perspective on the 
language-world relation comes first, for it is in virtue of seeing the world as a "limited 
whole", that we are (in some sense) led to "feel it as a limited whole" ( 6.45). Thus, it is 
the logic of our language, and the picture theory specifically, that brings us to the limit of 
the world. And at this limit a kind of contemplative ethic - the mystical, if you will - is 
shown.45 
Thus, before we investigate the ethical aspect of his transcendental perspective, 
we must determine not only what Wittgenstein means by "seeing the world aright", but 
why he thought that one is (in some sense) brought to see the world in the "right" way, 
ethically speaking, based on his 'theory' of how language connects with the world. This 
is the very beginning of his saying/showing distinction. Chapter two is therefore a 
detailed exegesis on the main function of Wittgenstein's 'propositions' with respect to the 
language-world relation in his TLP: These 'propositions' are metalinguistic assertions 
about language and the world Wittgenstein' s aim with these higher-order assertions is to 
clear up conceptual confusions in the logic of any descriptive language, set up of his 
45 It is not completely contemplative in that there are some hints at how to live in the world; but these are 
really a result of taking up the transcendental perspective, and should not be understood as ethical "truths". 
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"picture theory" of meaning, and pave the way for our seeing and feeling the world under 
the aspect of eternity. 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The Tractatus Shows the Relation Between 
Descriptive Language and the World via a 
Metalanguage 
Logic and the World in The Tractatus-Logico-Philosophicus 
In large part, Wittgenstein's TLP deals with how sentences are able to 
communicate information about the world. According to Wittgenstein, meaningful 
sentences are those sentences that represent or describe the world. Wittgenstein thinks 
that he can "show" just how descriptive language is able to do this: sentences ( or 
propositions) are, quite literally, pictures or models ofreality. Wittgenstein is also 
concerned with clearing up what he regards as philosophical confusions about the logic 
of our language, so that we may clearly see that the nature of a proposition is to picture 
reality. Of course, in setting up his picture theory of meaning and clearing up certain 
philosophical confusions Wittgenstein uses language. And the language that he uses is 
rejected at the end of his treatise as "nonsense" (unsinnig, 6.54). The questions before us 
in this chapter are these: what sense can we make of the 'propositions' that deal with 
logic and the world in the TLP? How can we take his 'claims' as illuminating nonsense? 
And even more importantly, for my purposes, how does this illuminating nonsense lead 
us to see the world "sub specie aeternitatis" ( 6.45)? 
I contend that Wittgenstein's 'claims' about logic in the Tractatus are best 
interpreted as meta-linguistic instructions of what Wittgenstein regards as the right 
perspective on the logic of descriptive language and its connection with the world. On my 
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view, Wittgenstein uses a higher order language that he rejects in the end as nonsensical. 
My interpretation permits one to reconcile Wittgenstein's 'propositions' as both nonsense 
and, at the same time, intelligible; "nonsense" because they do not picture states of affairs 
in the world; "intelligible" insofar as they are meta-linguistic assertions as to how to see 
the connection between language and the world. 46 Seeing the connection between 
language and the world - that language "pictures" reality - is part of what Wittgenstein 
means in saying that his 'propositions' aid us in "seeing the world aright" (6.54). 
Meta-language 
I admit that it is anachronistic to claim that Wittgenstein's utterances in his TLP 
are best interpreted as metalinguistic. After all, the concept of a metalanguage was not 
articulated until Alfred Tarski's work on theoretical semantics in 1 944, well after the TLP 
was written. I will justify interpreting Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' as a kind of meta or 
higher-order language by first giving a definition of a metalanguage, and then showing 
throughout this chapter that Wittgenstein's  use of language meets the criteria of a 
metalanguage. 
In his paper, "The Semantic Conception of Truth and the Foundations of 
Semantics',47, Alfred Tarski gives the first formal definition or criteria for a 
46 John Nolt has suggested that some of Wittgenstein's 'propositions' be regarded as straightforward 
metalinguisitc truths. This is plausible, just so long as we realize that Wittgenstein would not regard them 
as such. 
47 From Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, V. 4 ( 1944), pp. 34 1 -375. Reprinted in A.P. 
Martinich's, The Philosohy of Language, 3"' ed., Oxford Univ. Press: 1 996. Page references are to the 
Martinich anthology. 
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metalanguage. Although he does so within the context of providing an account of the 
semantic notion of"truth", the concept of a metalanguage is useful in other areas of 
semantics, as Tarski makes clear. This is worth quoting in full because it is suggestive of 
the role language plays in the TLP: 
Since we have agreed not to employ semantically closed languages48, we have to 
use two different languages in discussing the problem of the definition of truth 
and, more generally, any problem in the field of semantics. The first of these 
languages is the language that is "talked about" and which is the subject matter of 
the whole discussion; the definition of truth that we are seeking applies to the 
sentences of this language. The second is the language in which we "talk about" 
the first language. We shall refer to the first language as "the object language", 
and to the second as the "metalanguage" (p 67). 
And in the next paragraph Tarski goes on to say: 
It should be noticed that these terms "object language" and "metalanguage" have 
only a relative sense. If, for instance, we become interested in the notion of truth 
applying to sentences, not of our original object language, but of its 
metalanguage, the latter becomes automatically the object language of our 
discussion; and in order to define truth for this language, we have to go to a new 
metalanguage - so to speak, to a metalanguage of a higher level. In this way we 
arrive at a whole hierarchy of languages (Ibid). 
First off, I want to make clear that I am not attributing to Wittgenstein anything 
like a full-blown conception of a metalanguage. Instead, I am suggesting that 
Wittgenstein makes use of a language of a higher order or level in order to show us how 
any descriptive language connects with any possible world. 
48 "Semantically closed" is a notion that need not concern us here. The idea is simply that whenever a 
semantic term, like "is true", is applied to descriptions of sentences of the language the result is also a 
sentence in the language. A semantically closed language is one that contains all definitions of semantic 
terms as expressions in the language. Put differently, a closed language is one that both uses and mentions 
its own expressions. This is irrelevant for my purposes because Wittgenstein seems to regard all semantics 
as impossible or ineffable, whether the language is "open" or "closed". Incidentally, a semantically "open" 
language is one that does not contain its own semantics: semantic terms do not occur in the lower level 
language and are neither used nor mentioned there. In either case, whether the language is open or closed, 
Wittgenstein regards semantics as impossible or, at best, ineffable. 
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The second point that I wish to make is that Wittgenstein seems to endorse the 
idea that all semantics is, at best, unnecessary, and, at worst, impossible. As we shall see, 
it appears that Wittgenstein would not countenance talk of a higher order language at all .  
Indeed, he would say that the 'meaning' of any semantic term (such as " is true") is 
"shown" through the use we make of meaningful sentences in our language. Thus, what I 
am suggesting is that Wittgenstein regards all semantics as impossible. This is just to say 
that on Wittgenstein's view there can be no definition of semantic terms in either an 
object language or a metalanguage. 
But I want to argue that Wittgenstein does not really provide us with any good 
reasons for thinking that semantics is impossible or ineffable (though his 'propositions' 
are "senseless" in that they do not picture facts). Indeed, we will see that Wittgenstein' s  
own picture theory of language requires him to give definitions of certain terms in a 
higher-order language. 
In regarding all semantics as impossible, or, as the two Hintikka's say, "ineffable" 
(Investigating Wittgenstein: 1 986), Wittgenstein would reject the idea that terms such as 
"truth", "meaning", etc., can be defined at all .  Thus, even in the only legitimate language 
that there is ("legitimate" according to Wittgenstein) - i.e., our ordinary language, the 
language we use to depict facts in the world - there can be no semantic meaning (no 
logical definition) for a term such as ''truth". Rather, the semantic meaning of terms such 
as ''truth" and "falsity" cannot be defined at all, but their meanings can be shown in virtue 
of what counts as a meaningful sentence in any descriptive language. 
Now the main reason that I do not think that Wittgenstein is correct in thinking 
that semantics is impossible ( or inexpressible) is this: he is doing it himselfl Of course, 
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his own account of what is to count as a meaningful sentence - all of which is carried out 
in a higher-order language - is summarily dismissed as meaningless based on his own 
picture theory of meaning. Indeed, Wittgenstein's language in the TLP is in part designed 
to get us to appreciate that the only language that has full-blown meaning is the language 
of science broadly construed. And whether we agree with him or not here, he makes his 
philosophical points in a language very different from the one that he is talking about -
i.e., those sentences that picture reality. Thus, on my view his attempt to "show" what 
cannot be said is much like 'saying' something in a metalanguage about an object 
language. 
A third important point about metalanguage is that it is always relative to, as 
Tarski says, an "object language". I will show that the object language in Wittgenstein's 
TLP - the language that is talked about - shifts. Sometimes Wittgenstein talks about 
Russell's own theory of types and what is wrong with it, but more often Wittgenstein is 
defining a logical language - namely that meaningful language must depict, model, or 
picture reality. But in either case the object languages that are talked about are discussed 
in a language quite different from the ordinary language that pictures facts. It is my 
contention that this language that Wittgenstein uses is best interpreted as a meta- or 
higher-order language. 
A fourth and final point, and one that I will investigate more fully later, is 
Russell 's suggestion that perhaps Wittgenstein can do away with the concept of 
"showing" and talk instead about a "hierarchy of languages": 
. . .  Every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in 
the language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing 
with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that 
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to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit. Mr. Wittgenstein would of 
course reply that his whole theory is applicable unchanged to the totality of such 
languages (TLP, xxii). 
Note that Russell 's notion of languages with different structures is similar to Tarski 's 
point about higher and higher levels of meta-languages. Wittgenstein would, as we shall 
see, want to deny anything like a hierarchy of languages, but it seems that he is 
committed to at minimum a kind of one-time meta-language to "elucidate" or make 
perspicuous the connection between language and the world. 
Showing and Metalanguage in the TLP 
In saying that the 'propositions' in the TLP are meta-linguistic assertions whose 
purpose is to reveal the pure structure of how any descriptive language is able to depict 
facts in any possible world, I am in effect saying that Wittgenstein is (at least in part) 
providing us with rules whose purpose is to make clear the picture theory, and that he 
takes his picture-theoretic view to apply to all possible descriptive language. Thus, on my 
account it is a meta- or higher-order language that does the showing here.49 And 
Wittgenstein himself says in his early NB: "Pseudo-propositions are such as, when 
analyzed, tum out after all only to shew what they were supposed to say" (p. 1 6). The 
bulk of Wittgenstein's remarks in the Tractatus are "pseudo-propositions". Wittgenstein 
49 In correspondence, Gary Levvis characterized the 'propositions' of the TLP "as part of an impossible 
meta-language" because such "propositions cannot be part of a representational medium". I claim 
Wittgenstein's 'propositions' are 'nonsense' because they cannot describe of represent reality. So Levvis 
and I are on all fours here. Like Levvis, I think that the same thing can be said about Wittgenstein's 
attempts to say anything about semantic terms such as "showing", "saying", and remarks like "a 
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is attempting to 'say' what, by his own semantic theory (the "picture theory) cannot be 
said, but only shown. As PMS Hacker aptly notes: 
The Tractatus does not show what it is to make sense - it tries to say what it is 
(namely, to agree and disagree with the possibilities of the obtaining and non­
obtaining of states of affairs: TLP 4.2). And since, according to the Tractatus, one 
cannot say what cannot be other than it is, the endeavour to spell out the essential 
nature of sense inevitably transgresses the bounds of sense (p. 22). 50 
More specifically, I argue that meta-language is the means by which Wittgenstein ( 1 )  
clears up certain philosophical confusions, (2) sets up his picture theory of meaning, and 
finally (3) paves the way for seeing and feeling the world sub specie aeternitatis. In this 
chapter I will focus mainly on ( 1 )  and (2), leaving a full account of (3) to chapters three 
and four. Here I shall only be concerned with those 'claims' that deal with how the logic 
of our language relates to the world, suggesting in the end that Wittgenstein's picture 
theory of language projects us out of the world, thereby paving the way for our seeing the 
world sub specie aeternitatis. 
Two preliminary points need to be made before we survey examples of 
Wittgenstein's use of meta- or higher-order language in the above two areas. First, we 
will have to pay close attention to the context in which Wittgenstein makes his meta-
linguistic 'claims' in order to discern what is to count as the object language. In some 
cases his meta-linguistic 'claims' take Russell 's own theory of types - a theory of a 
proposition states something only insofar as it is a picture" (but other examples abound). The point is that 
such talk "cannot be part of the representational medium", as Levvis has remarked. 
5° From "Wittgenstein, Carnap, and The New American Wittgensteinians"; The Philosophical Quarterly, 
Vol. 53, No. 2 1 0, Jan. 2003 . Note that Hacker's main reason for thinking that Wittgenstein's picture theory 
''transgresses the bounds of sense" is connected to its "essential nature." For Hacker, the propositions that 
clarify the picture theory cannot have sense because we cannot say what the world would be like if the 
picture theory were false - that is, we "cannot say what cannot be other than it is." And this just means that 
the propositions that bring the picture theory into relief cannot have sense because they are not bipolar, but 
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hierarchy of propositional functions - as the object language, and in other cases his meta­
linguistic 'claims' have as their target the contingent propositions that model reality ­
that is, the propositions that, on Wittgenstein ' s  account, have sense. In short, there are 
two languages in the TLP that Wittgenstein speaks about: either a formal language (like 
Russell 's theory of types) or our ordinary language. When Wittgenstein speaks about the 
former it is with a view to clearing up certain philosophical confusions and when he 
speaks about the latter he is in effect stipulating how his picture theory of meaning 
applies to any possible world. (Of course, the picture theory applies to the world whether 
we recognize it or not according to Wittgenstein. Wittgenstein is attempting to make 
perspicuous just how descriptive language connects to the world). 
Second, before demonstrating why Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' are best 
interpreted as meta-linguistic, and why this counts as "showing", I need to give a cursory 
account of the distinction between saying and showing in the TLP. 
Showing Vs. Saying 
In a letter to Russell Wittgenstein wrote:5 1  "The main point (of the TLP) is the theory of 
what can be expressed (gesagt) by propositions ( and, which comes to the same, what can be 
are instead a clarification or elucidation of what any descriptive language and any world must share in 
order for contingent propositions to be able to picture the world at all. 51 Ludwig Wittgenstein: Letters to Russell, Keynes and Moore (p 71); ed. By G.H. Von Wright; Cornell 
Univ. Press, Ithaca, NY: 1 974. In the TLP Wittgenstein does not repeat this, but says instead that his 
"fundamental idea is that the logical constants are not representatives" and that ''there can be no 
representatives of the logic of facts" (4.0312). This "fundamental idea" is defended by the saying/showing 
distinction for Wittgenstein. A truth table does not require positing the existence of some quasi-empirical 
entity that "&" or "v" refer to. Instead, we can just see that the truth conditions for any molecular 
proposition is a function of the truth values of the elementary propositions that make it up. Thus, making 
explicit what the "cardinal problem in philosophy" amounts to; viz., the failure to make the distinction 
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thought) and what can not be expressed by propositions, but only shown (gezeigt); which, I 
believe, is the cardinal problem of philosophy" (Cambridge Letters : 1 995). What does this 
distinction come to and what philosophical problems and confusions does Wittgenstein think it 
solves? Let's first get clearer about what Wittgenstein means by "saying". 
What can be "said" in Wittgenstein's  sense of the word is pretty close to at least 
one standard meaning of the term: what can be said is what can be described. 52 When 
some statement is made a thought is articulated. We say that such a thought has content. 
But what does this mean? The content just is a description of an actual or possible 
situation. For example "The cat is on the mat" expresses a proposition that describes the 
way the world is or the way it might be. Thus, what can be said is what can be described. 
We ought first to note that what is said in descriptions like the one above can also 
be shown. I could just as easily show or demonstrate to someone that "the cat is on the 
mat". Generally this is done demonstratively, with a gesture, as a shortcut to any 
description. This, however, is not what Wittgenstein means by "showing". For in this 
case what is shown can also be said and vice versa. So our first observation is that 
showing and saying, in this descriptive and explanatory sense, are not mutually exclusive, 
as the above example illustrates. Hence, this is not what Wittgenstein means by 
"showing". 
That this is not what Wittgenstein has in mind is clear, for at 4 . 1 2 1 2  he writes :  
"what can be shown cannot be said". Thus, by "shown" Wittgenstein must mean 
between what can be said and what can only be shown, is still the main point of Wittgenstein's TLP. His 
idea that there can be no logic of facts is shown, in part, by the truth table method. 
52 Of course, in ordinary usage "said" covers areas that Wittgenstein would reject as un-sayable. Its scope is 
broader in its normal use. The same is true for the term "described". For example, people take themselves 
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something different here. What then does it mean for something to be shown in this 
radical way? Bertrand Russell suggests an approach that avoids the notoriously 
mysterious "showing" that is so prevalent in the TLP. 53 Let's begin here. 
Russell's Hierarchy of Languages: A voiding "Showing" 
In his introduction to the Tractatus, Russell notes that Wittgenstein does "manage 
to say a good deal about what cannot be said" (xxi). Moreover, Russell himself suggests a 
kind of meta-linguistic approach (or, better, a hierarchy of languages) to avoid 
Wittgenstein's notoriously cryptic distinction between saying and showing. The 
foregoing is quoted on page 69, but for convenience I will repeat Russell ' s  words: 
. . .  Every language has, as Mr. Wittgenstein says, a structure concerning which, in 
the language, nothing can be said, but that there may be another language dealing 
with the structure of the first language, and having itself a new structure, and that 
to this hierarchy of languages there may be no limit. Mr. Wittgenstein would of 
course reply that his whole theory is applicable unchanged to the totality of such 
languages (TLP, xxii). 
Russell then goes on to say that "the totalities concerning which it' is impossible to speak 
logically are nevertheless thought by [Wittgenstein] to exist, and are the subject matter of 
his mysticism" (ibid). In other words, Russell is suggesting that Wittgenstein would claim 
that there is nothing that can be said about the logical structure of any such "totality" of 
languages. 
to be "saying" things about the nature of God and the meaning of life or about semantic terms like "truth", 
"meaning", or "proposition". 
53 D. Pears said of the doctrine of showing: "A baffling doctrine, bafflingly presented" (The False Prison, 
vol. 1 ,  p. 1 47). 
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It is doubtful, however, that Wittgenstein would even allow the first step that 
Russell takes here; that is, Wittgenstein would probably reject the idea that there could be 
another language, with a new structure, from which we could say anything at all about 
the lower level structure. 54 And Wittgenstein would certainly reject the idea of their being 
a "totality of languages" whose structures are ultimately all shown. Still, there is evidence 
that Wittgenstein is using some sort of higher-order language whose purpose is to show 
us the logical grammar or syntax of our language: "In logical syntax the meaning of a 
sign should never play a role. It must be possible to establish logical syntax without 
mentioning the meaning of a sign: only the description of expressions may be 
presupposed" (3 .33). And at 3.334 Wittgenstein writes: "The rules of logical syntax must 
go without saying, once we know how each individual sign signifies." He seems to be 
clearly rejecting theoretical semantics here. But we should ask: "How does one 
"presuppose" . . .  "only the description of expressions" without (at least once) resorting to 
a higher-order language?" If an example is needed we do not have far to look. At 4.242 
Wittgenstein writes: "Expressions of the form 'a = b' are, therefore, mere 
representational devices. They state nothing about the meaning of the signs 'a' and 'b ' ." 
Here we have a straightforward use of a higher-order language. Wittgenstein is 
describing the use of the expression 'a = b'. The expression within the quotes is being 
described. And there are other examples that are less explicit: "A name means an object. 
The object is its meaning" (3.203). Such descriptions as these are elucidated in a higher­
order language. 
54 In his Discussions of Wittgenstein ( 1970), Rush Rhees writes: "Wittgenstein always thought that 'meta­
languages' were an evasion" (p. 3). The whole idea that meta-languages could say more about semantic 
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Note first that the expression "description of expressions" is just the kind of thing 
that is carried out in a higher order language. So how can Wittgenstein have his cake and 
eat it too? If I am correct, how can Wittgenstein be opposed to Russell ' s  proposal of 
higher order languages while at the same time using a higher order language to provide a 
"description of expressions" or "signs"? What is Wittgenstein objecting to here? 
It seems that one of the implications that we are to draw from 3.33 and 3.334 is 
that ifwe have to resort to saying what our signs mean, presumably in some other higher­
order language, then we are on the wrong track. The point of 3 .334 seems to be that we 
cannot mention the meaning of a sign, though we can describe the sign itself. That is, we 
can 'say' syntax, but not semantics. We might say that according to Wittgenstein 
semantics speaks for itself once we have a description of the signs first. But can we 
interpret Wittgenstein's prohibition against mixing semantics and syntax in a way that is 
more philosophically interesting than this? 
Recall that Wittgenstein seems to be against the idea of a higher-order language, 
one that has a different structure than the one that is below it. Why is he so opposed to 
such a language? Presumably, he is opposed to such a program because we would then be 
required to give an account of the logical syntax of that higher-order language, and would 
thus be forced to say what counts as the meaning of the signs for this higher order 
language. Such an approach appears to lead to an infinite ( or at least a finite) regress, 
where at each level of language we must go higher still in order to explain the meaning of 
terms (what Wittgenstein called "formal concepts") was, according to Wittgenstein, misguided. 
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the signs in the language below. 55 Perhaps Wittgenstein wants to block the need to po.sit 
an infinite ( and even a finite) series of languages, each with their own structures. 
Certainly Russell is co�mitted to something like higher and higher levels of 
languages (an approach, as we have seen, that Tarski endorses much later). And this 
approach does seem to lead to an infinite series of higher and higher order signs and their 
meaning (as Russell admits). In 3.33 we see Wittgenstein implying that we need not 
resort to a language with a different structure in order to give our signs meaning. All 
that's needed is a description of the use of signs: their syntax. In doing so Wittgenstein is 
using language to "show" that the semantic meaning of any term is seen once we have the 
right notation - that is, once we have a correct description of our signs. What I am 
suggesting is that the ' language' of the TLP purports only to provide us with a description 
of signs, and has nothing to say about the semantic meanings of signs, for their meanings 
with be shown once we have the logical syntax right. 
55 Rush Rhees lends support to my interpretation when he writes: "Wittgenstein was still less satisfied (than 
he was with Russell ' s  theory of types) by the later developments which have spoken of a hierarchy of 
languages or 'meta-languages' . . .  [and that] . . .  what Wittgenstein calls 'formal concepts' are what some 
would now call ' semantical concepts . . .  [and that a meta-language] can 'establish' these concepts, and 
establish, for instance, the relation of propositions to reality, in terms of a meta-language" {p. 3, 
Discussions of Wittgenstein, 1 970). On Rhees view, these "developments" miss the crucial point of the 
distinction between saying and showing. What is said in a meta-language can only be shown, according to 
Rhees interpretation of Wittgenstein. In the end, Rhees thinks that for Wittgenstein higher order languages 
were "an evasion of the problem" (p. 3). But Rhees only hints at how "showing" works with respect to the 
logic of our language. Rhees suggests that any attempt to say what the meaning is of a proposition such as 
"p is a proposition" or what it means to "giye an account of 'expressing a proposition"' is impossible, and 
that the proposition as picture is as close as one can get to showing what it means (p 4). Still, Rhees is left 
in the uncomfortable position of explaining just how Wittgenstein gets across ideas about the picturing 
relation ("abbilden"). Isn't this accomplished via a meta-language? On my view it is just such a language 
that makes the picturing relation so plausible - at least with respect to descriptive language. And once we 
see it, we no longer need Wittgenstein's higher-order language But there is something right about Rhees 
suggestion that nothing informative can be said about what, for example, is meant by the 'proposition' "'p' 
says that p' (p. 4) and that once we are shown that a proposition is a picture we at once see that any attempt 
to say anything about the essential nature of the proposition can only entangle us in empty verbiage. 
77 
This is quite different than what Russell says in introducing the idea of a 
hierarchy of languages. In talking about a "hierarchy of languages" we see Russell 
suggesting something like the use of higher-level languages to describe the structure of 
lower level languages ad infinitum. Moreover, Russell 's talk of higher-level languages 
involves (at the time anyway) reference to objects or entities ("classes"), and thus is not 
purely syntactic. And we know that Wittgenstein was adamantly opposed to any 
justification of the logic of our language (syntax) that required reference to logical facts 
or entities : ""There can be no representatives of the logic of the facts" (4.03 1 2). This is 
perhaps another reason why Wittgenstein was so opposed to Russell 's method. 
Notwithstanding the reasons why Wittgenstein found Russell's approach 
wrongheaded, it seems obvious that the 'propositions' of the TLP are meta-linguistic in 
just this sense: Wittgenstein is using a higher-order language to reveal or lay bare the 
pure form of descriptive language and its connection to the world. It does appear that 
Wittgenstein is giving us instructions as to how to see the connection between language 
and the world; that is, he is both clearing up certain confusions ( of which "the whole of 
philosophy is full . . .  " 3 .324) and laying out the rules for the picture theory of meaning. If 
Wittgenstein's 'propositions' are not minimally giving an account of what he regards as 
the fundamental connection between language and the world, then it is hard to see not 
just what sense, if any, can be made of them, but what possible role his 'propositions' 
play - how do they "clarify thoughts" and "propositions" ( 4. 1 1 2)? How does his use of 
language "elucidate" anything (6.54)? 
I contend that Wittgenstein's attempt to clear up problems that result from "our 
failure to understand the logic of our language" ( 4.003) requires the use of a one- time 
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metalanguage so that we may see the proper role that our signs play. This is the main 
difference between Wittgenstein's  use of a higher-order language and Russell 's 
commitment to a hierarchy of languages. For Wittgenstein, once this is accomplished -
that is, once a description of our signs has been given - there is no further need for any 
higher-order language at all .  The instructions can all be discarded as nonsense in the end. 
This is one of the areas where he differs from Russell, who is more than happy to 
have an infinite series of languages, each with a different logical structure, and each 
capable of saying something about the structure of the language below it. Moreover, 
Wittgenstein most likely would have rejected the idea that there exists a "totality of 
languages", as would Russell, but for a different reason. Wittgenstein would reject such a 
totality not because there is an infinite hierarchy of languages (a ' la Russell), but rather 
because there is only one full blown language, one with both meaning and a logical 
structure: the language that we use everyday - that is, the contingent propositions of 
natural science broadly construed. This is evinced by the following comment: "the 
totality of propositions is language" (4.00 1 ). That the "totality of propositions" covers 
only contingent propositions that model reality is made clear at 4: "A thought is a 
proposition with a sense." Hence, by "propositions" in 4.00 1 Wittgenstein means that all 
and only those propositions that picture reality, whether truly or falsely, have meaning. 
When Wittgenstein says at 4.0 1 that "the totality of propositions is language" he is in 
effect identifying language with just those propositions that picture or describe or 
represent or model reality. Any other use of language will be geared either to getting us 
to see that "the totality of propositions [ with sense] is language" or it will have a function 
altogether different ( such as exhorting, praying, cursing, etc.). Wittgenstein' s  use of 
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language in the Tractatus is best construed as higher-order instructions whose logical 
structure only mimics that of our ordinary contingent propositions, but does not express 
facts at all - that is, the 'propositions' of the TLP do not picture the way the world is or 
the way it might be. 
No doubt Russell ' s  way of characterizing languages and their different structures 
would not have appealed to Wittgenstein' s linguistic parsimony. On Wittgenstein's view 
there is, as I have already suggested, only one such structure; namely, the contingent 
propositions that picture reality. Any language used to 'describe' or explain this structure 
cannot itself have a structure that can be explained at all. This is most likely why 
Wittgenstein regards his own 'propositions' as "elucidations", and, strictly speaking, 
"nonsensical" (6.54). Indeed, any higher-order language is technically nonsense 
according to Wittgenstein's picture theory because such a language does not model facts 
in reality. 
One point that I wish to emphasize in all this is that perhaps Russell did not get 
the TLP as wrong as Wittgenstein claims he did. Indeed, perhaps one of the things that 
Wittgenstein did not like about Russell ' s  introduction is Russell' s  speculation that there 
might be an "infinite" hierarchy of languages, each with its own structure. For on 
Wittgenstein' s view this is really an evasion of the problem and not a solution to it. 
Again, Wittgenstein's solution is to provide, once and/or all, an analysis of how the 
contingent propositions of any language link up with the world. And once this goal has 
been accomplished, there is no need for the sort of higher-level language that is used to 
speak about the structure of a lower level language. Indeed, that Wittgenstein wanted to 
do away with talk of higher-level languages is evinced by his comment on Russell 's  
80 
theory of types: " . .  . It can be seen that Russell must be wrong, because he had to mention 
the meaning of signs when establishing the rules for them" (3.33 1 ). A plausible 
interpretation of this remark is that it is illegitimate to attempt to say anything about the 
meaning of the signs we employ in any language, but why? According to Wittgenstein it 
is because paradox results from the attempt to do semantics (to say what our signs mean) 
in the language that is being talked about and because higher order or metalanguages are 
merely an evasive artifice that pushes the problem back a step. 
We have already seen that Wittgenstein is using a kind of higher order language 
in making perspicuous what he thinks is wrong with Russell 's approach. We see the same 
use of a higher-order language here: "the simple signs employed in propositions are 
called names" or "The name means the object" (3 .202 and 3.203, respectively). I will 
come back to this when we investigate the function that a higher-order language plays in 
setting up the picture theory of meaning. Let us now discover how Wittgenstein uses a 
kind of meta-language to correct what he regards as a fundamental confusion in Russell 's 
type theory. More generally, how is it that a higher-order language helps us to 
"understand the logic of our language" ( 4.003)? 
The Russell/Frege Paradox and Russell's Solution to it: Type Theory 
In his attempt to reduce all of mathematics to logic Russell encountered a serious 
problem. He tried to show that numbers could be reduced to classes, that they could be 
defined in terms of classes. It was Frege who first had the idea that numbers could be 
analyzed as classes of things. Hence, the number two could be reduced to the class of 
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pairs; three to the class of triples, etc. In his attempt to carry out this project, Russell 
needed to give an account of classes of classes. 
First, we can see that there are classes of classes, such as the numbers just 
described. Some classes seem to be members of themselves and others do not. For 
example, the class of all classes with infinitely many members is a member of itself. But 
now suppose we ask whether the class of all non-self-membered classes is a member of 
itself. It was precisely here that Russell discovered that the assumption that to every open 
formula there corresponds a class resulted in paradox. For if such a class is a member of 
itself, then it is not a member of itself; and if it is not a member of itself, then it is a 
member of itself. Here we have a logical contradiction. 
The solving of this paradox was of paramount importance to Russell ' s  program of 
reducing mathematics to the foundations of logic. Why? If the assumption that a class 
corresponds to every open formula is false, then there must be something wrong 
(somewhere) with the assumption that mathematics can be reduced to class logic. What 
Russell develops, then, in order to avoid this contradiction, is a hierarchy of types of 
objects. This is reminiscent of the distinction between an object language and a meta­
language, though Russell did not characterize it this way. His approach is a forerunner of 
the meta/object language distinction. 
Russell's approach blocks the contradiction in the following way: The 
contradiction results from "the formation of what we may call ' impure' classes, i .e., 
classes which are not pure as to 'type' . . .  [for] . . .  to construct symbolically any class 
whose members are not all of the same grade (type) in the logical hierarchy is to use 
symbols in a way which makes them no longer symbolize anything" (Introduction to 
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Mathematical Philosophy, p 1 37). We can only apply the term "class" to those objects 
that properly fall under it. For at any given level, one can refer only to objects of previous 
levels, and classes at any given lev�l can contain only classes of previous levels. Hence, 
one cannot talk unrestrictedly of the class of all non-self-membered classes. In Russell ' s  
language, this is  an example of an "impure" class, as mentioned above. Note that this 
hierarchy of types of objects and what can be predicated of them is very close to a 
hierarchy of languages. 56 Russell ' s  solution is simply that what can legitimately be said 
about "non-self- membered classes" of a certain level cannot be said about "the class of 
all non-self-membered classes", since there is no such "impure" class. Russell's type 
theory, then, will not permit us to ask if the class of all non-self-membered classes has 
the property of having itself as a member. The paradox never gets off the ground because 
what we can say of classes we cannot say of classes of classes, etc. 57 Again, it is 
56 But it is not, strictly speaking, a pure hierarchy of languages, for it involves a reference to things or 
entities, to the most general facts of the universe, as Russell would say. PMS Hacker reminds us: "The 
theory of types was an attempt to justify logical syntax by reference to reality, i.e., by reference to the 
nature of what is represented - and there can be no such justification." ("Wittgenstein and the New 
American Wittgensteinians"; Philosophical Quarterly; vol. 53; no. 2 1 0; Jan., 2003) We have already seen 
that Wittgenstein was adamant that logic did not represent the facts at all ( 4.03 12  and NB, p I 06), and so it 
might be that Russell 's connecting logical syntax to very queer entities was what put Wittgenstein off 
Russell's theory of types, and not simply a hierarchical structure of language. 
57 The assumption that there must be an infinite hierarchy of these objects (classes) is a consequence of 
Russell' s  solution. It is therefore impossible to speak about "The class of all classes", for there is no such 
class. In his introduction to the TLP we see Russell suggesting that there might be an infinite hierarchy of 
languages (not objects or classes), each with a different structure. What can be said about the structure ofa 
language cannot be said in the language that has that same structure. But another, higher level language, 
one with a different structure, can be used to speak about the structure of the first, lower-level, language. 
Wittgenstein, on the other hand, seems to completely reject the idea of their being a hierarchy of languages, 
each with their own structure, for the following reason: if I try to explain the structure of some language 
using the language that shares that structure, then I end up making illicit use of the structure that wants 
explaining: It is i1licit because anything said about the structure of a certain language from within that 
language is begging the question by using the very structure that one purports to explain. Hence, nothing 
gets explained. The foregoing appears to be Wittgenstein's view. Although the context in which Russell 
talks about a hierarchy of languages has more to do with avoiding Wittgenstein's notion that the meaning 
of formal concepts are shown, we once again see Russell having no qualms about positing infinite 
hierarchies (in this case of languages, not classes). Wittgenstein is very uncomfortable with infinite (and 
even finite) hierarchies because he regards them as a kind of evasive artifice. 
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important to see that Russell takes the term "class" and the term "class of classes" to refer 
to abstract entities (specifically, propositional functions), and hence Russell 's hierarchy is 
technically concerned with different types of objects, not different types of languages58 
(though admittedly this distinction gets blurred). 
The Use of Meta-Language in Showing what's Wrong with Type Theory 
In Wittgenstein' s opinion type theory is both baroque and unnecessary. In the 
Tractatus we see Wittgenstein going to great lengths to avoid a hierarchy of types of 
objects, and instead advocating a more 'horizontal' approach; that is to say (less 
metaphorically), everything that can meaningfully be said is said by the class of 
propositions that picture reality; that is, ordinary propositions. For Wittgenstein a meta­
language (though he wouldn't have used this expression) is otiose.59 He perhaps might 
have said a hierarchy of signs that are about (refer to) different types of objects is 
unnecessary in the end. Put slightly differently, the objects that are referred to (above 
level 1 )  that Russell thinks are required to avoid the contradiction are, on Wittgenstein' s 
view, dispensable. Such higher-level objects are a result of being confused by language. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein regards the term "class" as a "nonsensical pseudo-concept" that is 
properly "expressed . . .  by a variable name" (4 .. 1 272). At any rate, it was Russell' s 
58 As P.M.S. Hacker makes plain: " . . .  Russell originally conceived of entities, not expressions, as being of 
one type or another." (Wittgenstein 's Place in Twentieth Century Philosophy, p 1 2) Russell first made this 
move in adopting typed variables. Later, Tarski that made the move from different types of entities to 
different types of syntactical expressions more explicit. 
59 Wittgenstein is very specific about this: "All grammar (syntax) is a theory of logical types: and logical 
types do not talk about the application of language. Russell failed to see this." (Wittgenstein 's Lectures, 
Cambridge 1930-32, p. 1 3 :  1 980) 
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attempt to say what can only be shown that led to this superfluous ( according to 
Wittgenstein) hierarchy of different types of objects. 
But notice how Wittgenstein makes these points against Russell ' s  theory of types: 
By using a kind of meta or higher-order language: First, Wittgenstein' s  characterization 
of Russell ' s  theory is in a meta-language (3 .332): "No propositional sign can say 
anything about itself, because the propositional sign cannot be contained in itself (that is 
the "whole theory of types")." This is his (very brief) summary of Russell 's theory of 
types. Now if we look at an example of a self-referring sentence or proposition we see 
that the meaning of the sentence or proposition (however ambiguous) can only be 
articulated by making use of semantic terms. 
The following example is (perhaps) the kind of thing Wittgenstein has in mind: 
"This statement is false." If this statement is taken to refer to itself, and we ask, ' is this 
statement true or false?' we immediately run into paradox. If we assume that it is false, 
then we must conclude that it is true since it says of itself that it is false. But if we assume 
that it is true, then it must be false since it says of itself that it is false and thus says so 
truly. Here we have a contradiction that results from our using the sentence to analyze the 
meaning of the proposition expressed by that very sentence: we are using the sentence to 
refer to the meaning of the sentence. One explanation as to why we end up in paradox is 
that we are making syntax - the logical structure of the sentence - dependent on what we 
take the sentence to mean, that is, on semantics. 
Russell and Wittgenstein take very different approaches to this type of problem. 
Russell 's  method (which became much clearer after Tarski) was to resolve the 
contradiction by showing that such self-referential sentences collapse the distinction 
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between a meta- (or higher-order language) and an object language. This collapsing of 
the distinction results in our both defining and applying the semantic term "true" in the 
language in which it is used. The paradox results in our not making the sharp distinc�ion 
between a higher-order language (a metalanguage), in which the semantic term 'is true' is 
first defined, and then applying it to sentences of the language that we are talking about, 
the object language. Both Russell and Tarski favor this type of approach. The second 
method, the one that Wittgenstein seems to favor, is to show that such propositions could 
not have a sense or meaning in the rather peculiar way in which Wittgenstein defines 
"sense". Recall that according to Wittgenstein all and only those propositions that depict 
facts have sense. Thus, Wittgenstein' s approach seems to be that the statement "This 
statement is false" is a pseudo-proposition - it is nonsense - because it not only refers to 
itself but makes illicit use of a formal concept ("is false") as if it were a concept proper, 
like, for example, "is a horse." Formal concepts such as "is true" or "is false" cannot be 
said according to Wittgenstein - they do not have semantic meaning. However, their 
meaning is "shown" in the use we make of ordinary contingent propositions. 
But notice that either approach (whatever we may think of them) requires our 
resorting to a higher-order language to solve this problem. In the method favored by 
Russell and Tarski this is obvious. Wittgenstein's approach, however, would also seem to 
require a metalanguage to explain (define) what it means for a proposition to have sense. 
What is it about the nature of the proposition that rules out such self-referring expressions 
as meaningless? Whether we ultimately agree with Wittgenstein or not is irrelevant. The 
important point is that he must resort to a higher-order language to provide us with some 
criterion as to what is to count as a proposition with sense, so that we can see why such 
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self-referring expressions are nonsense. And on my view he attempts this very thing in 
his TLP with a meta- or higher-order language. 
Thus, in order to show how certain self-referring sentences result in paradox we 
must ' say' - in a kind of higher-order language - what we take the sentence to mean or 
more properly what we take the predicate "is false" to mean. And this logical definition 
will be given in such a language. And in order to show that self-referring expressions are 
nonsense, we must be given a kind of logical definition or criterion as to what is to count 
as a sentence with sense ( one that is meaningful). And this, so it seems to me, must be 
given in a language that is of a higher-order, even for Wittgenstein. It is important to see 
that even ifwe do not regard the 'propositions' of the TLP as a metalanguage, it is a 
language that contains semantic terms such as "true", "meaning", "denotes", etc. Thus, 
Wittgenstein' s language has functions that are typical of a meta-language in Tarski's  
sense. Indeed, i t  is  not clear what other function the 'propositions' of the TLP - at least 
those that deal with the connection between the logic of our language and the world, 
which is the bulk of them - can have, given that they certainly do not picture facts, and 
are thus, in this sense, without meaning. 
In his criticism of Russell ' s  theory of types Wittgenstein is also using a meta­
language to show where he thinks Russell goes wrong: "It can be seen that Russell must 
be wrong, because he had to mention the meaning of signs when establishing the rules for 
them" (3.33 1 again). By "meaning of signs" Wittgenstein means something like "what 
the signs refer to" or what they are "about" - i.e., the semantic meaning of the signs. And 
by "rules" for the signs Wittgenstein means how the signs can be legitimately used - that 
is, their logical syntax. The charge against Russell amounts to the idea that we ought 
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never, according to Wittgenstein, make the logical syntax of our language contingent on 
the meanings of the signs. John Nolt sums this up nicely when he writes: "The charge 
against the theory of types is that it makes syntax dependent on semantics because one 
cannot set up the theory without mentioning the meanings of the signs in establishing 
syntactic rules for them" (from John Nolt' s lecture on logic60). 
However, it is apparent that Wittgenstein, in order to make clear ("elucidate" 
3 .263) what he regards as confusion on Russell's part, must himself use certain formal 
concepts that his own semantic 'theory' (the picture 'theory') regards as unsayable. What 
Wittgenstein is 'saying' cannot, by his own lights, be said. The charge that Russell is 
guilty of relying on semantics to explain the use of his syntactic signs is a charge that can 
only be made in something like meta-language. Wittgenstein is forced to use a higher­
order language to clarify what he regards as a mistake on Russell's part. Moreover, as we 
shall shortly see, it appears that in setting up his picture (model) theory of language, 
Wittgenstein does exactly the same thing as Russell - that is, he uses a higher order 
language, one that gives the semantic meaning of signs61 , to explain the syntactic use of 
those signs. Indeed, as early as 1 914  Wittgenstein wrote : "Every connexion of signs 
which appears to say something about its own sense is a pseudo-proposition (like all 
propositions of logic)" (NB, p. 1 2). Thus, the propositions of the TLP are "pseudo­
propositions" because they attempt to say where Russell goes wrong and they attempt to 
60 Professor John Nolt thinks that this is not an insurmountable problem for Russell, but this need not 
concern us here. I am only interested in what Wittgenstein took to be the problem with Russell's theory of 
types. 61 The distinction between "sign" and "symbol" is simply that the former is merely a scratch on a piece of 
paper until we give it a meaning or a role to play, whereas a symbol is a sign that has a role to play in our 
syntax. 
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say what the meaning of ordinary propositions consists in. What I am doing is basically 
interpreting Wittgenstein's  "pseudo-propositions" as meta-linguistic assertions. 
At the end of the day, Wittgenstein�s chief objection to Russell 's theory of types 
is that it is unnecessary or superfluous. There is, according to Wittgenstein, no need for a 
hierarchy of types. For the meaning of any sign will be apparent in the use we make of 
the sign. And it is the role or function of the sign that determines the signs meaning: "If a 
sign is useless, it is meaningless; that is the point of Occam's maxim"(3 .328). The 
context of this observation falls within Wittgenstein's criticism of Russell 's type theory, 
but it applies equally to Wittgenstein' s own project to set up a 'theory' of how 
propositions "show" their sense. Wittgenstein wants to say only what he regards as being 
minimally required in order for us to see how propositions have sense - that is, in order to 
set up his picture theory of meaning. And in order to do this I maintain that he must use a 
higher order language. It is to the setting up of his picture theory that we now tum. 
"Elucidating" the Picture 'Theory' Via a Higher-order Language 
Much is ' said' by Wittgenstein before we can appreciate what he means when he 
says that "a proposition shows its sense" (4.022). We are told that a proposition "shows 
its sense" in virtue of its being a "picture of reality" ( 4.0 1 ), and that "a picture is a fact" 
(2. 1 41  ). The question before us is this :  How does Wittgenstein build his picture theory? 
Wittgenstein rather notoriously begins his TLP with a view of the world as a 
whole: "The world is all that is the case" ( 1 ), and proceeds to work backwards from this 
God's eye view, showing us just how the connection between language and the world is 
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forged at the deepest level . It is this linking up, as it were, of the language-world relation 
that is accomplished by and through a higher-order language. In demonstrating that he 
uses such a language t<:> build his picture theory, I will start from what Wittgenstein 
regards as the basic constituents of reality - the "objects that make up the substance of 
the world" (2.02 1 ) - and proceed up and out, if you will . 
Names and Objects; the Most Basic Language/World Relation 
One couldn't have a better example of the use of higher-order expressions or 
sentences than Wittgenstein's 'claim'  that "a name means an object. The object is its 
meaning" (3 .203). Here a simple sign, such as 'A ' refers to (bedeutet) a simple object, a. 
Here "simple" means that neither the sign nor the object is complex; they cannot be 
analyzed or broken down any further. These simple objects are absolutely indefinable, as 
are the signs that refer to or name them. Unfortunately, Wittgenstein does not provide us 
with any examples of such signs or simples. 62 But we can appreciate his point if we 
assume that something like a sense datum ( e.g., a point of red on a visual field) is simple 
and that the indexical "this" serves as a simple sign used to name it. At any rate, we 
clearly see Wittgenstein using the term "name" to mean (to refer to) the name of a simple 
object. If this is not a higher order language then I do not know what is to count as one. 
62 I am not even going to touch the issue of what is to count as an object, as this issue goes well beyond the 
scope of what I am trying to establish here; namely, the role played by Wittgenstein's 'propositions' in 
setting up his picture theory. 
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Wittgenstein instructs us further as to how his sign language or logical syntax 
works when he writes: "every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve 
. to define it; and the definitions point the way" (3 .261 ). Here Wittgenstein is stipulating, 
via a higher order language, how we are to apply his picture theory of language. But how 
are we to understand 3 .261 ? Wittgenstein is instructing us that certain "primitive signs" 
(names) which cannot be defined further (see 3 .26) serve to define those expressions that 
are built up from them, that have a "definition". More specifically, an "elementary 
proposition" is defined as "a . . .  concatenation of names" ( 4.22). 
On the language side of the language/world relation - on the logical syntax side -
we go from a simple sign (a "name") to the building up of an "elementary proposition" (a 
"nexus" or "concatenation of names"). Wittgenstein is "pointing the way" to his picture 
theory of language through the use of such stipulative definitions. Witness 4.24: "Names 
are the simple symbols: I indicate them by single letters ('X', ' Y' , 'Z')." All of this can be 
said, according to Wittgenstein, for we are dealing here with logical syntax, not 
semantics. More importantly, the simple signs or names refer to simple objects in the 
world; that is the primary function of the simple signs. And it is the link between 
language and the world that cannot be "said". The language-world relation involves 
semantics, whereas the language side alone, such as giving a description of the way signs 
are to be used, involves logical syntax. Let us now see what role is played by the 
"elementary propositions". 
9 1  
Elementary Propositions and States of Affairs 
At 4.2 1 we are told that the "simplest kind of proposition, an elementary 
proposition, asserts the existence of states of affairs". And we already know that "a state 
of affairs is a combination of objects (things)" (2. 0 1 ). Thus, an elementary proposition 
depicts a state of affairs in the world. But notoriously, once again, Wittgenstein does not 
provide us with a single example of what is to count as an "elementary proposition". (We 
might suggest something like Neurath's  protocol sentences as examples of elementary 
propositions merely for illustrative purposes. Thus, "red here now" might count). But 
why can't we at least illustrate what is to count as an elementary proposition-why can't 
we at least point to one? More to the point, why should we think that there are such 
linguistic entities as "elementary propositions" and the ( ontological) "states of affairs" 
that they correspond to? 
Wittgenstein's argument for this is in a higher-order language as well. At 3 .23 
Wittgenstein writes: "The requirement that simple signs be possible is the requirement 
that sense be determinate." And at 4.22 1 1 he writes :  "Even if the world is infinitely 
complex, so that every fact consists of infinitely many states of affairs and every state of 
affairs is composed of infinitely many objects, there would still have to be objects and 
states of affairs." Wittgenstein holds that the meaning of any proposition must be, in 
theory, determinate - a proposition is "articulate" (3 .25 1 ). A proposition is articulate 
because it means whatever it does in virtue of being a picture of reality. But the sense of a 
proposition could not be determined if there were no states of affairs, and there could be 
no states of affairs if there were no simples. Now in this argument as to why there must 
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be "states of affairs" and "simples" we see the use of a higher-order language. For all 
these terms or expressions ("states of affairs", "simples", etc) are defined in a language 
that is distinct from the ordinary language we use to picture facts. Sentences of ordinary 
language - the language of science broadly construed - are the only sentences with sense. 
Let us revisit Wittgenstein's argument for simples. Without simples there could 
be no picture (right or wrong, true or false) of reality. The fully articulated proposition, 
then, even if we cannot empirically give its complete logical analysis, must in principle 
be analyzable into simple signs ("names") that correspond to simple objects. According 
to Wittgenstein, we could never map our language onto the world without positing the 
existence of simple objects ( simples are a necessary or transcendental requirement for 
sense in any descriptive language). That Wittgenstein has something like this in mind is 
clear: "If the world had no substance, then whether a proposition had se�se would depend 
on whether another proposition was true" (2.02 1 1 .  Why is this so unacceptable? 
Wittgenstein tells us at 2.02 1 :  "In that case we could not sketch any picture of the world 
(true or false)." No proposition could picture a fact if the analysis did not end with simple 
objects, for the truth of any proposition would then depend on the truth of another 
proposition and we would thus never arrive at the pure correspondence between language 
and world. We might put it by saying that the simple objects (whatever they are) are what 
anchor our descriptive propositions to the world. There could be no facts and so no 
(describable) world without simple objects. "The world is all that is the case" ( 1 )  would 
be a completely empty instruction as to how to see the world if we did not posit the 
existence of simple objects. The reason is plain: each and every sentence that has 
meaning (sense) acquires it in virtue of depicting either the way the world is or the way it 
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might be. But in order to do this a sentence ( a picture) must be "articulate" (3 . 1 41 ), and 
by "articulate" Wittgenstein means that a sentence must in principle be capable of being 
analyzed down to its most basic constituents, names. And the names must correspond in 
reality to objects (simples). If names do not correspond to simples, then we could not 
"sketch any picture of the world (true or false)" (2.021 2) because the truth of any 
sentence would depend on the truth of another sentence, and thus language would never 
get to the "substance of the world " (2.021 1 ). This is why I say that "The world is ·all that 
is the case" would be vacuous if there were no simple objects and the names that refer to 
them. We could not "sketch a picture" of any possible world if there were no simples 
[what Wittgenstein calls "the substance of the world" (2.02 1 1 )] .  
The existence of "simple signs" and simples seems to rest on the idea that their 
existence is required in order for "sense" (meaning) to be "determinate" (3 .23). There is a 
Kantian flavor in all this in that Wittgenstein appears to be giving a kind of 
transcendental argument for the existence of objects or simples. In order for sense or 
meaning to be determinate, we must posit the existence of simples. Wittgenstein does not 
peer into the world, discover that there are simples as a matter of fact, and then argue on a 
posteriori grounds as to how a proposition has a determinate meaning (this explains the 
conspicuous absence of anything remotely resembling an example of a simple in his early 
work, as well as his dismissal of the need to provide any examples). Rather, his 
ontological commitments are dictated by his view of what is required in order for 
descriptive language to picture this or that fact. The requirement that simples exist (the 
"substance of the world") is a transcendental condition for the possibility of sense 
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(meaning). If we are to describe the world at all, then the existence of simples must be 
posited. 
Note that what makes Wittgenstein's 'pseudo-propositions' both semantic and 
higher order is his use of terms such as "true", "means", "refers" or "denotes", etc. This is 
the most telling characteristic of any higher order language. And Wittgenstein then uses 
his 'propositions' to build his picture 'theory' of how descriptive language connects to 
the world. Even if you regard my interpretation of Wittgenstein's picture 'theory' of 
language as mistaken it appears that the building of it is said in a higher-order language: 
That "names" are simple signs which "mean an object"; that an "elementary proposition" 
refers to a state of affairs; and that "propositions" depict possible facts in the world. The 
'meanings' or definitions of such terms and what they refer to are all given in a higher 
order language: we have "names" corresponding to objects (simples); "elementary 
propositions" corresponding to states of affairs; and lastly "propositions" corresponding 
to pictures. The 'meanings' of all the terms in quotations are given in a metalanguage 
with a view to showing us how ordinary contingent propositions depict reality. In order to 
see how propositions are meaningful ( or what it means to say that propositions have 
sense) we must see that the meaning of a "simple sign" is its bearer. All this is done in a 
higher-order language, for such claims cannot occur in the language that Wittgenstein is 
talking about. Much the same could be said for all the other terms (e.g., "states of 
affairs", "elementary propositions", etc) that Wittgenstein introduces. All are introduced 
so that we may see what it 'means' to ' say' that a proposition has sense only in virtue of 
its being a picture of reality (2.22 1 ). 
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Thus, all of these terms have only a meta-linguistic meaning, if they have 
meaning at all. Of course, according to the letter of Wittgenstein's view as to what counts 
as a proposition with sense they have no meaning at all; such 'claims' do not picture facts 
in the world. What I am suggesting is that their only purpose is to show us how 
contingent propositions depict facts. And once this is accomplished these '4elucidations" 
can safely be discarded. 
Propositions and the Facts They Picture 
At 4.021 Wittgenstein writes: "A proposition is a picture of reality: for if I 
understand a proposition, I know the situation that it represents." And at 4.024 he writes: 
"To understand a proposition means to know what is the case if it is true. (One can 
understand it, therefore, without knowing whether it is true.) It is understood by anyone 
who understands its constituents." First, a proposition is made up of simple signs or 
names. These are its constituents. We have already examined the parts that make-up a 
proposition, and have seen that the definitions of these parts are carried out in a meta­
language. We are now in a position to see that the definition of a proposition is something 
like this: the sense of a proposition just is "the conditions that make it true." This 
definition permits us to understand true as well as false propositions. A false proposition 
has sense (meaning) so long as we can articulate the way the world would need to be in 
order for it to be true. 
In grasping what it means for a proposition to have sense (meaning) we must 
interpret Wittgenstein's 'claims' as meta-linguistic. What he defines as a proposition with 
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sense can only be defined in some higher-order language. He fills in what he means when 
he says "a proposition shows its sense" ( 4.022). And at 4.02 1 where we are told that it is 
in virtue of being a "picture of reality" that a proposition's sense is shown. But how does 
Wittgenstein get us to see this? By in effect 'showing ' ( or stipulating or elucidating) that 
the only propositions that count as meaningful ones- that is, the ones with sense - are 
those that "picture reality". And this is all accomplished via the use of a meta-language. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein is providing a criterion of meaning for our ordinary contingent 
propositions. Put another way, Wittgenstein is giving us a definition in a higher order 
language of what is to count as a meaningful proposition in our lower-level language. 
The lower-level language is simply the set of contingent propositions of science broadly 
construed. These are the propositions that have sense because they depict possible 
situations in the world. What Wittgenstein is in effect 'saying' is this: "The criterion of 
meaning for ordinary contingent propositions is that they represent or picture a way in 
which the world might be". We might call this the picture theory criterion of meaning. 
Notice that this 'claim' is of a higher-order than the contingent propositions that it speaks 
about. It cannot have the kind of meaning that it requires of ordinary propositions. Yet, 
for all that, it seems quite intelligible. We understand it. And I submit that we should 
understand it as a higher-order 'claim' about what is to count as a meaningful proposition 
in ordinary language. 
Indeed, understanding Wittgenstein's  picture theory of meaning in this way paves 
the way for seeing the world as a "limited whole", for we can see that a complete list of 
all true propositions would give us a complete description of the world: "The world is all 
that is the case" ( I ). His higher order language is required in his account of everything 
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from the deepest connection between any descriptive language and all possible worlds ("a 
name means an object") to his picture 'theory' of meaning (a proposition with sense is by 
definition one that represents a possible situation in the world). And it leads, in the end, 
to his invitation to us to view "the world as the totality of facts, not things" ( 1 . 1  ). His 
metalinguistic account of the picture theory of meaning leads nicely into his invitational 
and evocative use of language whose function is to cause us to feel the world as a 
"limited whole". 
The Logic of Descriptive Language Results in Our "Seeing the World as a Limited 
Whole" 
Wittgenstein begins his treatise with the oracular pronouncement "the world is all 
that is the case" ( 1 )  and ends with the pronouncement "what we cannot speak about we 
must pass over in silence" (7). Much of his work consists in directing our attention to his 
picture theory of language. ( 1 )  Directs us to see the world from a God's eye view. But 
Wittgenstein fills ( 1 )  in, so speak, by providing us with metalinguistic assertions as to 
how we can come to see the world in this way. I have argued that he does so by using a 
higher-order language. Wittgenstein begins by projecting us out of the world ("the world 
is all that is the case", 1 )  and ends with a demanding silence about anything that does not 
involve a sentence about some possible fact in the world ("whereof one cannot speak 
thereof one must remain silent", 7). He begins and ends with a transcendental view of the 
connection between language and the world. In the bulk of his work he 'says' something 
about this connection. But the connection between language and the world turns out to 
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have rather negative consequences in terms of our saying anything about the importance 
or meaning of life and where in the world value is to be discovered. For in showing us 
that the world is "all that is the case" (and nothing more), we are forced to see the 
impossibility of saying anything about what, according to Wittgenstein, really matters. I 
have argued that all of this is done with a higher order language; a language that 'says' 
what cannot technically be said by his picture theory: a language which "shows" us that 
the right way to see the world is to see it as nothing more than a complete description of 
all true contingent propositions. 
But what is the ultimate purpose of this language that is, by Wittgenstein's own 
lights, not a language? How does any of this take us to the really important stuff that 
cannot be said? The picture theory shows us that all that we can speak about are the facts 
in the world. For the logic of our language - that is, the logic of any representational 
language - can do no more than this. As he says in his LE, all that language can give us 
are "facts, facts, and facts but no ethics" (p. 67). As far as the logic of our language is 
concerned, seeing the world as a "limited whole" means no more than that a complete 
description of all the facts in the world is to see the very limits of the world. Should (7), 
then, be understood as no more than the admonition that we are stuck only with facts, and 
that the world is totally without value and meaning in an absolute sense? Can anything 
positive be said about value at all? More importantly, how does his view of the logic of 
our language lead to anything remotely related to the ethical? (For one of my main 
contentions is that the logic of our language (in some sense) leads to a perspective on the 
world that has an ethical aspect to it.) Must we suppose, in order to wrest some sense of 
the ethical from Wittgenstein' s  Tractatus, that when he refers to what we cannot "speak 
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about" he is referring to some nouinenal realm of value, something about which we 
cannot speak, but is ineffably there?63 Or is (7) suggesting that there is nothing to keep 
quiet about and so we should keep quiet? 
I will try to tread a path between these two extremes, arguing instead that 
Wittgenstein's God's  eye view of the world opens the door for our feeling the world as 
having absolute value. This feeling or experience is the experience of the mystical. I want 
to suggest that the mystical "shows itself' (6.522) when we "feel" the world as a "limited 
whole" (6.45) Whether or not Wittgenstein is ri.ght about this, it is pretty clear that he 
thought that seeing the world under the aspect of eternity has an aesthetico-ethical 
dimension to it. But this aspect of the perspective can only be appreciated once we have 
been brought to the limit of descriptive or representational language, and thus to the limit 
of the world (5 .61 ). 
The limit of our language shows us that ethics cannot be discovered in the facts of 
the world, and thus the only place left for absolute value is in our perspective on "the 
world as a limited whole". But two nagging questions still remain:  First, how can we 
characterize the aesthetico-ethical dimension of the transcendental perspective on the 
world if the perspective is at the very limit or outside of language and the world? Second, 
what, if any, practical good comes out of this perspective - does the view have nothing to 
do with ethics in the more ordinary ( and intuitive) sense at all? 
I answer these questions in Chapters Three and Four. In Chapter three I argue 
that Wittgenstein's  perspective on the world can be characterized as will-less and 
63 Engelmann, for example, says this about the "significance" of the TLP: "It consists in having established 
the irrefutable separation between the higher sphere, which exists, and its expression, which is 
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timeless, and that this, in part, is what enables us to feel or experience the world as 
having absolute value. I also argue that when Wittgenstein speaks about the 
"metaphysical subject" and the "willing subject" he is not committed to any type of 
noumenal self that apprehends value in some transcendent realm. Instead, I contend that 
his use of these terms is a kind of dramatic way for him to express his transcendental 
perspective on the world. Here it is important to notice that I avoid the positivistic view 
that nothing at all is elucidated by Wittgenstein's remarks on ethics, value, and the 
mystical. 
I also demonstrate that Wittgenstein does have a way to talk about ethics, in the 
more ordinary sense, if we attribute to him a view of moral claims that is very like 
Philippa Foot's position in here article "Morality As A System of Hypothetical 
Imperatives" ( 1 972). If we interpret Wittgenstein talk about "relative" value in the world 
as something akin to Foot's view that moral claims are basically hypothetical 
imperatives, we have a way to reconcile the idea that value, in an absolute sense, can 
have nothing to do with the facts in the world, whereas ethical claims made about this or 
that action (which is a fact in the world) can be said, but have only a hypothetical status. 
problematical, and in having shown up the fundamental dubiousness of such expression" (Letters from L. W. 
with a Memoir, p. 98). 
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CHAPTER THREE 
(a) An Aesthetico-Ethical 
Perspective with Respect to The World; 
The Influence of Arthur.Schopenhauer 
For the man who studies to gain insight, books and studies are merely rungs of the 
ladder on which he climbs to the summit of knowledge. As soon as a rung has 
raised him one step, he leaves it behind. On the other hand, the many who study 
in order to fill their memories do not use the rungs of the ladder for climbing, but 
take them off and load themselves with them to take away, rejoicing at the 
increasing weight of the burden. They remain below forever, since they are 
carrying what ought to have carried them. (Schopenhauer: WWR, Vol. II, p. 72) 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them - as steps - to climb up beyond them. (He must, so to speak, throw away the 
ladder after he has climbed up it.) 
He must transcend these propositions, and then he will see the world aright. 
(Wittgenstein: TLP, 6.54)64 
The above passages makes clear that Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein regard 
"insight" or a kind of perceptual knowledge - in Wittgenstein' s language, "seeing the 
world aright" - as the primary goal of any philosophical work ( or, for Schopenhauer, any 
work of genius), and that we are to use "books and studies" as rungs on a "ladder" to gain 
such insight. Only then can the "books and studies" - the 'propositions' - be left behind 
or discarded. 
And this is not the only overarching, if rather loose, parallel between the two 
thinkers. Indeed, Schopenhauer regards conceptual, abstract knowledge as second rate 
compared to intuitive perception: "The source of true wisdom lies not in the abstract 
64 Wittgenstein's claims here are far more extreme than Schopenhauer's. However, both passages 
demonstrate the influence that Schopenhauer had on Wittgenstein (the obvious reference to "throwing away 
the ladder"), as well as the fact that both thinkers regarded "books and studies" (especially Philosophy) and 
philosophical 'propositions' as a means to gaining "insight" or the right perspective. It might be called 
wisdom. 
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rational knowledge, but in the correct and profound apprehension of the world in 
perception" (my emphasis, WWR, p. 80). This is very like Wittgenstein' s talk of coming 
to "see the world aright" (6.54, my emphasis). Moreover, Wittgenstein's picture theory of 
language is, in the words of James Edwards, the apotheosis of "rationality-as­
representation" (p. 60). 65 What can be represented ( described or said) by propositions of 
natural science broadly construed is "abstract rational knowledge", and all that can be so 
represented or pictured is not the really important part of Wittgenstein' s work. In his 
preface Wittgenstein says that the "truth of the thoughts that are here communicated . . .  
seem . . .  unassailable and definitive . . .  [and] . . .  this shows how little is achieved when these 
problems are solved" (TLP, p. 4). Why is so little achieved? All he has shown is how to 
draw the line between sense and nonsense; and propositions with sense, I am suggesting, 
are very like the kind of knowledge that Schopenhauer regards as second rate. D. A. 
Weiner has written: "According to Schopenhauer, only abstract knowledge can be 
communicated in words; intuitive knowledge, on the other hand, can be shown, but not 
said" (p 38).66 
Today it is a pretty well known fact that Schopenhauer had a tremendous 
influence on Wittgenstein's  early work.67 But it is very difficult to trace those influences 
in a detailed and illuminating way, especially when it comes to Wittgenstein's remarks 
65 In his Ethics Without Philosophy (1982) 
66 Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer 's Influence on Wittgenstein 's Early Philosophy ( 1992) 
67 G.E.M Anscombe quotes Wittgenstein as saying: "Schopenhauer was fundamentally right, if only a few 
adjustments and clarifications were made" (Introduction to the Tractatus, p 1 1). But who in the hell knows 
what "clarifications" and "adjustments" Wittgenstein had in mind. He certainly does not tell us. Indeed, 
what is so frustrating about Wittgenstein's TLP (one of the things anyway) is that he does not give due 
credit to Schopenhauer anywhere. Yet it is clear that much of his ideas come from Schopenhauer. It is 
really a mystery as to why he so conspicuously leaves Schopenhauer out. For an intriguing answer to this 
question, see the marvelous little book Genius and Talent: Schopenhauer 's Influence on Wittgenstein 's 
Early Philosophy by D. A. Weiner ( 1992). 
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about ethics and aesthetics. In what follows I will focus on those aspects of 
Schopenhauer's work that clarify the aesthetico-ethical aspect of Wittgenstein' s  
transcendental perspective with respect to the world. The above parallels, though 
somewhat loose, do suggest that both thinkers regarded intuitive perception (I hesitate to 
refer to this as "knowledge" on Wittgenstein' s narrow view of what can count as such) as 
more profound and harder to come by than rational knowledge, and both seemed to think 
that philosophy shows us something vital about the world as a whole. Still, we need to get 
to the details of Schopenhauer's  influence on what I am calling Wittgenstein's 
transcendental perspective on the world. 
What metaphysical and ethical presuppositions did Wittgenstein borrow from 
Schopenhauer, and, more importantly, how do they show up in his draconian approach to 
ethics and value in his TLP? 
Relating "Das Mystische" to the World 
Wittgenstein claims that ethics, aesthetics, and (even) logic are "transcendental" 
(6.42 1 and 6. 1 3, respectively). But he sheds very little light on what he means by 
"transcendental" (6.42 1 ), except to say that it is what' s shown (6.522), and cannot be 
said; it is also what is "higher" (6.42), if that helps. Nor does he give us more than a few 
hints as to what the relation is between the world that is pictured through descriptive 
language and the other areas (above) that he characterizes as "transcendental". What is 
the relation of ethics, aesthetics, and value to the world? 
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There must be some connection or relation, for if no such connection exists it is 
hard to see why Wittgenstein regarded whatever it is that's "higher" as vital to our seeing 
the world "aright" (6.54). Magee's comment about Schopenhauer's philosophy is equally 
pertinent to Wittgenstein's work: "Of course, all these things [i.e., what's "higher": 
ethics, the value of the world, etc.] must have what one might call an interface with the 
world of phenomena: if they did not, they could have no import for us whatsoever" 
(Magee, p. 3 1 7). 68 
We are left with wondering just what the relation is between what's 
"transcendental" and the world of facts. What is the connection between the "thing that 
indeed cannot be put into words", but "makes itself manifest" (6.522) and the world? 
How do the two "interface"? Put differently, the problem reduces to this: If ethics is 
"transcendental" (6.42 1 )  and value "lies outside the world" (6.4 1 ), then it seems that the 
connection between ethics and the world in which we live is hopelessly mysterious and 
even irrelevant.69 The transcendental perspective on the world must, it seems, make a 
difference in our attitude toward the world as a "limited whole" (6.45}-in how we come 
to see and "feel the world" (6.45). I will argue that this perspective is an attitude that we 
take to the world: "The will is an attitude of the subject to the world" (NB, p. 87). Now 
the term "will", as it is used here, is to be distinguished from the will of individual 
subjects in the world; that is, will that takes as its object some particular fact or facts in 
the world. 
68 Magee, Bryan: The Philosophy of Schopenhauer ( 1 983) 
69 Perhaps "irrelevant" is not quite right. Certainly Wittgenstein's conception of ethics has little to do with 
our actions in the world. It is more appropriate to say that the ethical in Wittgenstein's TLP is "far 
removed" from the facts in the world. This is what I mean by "irrelevant." 
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I will argue that Wittgenstein has two senses of will at work in his Tractatus: the 
first takes the whole world - the world as a "limited whole" - as object. It is in this sense 
that will is essentially involved in the aesthetico-ethcial dimension of Wittgenstein's 
transcendental perspective with respect to the world. Witness: "If the good or bad 
exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the limits of the world, not the 
facts - not what can be expressed by means of language. In short the effect must be that it 
becomes an altogether different world. It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole" 
(6.43). The second notion of "will" or "willing" is the more ordinary will of this or that 
subject in the world, and is essentially connected with the actions of individual subjects. 
This notion of will is the one that Wittgenstein refers to as being a "phenomenon [ that is] 
of interest only to psychology" (6.423). Will, in this latter sense, is to be disconnected or 
divorced from the transcendental perspective on the world if we are to see the "world 
aright". 
I contend that there are interesting parallels between Wittgenstein' s  "metaphysical 
subject" (5 .633 and 5.641 )  and Schopenhauer' s  "pure knowing subject." Neither 
Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein use these terms univocally, as we shall see. I will argue 
that when Wittgenstein refers to the "metaphysical subject" he is best interpreted as 
referring to a perspective that is disconnected from the individual subject 's will in the 
world. The perspective amounts to a kind of pure objectivity with respect to the world. 
Indeed, it is in large part the will-less and timeless (qua individual subject in the world) 
aspect of Wittgenstein's "transcendental perspective" that lends the perspective its 
aesthetico-ethical dimension. 
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Now the language used by Wittgenstein suggests that it is the "metaphysical 
subject" that takes up such a perspective. However, it is my view that what Wittgenstein 
calls the "metaphysical subject" is better thought of as any i�dividual subject that views 
the world from a timeless and will-less perspective. The primary ethical goal - the ethical 
point - of the Tractatus is to bring us to this perspective. 
To see the world "sub specie aetemi" (6.45) is to take up the transcendental 
perspective. Moreover, it is precisely this perspective that serves as "the solution of the 
riddle of life" - a solution that "lies outside space and time" (6.43 12). Having said that 
this solution "lies outside space and time", it is natural to want to interpret Wittgenstein 
as suggesting that value, ethics, and will, which is "the bearer of good and evil" (NB; 
2 1 . 1 7  . 1 6, p. 76) is something that stands outside the world, in a kind of "noumenal" 
reality in the following sense: the ethical will stands beyond the totality of facts, and thus 
is beyond our ken, but if, per impossible, we were in a position to know something about 
it there would be much that we could say. 
Such a view treats the metaphysical subject as part of some super-worldly reality; 
something forever out of reach but required as a kind of touchstone for value in this 
world. This is a mistake. 70 Again, the "metaphysical subject" is best interpreted as a will­
less and timeless perspective on the world; an attitude to the world as a limited whole. 
I want to begin with a brief and very conservative account of Schopenhauer's 
distinction between the world as will and the world as representation. This will be 
70 "The thinking, presenting subject; there is no such thing" (5.63 1 ). 
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followed by an account of the distinction between Schopenhauer's  "pure knowing 
subject" and his "purely knowing subject". Then we will investigate those unmistakably 
Schopenhauerian passages of Wittgenstein's Notebooks ( 1 9 14- 1 9 1 6) that made their way 
(albeit in abbreviated and different form) into the Tractatus. These passages concern: 
ethics, aesthetics, the metaphysical subject, and the world seen "sub specie aetemitatis." 
World as Will and Representation :  The Two Poles7 1  
According to Schopenhauer will is the ultimate ground72 of all our representations 
and so our world: it is the matter/energy that is required for the existence of a world of 
representation in the first place. Will is manifested in all things, inanimate and animate 
objects. Will, energy or force manifests itself in the phenomenal world - the world of 
representation - through particular bits of matter, that is, through objects. 
In addition, there is another aspect of will - one that cannot be represented; this is 
will as it is in itself. It should be noted that Schopenhauer usually just distinguishes 
between will as "the thing in itself' and as "phenomena" or "objects." 
But there are some passages that support reading Schopenhauer in terms of a 
three-fold distinction. For example, in Volume I he talks about matter as "nothing but 
causality" (Wirken13), suggesting that matter is not any type of object or thing within the 
71 Richard Aquila has been instrumental in helping me to understand the broad strokes of Schopenhauer's 
view. 
72 Will should not be thought of as the cause of the world; it is not a ground in this sense. For will is, 
strictly speaking, independent of the principle of sufficient reason. This means that it is outside the 
phenomenal world and so outside of space, time, and causality. It just is. However, without will there is no 
world of representation. 
73 Richard Aquila suggests "effectuality" or "effectivity" in place of"causality" as a translation of Wirken. 
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world as presentation, but that it is rather an expression of the "in-itself' on a level that is 
more fundamental than the objects and things within the phenomenal world (p.8). And in 
Volume II he mentions that the matter "pole", when divorced from our way of viewing or 
representing it, is "quite dead" (p. 1 5). In any case, Schopenhauer emphasizes that we 
cannot know will "as it is in itself." 
Indeed, since will just is force or energy that constitutes the world as 
representation, it cannot be pictured or represented outside of the way in which it 
manifests itself in the phenomenal world. Whatever qualities or characteristics belong to 
will, outside of the way in which it is manifested in the world of representation, is forever 
beyond our ken. We can only 'characterize' it as being a kind of undifferentiated unity. 
(1) The Pure Knowing Subject and (2) the Purely Knowing Subject 
In order for there to be a world of representation in the first place there must, in 
addition to will (matter/energy/force), be a knower to which the world as representation 
presents itself. There are essentially, then, two "poles" in Schopenhauer' s philosophy: 
There is will, which can be thought of as the "matter/energy pole", and there is the 
knower, which can be thought of as the "subject pole". Neither of these poles can 
themselves be represented according to Schopenhauer: the matter pole because it just is 
the force or energy which makes possible what's represented, and the subject pole 
because it is what' s  required for the world as representation to be apprehended or 
cognized at all: "The world as representation, the objective world, has thus, so to speak, 
two poles, namely, the knowing subject plain and simple without the forms of its 
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knowing, and crude matter without form and quality. Both are absolutely unknowable: 
the subject, because it is that which knows; matter, because without form and quality it 
cannot be perceived" (Vol II, p. 1 5). This former "pole" is the subject of pure knowing: 
"That which knows all things and is known by none is the subject" (Vol. I, p. 5). Thus the 
subject pole, since it is not part of the world as presentation, cannot be an object of 
knowledge at all .  But there cannot be a world of representation without a subject and 
there cannot be a subject without a world of representation (whatever is known 
presupposes an object of knowledge and whatever is an object of knowledge presupposes 
a knower). There are then, on Schopenhauer' s view, "two essential, necessary, and 
inseparable halves. The one half is the object . . .  but the other _half . . .  [is] . . .  the 
subject. . .  [ that is] . . .  whole and undivided in every representing being" (p. 5). 
Now the term "subject" (immediately above) is somewhat ambiguous. Here 
Schopenhauer is not talking about an individual subject in the world as presented; that is, 
he is not referring to a subject that is instantiated in this bit of matter, but is referring only 
to the "knowing subject plain and simple" (p. 1 5). Richard Aquila characterizes the 
subject pole in the following way: "Schopenhauer is discussing the ' subject pole' 
wherever he is talking about the process of cognition as such, i.e., with respect to 
whatever there is in cognition that is not explicable wholly in terms of the particular 
material medium or substratum through which it is operating, or in which it is realized or 
instantiated" (Richard' s  Notes). 
Thus, "the pure subject of knowing", cannot, in the sense in which it has been 
explicated above, be thought of as a particular subject, for any particular subject would be 
instantiated by this or that bit of matter, and so could be an object of representation. This 
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latter subject just is " . . .  the subject of knowing, who appears as an individual only 
through his identity with the body . . .  " (p. 1 00). 
There is another distinction that needs to be made before we can appreciate the 
way in which Wittgenstein made use of Schopenhauer's talk of a "pure knowing subject." 
Schopenhauer also refers to the "purely knowing subject". This is more like a cognitive 
state of an individual. The idea that the purely knowing subject is more like the most 
objective state of an individual clearly stands out in those passages where Schopenhauer 
is talking about contemplative "genius": 
Genius is the capacity to remain in a state of pure perception [ what Schopenhauer 
also calls "the most complete objectivity", Vol. II, p. 1 85], to lose oneself in 
perception, to remove from the service of the will the knowledge which originally 
existed only for this service. In other words, genius is the ability to leave entirely 
out of sight our own interest, our willing, and our aims, and consequently to 
discard entirely our own personality for a time, in order to remain purely knowing 
subject, the clear eye of the world (p. 1 86).74 
Frequently, when Schopenhauer refers to the purely knowing subject he is referring to a 
cognitive state that is the purest form of objectivity. We will shortly consider some 
additional passages to support this claim. 
The importance of the distinction between ( 1 )  the pure subject of knowing and (2) 
the purely knowing subject is that it sheds light not only on Wittgenstein' s remarks about 
the "metaphysical subject" that is a "limit of the world" (5 .632), which is closer to ( 1 ), 
but provides more evidence that Wittgenstein is attempting to bring us to a perspective -
a purely objective contemplative state with respect to the world - that is divorced from 
74 Thanks to Richard Aquila for pointing out that E.J . Payne mistranslates an adverbial expression ("purely 
knowing subject) as an adjectival expression ("pure knowing subject"). The ''purely knowing subject" is 
more clearly a contemplative state that we can be in. 
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the will in much the same way that Schopenhauer characterizes the "pure perception" of 
the "genius" as will-less, which is closer to (2). 
The exact way in which Wittgenstein understood Schopenhauer's  talk of a "pure 
knowing subject" in ( 1 )  is unclear. Wittgenstein does refer to a subject "at the limit" of 
the world, as we have just seen ( and we will discuss what this means in greater detail 
later). But Schopenhauer does not characterize the pure knowing subject as being at the 
limit of the world in the way that Wittgenstein characterizes the "metaphysical subject" 
as being a "limit of the world". Schopenhauer says only that the forms in which the 
object can be represented, viz., space, time, and causality are a "limit" between the pure 
knowing subject and the object (Vol. II, p.25). He writes that subject and object "limit 
each other" in the following way: "The common or reciprocal nature of this limitation is 
seen in the very fact that the essential, and hence universal, forms of every object, namely 
space, time and causality, can be found and fully known, starting from the subject, even 
without the knowledge of the object itself, that is to say, in Kant's language, they reside a 
priori in our consciousness" (Vol. II, p.5; cf. p. 25). The "boundary" or limit here is not 
the pure knowing subject as such - this is not what is being described as a boundary; 
rather, it is space, time, and causality that is being characterized as the boundary between 
the subject and the object. The "a priori" forms of knowledge are a "boundary" between 
the world as represented and the subject of knowing, not the subject. Perhaps, then, we 
mus� say something weaker; namely, Wittgenstein's "metaphysical subject" is a limiting 
point or a "boundary" by virtue of being that aspect of the world as representation that 
expresses nothing more than conditions imposed by Schopenhauer's pure subject of 
knowing as understood in ( l ). And it is just in this sense, in tum, that Schopenhauer's 
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pure subject can be said to be a limit or boundary as well. In any case, I hope to make 
clear that Wittgenstein embraced something very close to Schopenhauer' s  "purely 
knowing subject" understood as a state of pure objectivity (2), and t�at this pure 
objectivity is what gives Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective its aesthetico-ethical 
aspect. 
Schopenhauer's Characterization of the "Purely Knowing Subject" qua 
Contemplative State 
Schopenhauer thinks that "the subject as pure subject of knowledge [is] free from 
individuality and from servitude to the will" (Vol. II, Book III, p. 1 80). Here are some of 
the ways in which Schopenhauer characterizes the purely knowing subject in the context 
of aesthetic contemplation: "Such a subject of knowledge no longer follows relations in 
accordance with the principle of sufficient reason; on the contrary, it rests in fixed 
contemplation of the object presented to it out of its connection with any other, and rises 
into this" (p. 1 78). And a little further down he writes: 
And . . .  
We lose ourselves entirely in this object . . . in other words, we forget our 
individuality, our will, and continue to exist as pure subject, as clear mirror of the 
object, so that it is as though the object alone existed without anyone to perceive 
it, and thus we are no longer able to separate perceiver from the perception, but 
the two have become one, since the entire consciousness is filled and occupied by 
a single image of the perception (pp. 1 78-1 79). 
Now whoever has, in the manner stated, become so absorbed and lost in the 
perception of nature that he exists only as purely knowing subject, becomes in this 
way immediately aware that, as such, he is the condition, and hence the supporter, 
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of the world and of all objective existence, for this now shows itself as dependent 
on his existence (p. 1 8 1  ). 
Finally, in discussing what is characteristic of artistic "genius", wit11:ess: 
. . .  Genius is the ability to leave entirely out of sight our own interest, our willing, 
and our aims, and consequently to discard entirely our own personality for a time, 
in order to remain purely knowing subject, the clear eye of the world . . .  (pp. 1 85-
1 86). 
Together, the above characterizations of the purely knowing subject make clear 
two pertinent points: First, this perspective stands outside Schopenhauer's principle of 
sufficient reason.75 More specifically, the perspective of the pure knowing subject is both 
timeless and (in some sense) detached from will. Second, the individual self becomes 
"lost", and there is no longer the dualism of particular subject and object. The individual 
subject drops out, and the object of apprehension becomes everything. According to 
Schopenhauer, knowledge of anything in the world of representation is determined by 
one of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason, including space and time. 
Juxtaposing the difference in the kind of knowing had by "the knowing individual" ( a 
particular knowing subject), against that had by the "purely knowing subject", 
Schopenhauer writes: 
The knowing individual as such and the particular thing known by him are always 
in a particular place, at a particular time, and are links in the chain of causes and 
effects. The pure subject of knowledge and its correlative, the Idea76, have passed 
out of all these forms of the principle of sufficient reason. Time, place, the 
75 On the Fourfold Root of the Principle o/Sufficient Reason ( 1 9 1 5) 
76 Schopenhauer makes use of Platonic "ideas" in a very different way than Plato did. For Schopenhauer 
such ideas are direct manifestations of the essence or type of a thing in the world as presented to us, but 
they are not to be thought of as giving us knowledge of the ultimate nature ofreality, as they were for Plato. 
Indeed, ifthere is any ultimate nature ofreality for Schopenhauer, it cannot be "known" outside of 
representation. Rather, "ideas" in Schopenhauer's sense are best understood as what's universal and 
timeless in the world. But this universal quality is apprehended through some particular thing, like a 
painting or piece of sculpture, etc. Schopenhauer's 'Platonic' ideas are intermediaries between the world of 
representation and the world as it is in itself. Wittgenstein has nothing comparable in to this in the 
Tractatus. 
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individual that knows, and the individual that is known, have no meaning for 
them (p. 1 79). 
Again, Schopenhauer holds that everything that we know within the world of 
representation is a manifestation of will. But with the sole exception of "Ideas", any 
object of knowledge as manifestation of will is apprehended as subordinate to the 
principle of sufficient reason. And causality is one of the four forms of this principle. 
With respect to individual subjects, the cause of any action is cashed out in terms of 
motive. And motive is one of the four forms of the principle of sufficient reason within 
the world of representation. Hence, every action we take and any goal we pursue is 
conditioned by will (in the form of motive). (Of course, there are forces other than motive 
at work as well). What follows from this is that even the pursuit of knowledge is 
subordinate to will. More specifically, there are always motives that drive us to acquire 
this or that bit of knowledge. The aim of all scientific knowledge, for example, is guided 
or driven by our interest or desire to understand the world. We may have only a practical 
interest in a part of the world or we may simply be interested in acquiring knowledge out 
of intellectual curiosity or we may, as sometimes happens, not be sure what drives us. 
Still, in any case it is the will that is primary here, and knowledge is a goal that satisfies 
will. 
Being outside of the principle of sufficient reason entails that the pure knowing 
subject cannot be causally influenced: it (somehow) escapes will in the sense that it is not 
conditioned by it. Thus, the view that is taken up by the "pure knowing subject" involves 
a detachment from will in the form of motive; that is, will as it is in the midst of the 
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world. Let us now compare Schopenhauer' s remarks about the pure knowing subject to 
Wittgenstein's remarks about the "metaphysical subject." 
Wittgenstein's Metaphysical Subject 
What we find in the Tractatus (at 5 .632 and 5 .633) is the following comment and 
question: "The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a limit of the world". 
"Where in the world is a metaphysical subject to be found"? Unlike Schopenhauer, 
Wittgenstein characterizes the metaphysical subject as something that is at the very limit 
of the pictured world. Wittgenstein makes use of Schopenhauer' s metaphor of this 
subject being like an eye in the visual field in that it is no part of the visual field (the 
world), but is rather a limiting point from which the entire world is viewed: one "does not 
see the eye" (5.633). This metaphor suggests that the subject is at the limit of the world in 
the same way that my eye is the limit of my visual field: if my field of vision is 
understood as the world and my eye stands in for the metaphysical subject, then clearly 
the subject is at the limit of my world just as my eye is at the limit or boundary of my 
visual field. 
The "metaphysical subject", being at the "limit" of the world as pictured, suggests 
that whatever it is it cannot be pictured or represented at all. Indeed, Wittgenstein claims 
that the only "sense" in which we can speak about it is to say what it is not: it is "not the 
man", "not the body or the human soul", but rather "the limit" and "not a part of the 
world" (5.641). Just as "nothing in the visual field allows you to infer that it is seen by an 
eye" (5 .633), nothing in the world allows you to infer that the world is seen by a 
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metaphysical subject. Wittgenstein does not explicitly draw this parallel, but it is clear 
that he does not think one needs to posit some subject over and above individual subjects 
in t�e world. Thus, the "metaphysical subject" is more plausibly thought of as a kind of 
God's eye view of the world. Indeed, such a ' subject' is better interpreted as the 
conditions necessary for us (as individual subjects in the midst of the world) to view the 
whole world - the world at its limit, which for Wittgenstein means the world as pictured 
(as "the totality of facts" and these being "all the facts", I and I .  I ). 
But is this all that Wittgenstein's "metaphysical subject" has in common with 
Schopenhauer's "pure knowing subject"? Are both, in their different ways, a limit to the 
world as pictured or represented? It appears that this is all they have in common. 
However, Schopenhauer's purely knowing subject qua state seems to have more in 
common with the way in which Wittgenstein is attempting to get us to see the world. If 
my view is correct, Wittgenstein transcendental perspective is detached from both will 
and time in the same way that Schopenhauer's "purely knowing subject" is. Let's try to 
make sense of the individual subject's will being detached from the world Gust what this 
might mean) by first investigating why Wittgenstein identifies ethics with aesthetics. 
Ethics and Aesthetics are the same: In What Sense? 
At 6.421 Wittgenstein writes: "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed. Ethics is 
transcendental. (Ethics and aesthetics are one)". Does Wittgenstein think both aesthetics 
and ethics are the same only because of their inexpressibility? Is this what makes both 
transcendental? We know that neither subject can be pictured or represented in the 
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contingent world of facts, and that this is why they cannot be said. But this is a purely 
negative characterization of such subjects. In order to take a stab at a more positive way 
to characterize what it means for ethics and aesthetics to be transcendental according to 
Wittgenstein, we need to see what Schopenhauer thinks the relation is between the "pure 
subject of knowing" and the aesthetic perspective (Book III, sections 32-34). In chapter 
four I investigate in more detail why Wittgenstein identifies ethics with aesthetics. 
According to Schopenhauer, when the artist contemplates an object of art, the 
blind, driving force which is will77 is detached from his perspective or apprehension of 
the object to the point that he no longer makes a meaningful distinction between himself, 
with his particular inclinations and desires, and the object of his perception. Interestingly, 
Schopenhauer places philosophy alongside the fine arts because the former, like the 
latter, is not in the service of the will : 
Not merely philosophy but also the fine arts work at bottom towards the solution 
of the problem of existence. For in every contemplation of the world, a desire has 
been awakened . . .  to comprehend the true nature of things, of life, and of 
existence. 78 For this alone is of interest to intellect as such, in other words, to the 
subject of knowing which has become free from the aims of the will and is 
therefore pure; just as for the subject, knowing as mere individual, only the aims 
of the will have interest (Vol. II, p. 390). 
77 Though in exactly what sense will is detached is not clear. For according to Schopenhauer everything in 
the phenomenal world is a manifestation of will. Thus, a detached and disinterested perspective must 
involve will in some sense. Wittgenstein, as we will see, talks of will as "phenomenon", the will that is "of 
interest only to psychology" (6.423). This is just the willing individual subject. It is will in this sense that is 
detached from the world of facts for Wittgenstein. Schopenhauer does not make such a distinction, and so it 
is more difficult to see how his pure knowing subject escapes the fetters of will. 
78 Notice that Schopenhauer puts Philosophy in with the fine arts, suggesting that the value of Philosophy is 
more closely tied to insight and perception, and that abstract, conceptual knowledge is what's most 
important. I suspect that the perspective Wittgenstein is trying to bring us to in his Tractatus is designed to 
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And in characterizing Schopenhauer's account of aesthetic experience, Magee writes: 
To the object's being seen as independent of the principle of sufficient reason 
there corresponds the subject 's seeing it as independent of anything to do with his 
willing - not as useful, or protectively enveloping, or obstructive or dangerous, or 
in any other way instrumental or mediating, but simply as itself (p·. 1 65). 
And Schopenhauer describes the artists' perspective as a "gift of genius": 
[Such contemplation] demands a complete forgetting of our own person and of its 
relations and connections, . . .  [ and] "is nothing but the most complete objectivity, 
i.e., the objective tendency of the mind, as opposed to the subjective [tendency of 
the mind, which is] directed to our own person, i .e., to the will (p. 1 85). 
I want to suggest that for both Schopenhauer and Wittgenstein, this tendency of 
the mind is not just tied to aesthetics, but is the apotheosis of the moral outlook on the 
world as well. Indeed, according to Christopher Janaway "morality for Schopenhauer is 
not a matter of duty or of 'ought' ; nor can it be founded in rationality. It is a matter of 
'seeing the world aright' ,  to use Wittgenstein's later phrase" (Schopenhauer, pp. 73-74). 
According to Schopenhauer, the right ethical attitude or outlook requires will­
less-ness or what Schopenhauer refers to as the "surrender of all willing" (Sec. 66) in 
much the same way as the aesthetical perspective does. This is clear from the following 
passages: 
Thus through the reduced interest in our own self, the anxious care for that self is 
attacked at its root; hence the calm and confident serenity afforded by a virtuous 
disposition and a good conscience . . .  (p. 374) 
And in Section 66 Schopenhauer writes: 
. . .  Whoever is still involved in the Principium individuationis . . . knows only 
particular things and their relation to his own person, and these then become ever 
renewed motives of his willing. On the other hand, that knowledge of the whole, 
of the inner nature of the thing-in-itself, which has been described, becomes the 
dissolve just such problems. We cease to ask such questions when we see that they cannot be given any 
descriptive meaning, and are thus nonsensical. I address this in the next chapter. 
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quieter of all and every willing. The will now turns away from life; it shudders at 
the pleasures in which it recognizes the affirmation of life. Man attains to the state 
of voluntary renunciation, resignation, true composure, and complete will-less­
ness (p. 3 79). 
And finally in Section 68 Schopenhauer comes close to equating the aesthetic 
contemplation of some object, divorced as such contemplation is from the will, as very 
close to the right ethical attitude toward "the heavy atmosphere of the earth" (p. 390). 
Schopenhauer goes on to say: 
We can infer how blessed must be the life of a man whose will is silenced not for 
a few moments, as in the enjoyment of the beautiful, but forever, indeed 
completely extinguished, except for the last glimmering spark that maintains the 
body and is extinguished with it (Ibid. ). 
Here, of course, Schopenhauer' s  truly ethical or saintly disposition or attitude 
toward all that happens in the world is rather more substantial than anything Wittgenstein 
says. Nowhere does Wittgenstein indicate that the individual willing subject is in some 
sense illusory, and thus part of a "veil of maya" (Sec. 68, p.379). Nor Does Wittgenstein 
claim: "the right ethical view or attitude is one that negates the will." Still, it is clear that 
a cessation of willing in the world - or something very like it, as we shall soon see - is 
connected with Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective on the world. 
Now the similarity that Wittgenstein sees between art and ethics is amplified in 
his Notebooks (1914-1916) :  "The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; 
and the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between 
art and ethics" (NB, p. 83). Indeed, I believe that the connection that Wittgenstein is 
alluding to here essentially involves viewing or contemplating the world-as-object in 
much the same way that Schopenhauer's  purely knowing subject qua state aesthetically 
contemplates an object: it is the most complete kind of objectivity that one can take with 
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respect to the world as a whole for Wittgenstein. This is the point that Wittgenstein is 
making when he writes: "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from 
the midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside" (Ibid). Here seeing from 
the "outside" most likely means disconnected from the service of the will in the same 
way that Schopenhauer's purely knowing subject is disengaged from servitude to the will 
when it apprehends an object aesthetically. The 'object' here, however, is not some object 
in the world, but rather it is the world and life seen from an aesthetic point of view. 
Immediately after his remark that "ethics and aesthetics are one" (NB, p. 77 and 
6.42 1 ), Wittgenstein asks: "Is it, according to common conceptions, good to want nothing 
for one's neighbor, neither good nor evil?" (NB, Ibid.). And he goes on to comment: "in a 
certain sense not wanting is the only good" (NB, Ibid.). Undoubtedly the tension that he 
feels here is the result of his trying to square an aesthetico-ethical perspective on the 
world with how one "ought", in the more ordinary sense, to live in the world. For how 
one ought to live in the world essentially involves willing in the world. We will leave the 
issue of how, if at all, this tension is resolved for the moment. The important point now is 
simply that Wittgenstein most likely held that aesthetics and ethics, in the admittedly 
peculiar way in which they are connected above, involve a kind of detached and 
disinterested view of the world. 
The Timelessness of the Transcendental Perspective 
In addition to being detached from will, the perspective that Wittgenstein is 
elucidating is al�o timeless. Recall that Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective is at the 
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limit of the world as pictured and is thus not subordinate to the principle of sufficient 
reason in any of its forms. Thus, any view outside the principle of sufficient reason is a 
fortiori outside of space and time. Hence, in addition to escaping from the dictates of will 
as motive, this perspective is also timeless. Indeed, time is only a determination of 
objects and events as they are represented and pictured in the world. That Wittgenstein's 
transcendental view of the world is timeless, and so transcendental in this further sense, is 
shown by the following comments: 
"If we take eternity to mean not infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then 
eternal life belongs to those who live in the present" (NB, p. 75 and TLP, 6.43 1 1 ). 
And in his Notebooks (1914-1916) he asks: 
"But is it possible for one so to live that life stops being problematic? That one is 
living in eternity and not in time"? (p. 74) 
And later he writes: 
''Only a man who lives not in time but in the present is happy" (p. 7 4) and 
"whoever lives in the present lives without fear or hope" (p. 76). 
In seeing the world from its limit; that is, in seeing all the facts that comprise the 
world,79 timelessness is a necessary concomitant. For there can be no before or after, 
there is only an eternal now given that all the possible ways in which the world might be 
is laid out before us, and all at once, so to speak. Thus, fear and hope, which can only be 
tied to the future, and which involve our identifying with the individual subject in the 
world (which I will say more about), cannot be part of this perspective. 
79 Recall that Wittgenstein's  transcendental perspective is a view of all possible worlds. Thus, we see all the 
combinations of facts in "logical space" that might have been realized in this world. Such a perspective 
exhausts every possible way in which the world can be pictured. 
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The timelessness of Wittgenstein's "solution" to the problem of finding absolute 
value and meaning in life is ineluctably tied to his transcendental perspective: "The 
solution o� the riddle of life in space and time lies outside space and time" (6.432 1 ). What 
is this "solution" but a transcendental view of the world? It is a turning away from any 
purported solution to the problem in the world of facts. Schopenhauer's influence is 
obvious here. Witness the following comments from Book IV on the eternal life being 
timeless: 
We must clearly recognize that the form of the phenomenon of the will, and hence 
the form of life and of reality, is really only the present, not the future or the past. 
Future and past are only in the concept, exist only in the connection and 
continuity of knowledge in so far as this follows the principle of sufficient reason 
(p. 278). 
For permanence no more belongs to . . .  the pure subject of knowing, to the eternal 
eye of the world, than does transitoriness, since passing away and transitoriness 
are determinations valid in time alone, whereas . . .  the pure subject of knowing lies 
outside time (p. 284). 
The present is the only real form of the phenomenon of the will. Therefore no 
endless past or future in which he will not exist can frighten him, for he regards 
these as an empty mirage and the web of Maya (Ibid.). 
Ultimately, then, the "pure knowing subject" or the "clear eye of the world" 
(Wittgenstein's "metaphysical subject") is nothing over and above a will-less and 
timeless perspective on the world as a limited whole. The result of taking such a view on 
the world is that the individual subject lives timelessly - eternally, i.e., in the present ­
thus detaching his will from the midst of the world: only by taking this transcendental 
perspective does one come to see the perspective as having an aesthetico-ethical aspect to 
it. One sees the world as an object of beauty - as something sublime, significant, and 
mystical - when one views it from a will-less and timeless perspective. 
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The Contemplation of the World "Sub Specie Aeternitatis" (6.45) 
For Wittgenstein, then, our "contemplation of the world from the point of view of 
eternity", just is the contemplation of the world as a kind of object writ large; an object 
whose value and meaning stands out only when we view the world from a will-less and 
timeless perspective. According to Wittgenstein the mystical "shows itself' (6.522) from 
our taking the transcendental perspective with respect to the world. Such a perspective is 
what permits us to see that anything of value in the world is contingently and accidentally 
attached to our will, that is, our interests, inclinations and desires, and so lacks the kind of 
absolute value that Wittgenstein is trying to get us to appreciate. Wittgenstein's position 
here is that there can be no absolute value or meaning in the world; there can be only 
"relative" value and meaning in the world (LE, p. 66). 
Thus, anyone who attempts to build a theory of absolute value or ethics that is 
grounded in the world is taking on an impossible task. The task is an impossible one 
because anything in the world has value only insofar as it is an object of our will in the 
world. Furthermore, Wittgenstein uses the metaphysical subject as a tool to get us to 
appreciate that we can (as individual subjects in the world) view the world as a "limited 
whole", and that in so doing we are taking a detached and disinterested perspective with 
respect to the world. When Wittgenstein says that "art and ethics are one" he means, in 
part, that the value of an object of art and the value of the world are only fully seen and 
appreciated when the will of the individual subject is detached from our contemplation of 
them. This is a key ingredient of the transcendental perspective on ethics. It is to 'see' the 
world from its limit: "The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the 
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midst of them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside" (NB, p. 83). And of course 
whatever is outside the world is outside language. This is why it is impossible to 
articulate what this absolute value consists in - it is "indeed the inexpressible" (6.522) 
The Transcendental Perspective and Will 
At this point I have to admit an apparent problem with my interpretation of what I 
have been calling Wittgenstein' s  transcendental perspective. What I am calling 
Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective on the world is not simply a pure "knowing", 
but involves an attitude to the world as a whole. Now "attitude" normally involve will. 
So how can Wittgenstein' s  perspective be will-less if will is (in some sense) involved? 
Schopenhauer faces a similar paradox since the world is through and through will. In the 
Notebooks Wittgenstein' s view of the will' s relation to the world comes down to an 
attitude of detachment from anything in the world. This perspective, then, cannot be a 
complete cessation of willing. If it is, then it is a cessation of will only in terms of the 
individual willing subject, not willing simpliciter. In the Tractatus he writes: 
If the good or bad exercise of the will does alter the world, it can alter only the 
limits of the world, not the facts - not what can be expressed by means of 
language. In short the effect must be that it becomes an altogether different world. 
It must, so to speak, wax and wane as a whole. The world of the happy man is a 
different one from that of the unhappy man (6.43) 
Here we see the familiar talk of the "limits of the world", only now no mention is 
made of a metaphysical subject being at the limit of the world, but instead the "exercise 
of the will" is said to "alter only the limits of the world, not the facts - not what can be 
expressed by language". Does this involve a willing subject that is at the limit of the 
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world, a willing subject in the sense of a subject over and above individual willing 
subjects? It does not. And for the same reason that apprehending the world as "the totality 
of facts" does not require a metaphysical subject in the sens� of a subject over and above 
individual knowing subjects. Indeed, we have even more reason to reject the notion that 
the metaphysical subject was ever anything more than Wittgenstein' s way of introducing 
a transcendental perspective on language and the world - quite literally a metaview - for 
clearly if we were prepared to say that Wittgenstein had in mind a metaphysical subject, 
in the sense of a knowing subject over and above individual knowing subjects, we would 
be equally committed to saying the same thing about his talk of a willing subject. We 
would then have two subjects at the limit of the world, a metaphysical knowing subject 
and a metaphysical willing subject. But such a bloated ontology is hardly in keeping with 
Wittgenstein's overly parsimonious sense of reality. Anyone who doesn't think that the 
logical constants refer to abstract entities is hardly likely to countenance two subjects at 
the limit of the world. Again, it is the transcendental perspective that involves both 
knowing (logic) and willing (ethics/aesthetics). 
This notion of willing - where the "world waxes and wanes as a whole" - is 
indeed very strange. It is not the typical willing of an individual subject, for such a 
subject does "alter" the facts of the world, and not "its limits". Particular willing subjects 
are engaged in the world - they are in the midst of the world. As such, they effect change; 
they do things. Moreover, we can and do speak about particular willing subjects. This is 
the notion of will and willing that is "a phenomenon" and "is of interest only to 
psychology" ( 6.423). 
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Willing, at the limits of the world, is a very particular attitude to the world: "The 
will is an attitude of the subject to the world" (NB, p. 87). But what sort of an attitude is 
this? It is an attitude of detachment to anything in the world: one should detach or free 
the particular willing subject 's desires and longings for objects and events in the world. 
And it is the transcendental perspective that shows that the "right" (6.54) way to see the 
world is to contemplate it from a detached and disinterested perspective; we no longer see 
ourselves merely as objects in the midst of the world, but instead relinquish our control 
( or rather the illusion of control) over the happenings and events in the world. 
At a more practical level; that is, at the level of how to live in the world, 
Wittgenstein is trying to show us, in a rather cryptic way, that contentment or happiness 
can only be found when we relinquish the illusion that happiness results from satisfying 
the desires of the particular willing subject. The illusion that makes the world an unhappy 
place is that we can wrest satisfaction from this life if only we manage well .  And for 
Wittgenstein "the life of knowledge is the life that is happy in spite of the misery of the 
world" (NB, p. 8 1  ). This is a hyperbolic way of saying that whatever contingent worldly 
happenings are thrown our way they needn't dictate our attitude to the world as a whole. 
We can live contentedly by living "the life of knowledge". And it is the transcendental 
perspective that shows us that the contented life just is the "the life that can renounce the 
amenities of the world" (NB, p. 8 1  ). Michael Hodges, in his book Transcendence and 
Wittgenstein 's Tractatus ( 1 990), is definitely on the right track when he writes: "The 
ethical will in its ultimate fulfillment aims at nothing, for what is, is what ought to be. It 
is rather for the will to come to "own" and "appreciate" what is as what ought to be" (p. 
1 1 2). And such a perspective must entail a detached and disinterested view of events and 
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happenings in the world in just this sense: We no longer want nor are we inclined to 
change anything in the world, but embrace the entire world just as it is. Thus the 
transcendental perspective "owns" and "appreciates" the whole world just as it is. But to 
adopt this stance means that there is no distinction between the way the world is and the 
way that it ought to be. 
The transcendental perspective does collapse the distinction between is and ought 
here. But the only way it can achieve this collapse is to show that absolute value cannot 
be attached to anything in the world. According to Wittgenstein, it is only our individual 
wills - will in the world - that attaches value to things and events in the world. (The 
value that attaches to anything in the world is always a "relative value". I will say more 
about this when I come to Wittgenstein' s "Lecture on Ethics"). 
When the world's events do not go according to our plans and designs or when a 
particular moral code that we embrace is not being adhered to, we balk. Here our 
perspective is very much one that is in the midst of the world, for we are saying that we 
know what is right, that we know how things ought to go, and that we find reality - the 
unfolding of events in the world or "how the world is" (6.44) - unacceptable. And it 
matters not whether our reasons are good or bad, noble or ignoble, for what we are failing 
to do is take the perspective that views the entire world under the aspect of eternity. This 
is in part why Wittgenstein says: "How things are in the world is of complete indifference 
for what is higher" (6.432). And of course the transcendental perspective is one of the 
things that rank as "higher." 
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But is there no Value in an Absolute Sense? 
The only �oom for absolute value, if there is indeed any such thing, is at the very 
limit of the world. I say "if there is any such thing" because Wittgenstein himself is not 
committed to there being such value: ".if there is a value which is of value, it must lie 
outside all happening and being-so (my emphasis). For all happening and being-so is 
accidental. What makes it non-accidental cannot lie in the world, for otherwise this would 
again be accidental" (6.4 1 ). We will look more closely at this passage in the second part 
of this chapter. For now it enough to see that Wittgenstein's  transcendental perspective 
on the world does not commit anyone to feeling the world as having absolute value or 
meaning. Indeed, there can be no logical or even causal connection between our seeing 
the world from on high and the mystical showing itself. 
Having said this, I think Wittgenstein's perspective on language and the world led 
him - and could lead others - to feel the world as having value, meaning, and 
significance in something like an absolute sense. Thus, if there is indeed a place for 
absolute value, and even if such value cannot be described, it seems to come about for 
Wittgenstein only when we see the world sub specie aeternitatis. When we can take up 
the transcendental perspective on language and the world open ourselves up to marveling 
at the existence of the world, and thus to an experience of ''the mystical" (6.44). I think 
that Wittgenstein is committed to something very close to this. 
This perspective on the world can, in part, produce in us an attitude toward the 
world that is detached and disinterested. We cease to be the arbiters of what, ultimately, 
is right and wrong in the world when we look at the world under the aspect of eternity. 
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Indeed, to see the world from such a vista is at once to see that a description of the entire 
world is exhausted by Wittgenstein's picture theory, and that no part of this picture - no 
propositions that picture this or that fact or any possible fact - can have value in an 
absolute sense. 
On the other hand, that there is a world that exists at all is something marvelous 
and inexpressible. According to Wittgenstein, it is coming to this realization that lends 
the world absolute value. Wittgenstein attempts to express this mystical sense ( or 
"feeling", 6.45) of the world in his LE. 
In this lecture Wittgenstein offers, as an attempt to characterize the value of life 
and the world in an "absolute" sense, the following experience: " [The experience] is, 
what one might call, the experience of being absolutely safe. I mean the state of mind in 
which one is inclined to say ' I  am safe, nothing can injure me whatever happens'" 
(Kenny, p. 292). Now we can make better sense of this type of experience if we frame it 
against the background of Schopenhauer's notion that the truly ethical viewpoint requires 
the denial or negation of will in man, and the recognition that the Principium 
individuationis is illusory. 
According to Wittgenstein, we are in some sense experiencing the world from a 
kind of will-less center (as purely knowing subject), for otherwise any such experience is 
absurd given that we are, as a matter of fact, never absolutely safe. Such an experience is 
a result of viewing the world from a transcendental perspective; i.e., a will-less and 
timeless perspective that frees us from fear, desire, and hope. In part, this means that 
although we are objects in the world, and hence liable to all the dangers concomitant with 
being in the midst of the world, we can experience the world as a kind of object of art, as 
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something that is neither "obstructive, or dangerous . . .  but simply as itself'. Indeed, it is 
the contemplation of the world from this will-less and timeless perspective that gives 
both life and the world as a whole meaning according to Wittgenstein. 
There is another experience that Wittgenstein describes - one that he calls the 
experience "Par Excellence" - in an attempt to get at absolute value. It is the experience 
we have when we "wonder at the existence of the world" (LE, p. 70). In part such an 
experience results from our viewing the entire world as something beautiful in itself, in 
much the same way that an artist views an object of art: "Aesthetically, the miracle is that 
the world exists. That there is what there is" (NB, p. 86). I will have a great deal more to 
say about such experiences, especially as regards how they relate to Das Mystische". For 
now it is enough to see that these kinds of experiences seem to require our taking a 
perspective on the world that is detached, disinterested, and timeless. 
It is important to not that when we take up the transcendental perspective we are 
no longer trying to wrest some satisfaction from contingent facts in the world. We are 
not, as Wittgenstein notes, trying to "bend the happenings of the world to [our] will" (NB, 
1 1 .6. 1 6). Trying to satisfy our will leads only, in the end, to frustration and unhappiness, 
and we are unable to marvel at the existence of the world. As long as we are imposing 
our individual wills in the world, and are thus only concerning ourselves with the facts as 
these facts affect us, we cannot "experience the world as a miracle" (LE, p. 70). And to 
"wonder at the existence of the world" or "experience the world as a miracle" is to view 
the world as more than just a collection of contingent facts, including the doings and 
strivings of individual willing subjects (which are also facts). Thus, the meaning of the 
world - its "waxing" -just is to see it "from the point of view of eternity." This means 
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that we are experiencing the world as an object of art, as something detached from our 
individual will. It is this disinterested perspective that confers the kind of meaning and 
value on the world that Wittgenstein has in mind. 
Ethics, Value, and the Negation of (Individual) Will in Schopenhauer 
We are primarily embodied will according to Schopenhauer, closer to apes than 
gods. Man's essential nature, if you like, is not, for Schopenhauer, the res cogitans of 
Descartes, but is the blind, driving force of will. Given that this is the kernel of man (and, 
for that matter, everything else in the world) man cannot be happy or content: for we are 
always either wanting this or that or else suffering from ennui once our desires are sated. 
So where does the value of life come from? From whence does one wrest satisfaction, 
contentment, or happiness in this world of strife? And what place is there for ethics and 
value in such a world? 
According to Schopenhauer the manifestation of will - in the individual subject ­
can never bring us any permanent contentment. For such acts of will always fasten on to 
particular objects or states of affairs within the world. But such objects are fleeting and so 
is any happiness or contentment we may have once we have obtained them: 
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All willing springs from lack, from deficiency, and thus from suffering. 
Fulfillment brings this to an end; yet for one wish that is fulfilled there remain at 
least ten that are denied. Further, desiring lasts a long time, demands and requests 
go on to infinity; fulfillment is short and meted out sparingly. But even the final 
satisfaction itself is only apparent; the wish fulfilled at once makes way for a new 
one; the former is a known delusion, the latter a delusion not as yet known. No 
attained object willing can give a satisfaction that lasts and no longer declines; but 
it is always like the alms thrown to a beggar, which reprieves him today so that 
his misery may be prolonged till tomorrow. Therefore, so long as our 
consciousness is filled by will, so long as we are given up to the throng of desires, 
with its constant hopes and fears, so long as we are the subject of willing, we 
never obtain lasting happiness or peace (Vol. I, p. 1 96). 
I believe that Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective on the world is designed 
to bring about an attitudinal shift toward the entire world, and that this shift was at least 
in part inspired by Schopenhauer's depressing account of will in the world.80 
Wittgenstein's solution to this problem is to bring us to a perspective that transcends the 
world as pictured so that we no longer identify with the individual willing subject - that 
is, with ourselves in the midst of the world - as having any more value than anything else 
in the world. The facts are all of equal value in that all facts are valueless. This is in part 
what Wittgenstein means by "seeing the world aright" (6.54). In part, this perspective 
requires an attempt on our part to negate the will of the individual subject. For this reason 
it is very similar to Schopenhauer's negation of will as the ultimate ethical desideratum. 
But it must be noted that Schopenhauer rejects the very possibility of implying any 
"ought" in connection with the truly ethical ;  rather, one is led to a negation of"will-to­
live" when one realizes the illusory nature of individual subjects by coming to see that 
will is really all-pervasive and one. 
For Wittgenstein the denial of will in the individual subject amounts to a breaking 
away of our being in the midst of the world, as I have suggested, that comes as a result of 
our viewing the world as a "limited whole". Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective on 
the world has an aesthetico-ethical aspect to it, as I have been at pains to show. 
80 Though here I admit I have no direct evidence for this other than claims such as this one: "I can only 
make myself independent of the world - and so in a certain sense master it -by renouncing any influence 
on happenings" (NB, p. 73). 
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The aesthetic perspective is disinterested and detached in the sense that we do not 
consider the object of art (whether an object in nature or some created work of art) in any 
of the more usual and more practical ways. The ethical aspect of the perspective is tied to 
man's disengaging his will from the world of facts. 
We have seen that Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective on value and the 
world involves a detached and will-less perspective. Now I want to begin to give an 
account of why he thought that such a perspective permeates the world with value in an 
"absolute" sense. 
Wittgenstein and the Good Life: The Metaphysical Subject and Absolute Value 
I will now attempt to tie together the disparate elements of Wittgenstein' s  
transcendental perspective on the world and its value. First, we have already seen that 
Wittgenstein' s  "metaphysical subject" is best interpreted as a variation on 
Schopenhauer's "pure knowing subject". I say "variation" because Wittgenstein' s subject 
is both a knowing and a willing subject, one that is at the very limit of the world as 
pictured. Schopenhauer's pure subject of knowing, on the other hand, appears to be 
entirely will-less. Equally important, neither Schopenhauer nor Wittgenstein is 
suggesting that there is some subject that literally stands at the limit ( or outside) the 
world. Their talk about a "subject" here should not be interpreted as a reification of some 
sort of metaphysical entity. Instead, as I hope I have made clear, such talk is 
Wittgenstein's way of bringing us to see the world from its limits--ofbringing us to a 
transcendental perspective on it. 
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At the end of the day, Wittgenstein's notion of will at the limit of the world is best 
understood as a kind of stance or attitude toward the world. Indeed, Wittgenstein suggests 
that perhaps even thinking is an act of the will: "Or is the mistake here this: even wanting 
(thinking) is an activity of will"? (NB, p. 77) He suggests that if we could "conceive" of 
"a being" that only perceives - that merely "sees" - then we could imagine "a world 
without ethics" (Ibid.). So it appears that to "think" about or contemplate the world 
involves will. Hence, Wittgenstein' s perspective has an aspect of will about it-it is not 
just "purely knowing"; unless, of course, one wants to say that "thinking" about the world 
as a "limited whole" collapses into pure knowing. The passage is worth quoting in full, 
especially since Schopenhauer's influence is incontrovertible here: "But can we conceive 
a being that isn't capable of Will at all, but only of Idea 81 ( of seeing for example)? In 
some sense this seems impossible" (Ibid.). 
This clearly points to the willing and the knowing subject as being two sides of 
the same coin according to Wittgenstein; or better, two aspects of the very same 
transcendental perspective: knowing and willing. The former represents the picturing 
aspect of the perspective (the logic of our language), whereas the latter is the attitudinal 
aspect of the perspective (the aesthetico-ethical). 
This notion of willing - where the "world waxes and wanes as a whole" (6.43) is 
indeed very strange. He amplifies his "waxing and waning" comment in his NB where he 
writes: "As if by accession or loss of meaning" (p. 73). Hence, the "willing subject" is 
best understood as another facet of the transcendental perspective. We are able to lend the 
81 Vorstellung : ''representation" 
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world more or less meaning ( and presumably absolute value) by taking a particular 
attitude toward it. 
Thus, the subject that is the "bearer of good and evil" (NB, p. 76) is 
Wittgenstein's way of expressing what it is about us, as individual willing subjects that 
enables us to color the world with value; that is, with good and evil : 
"Good and evil enter only through the subject. And the subject is not part of the 
world, but a boundary of the world" (NB, p. 79). 
And again: 
"It would be possible to say (a' la Schopenhauer): it is not the world of idea 
( Vorstellung) that is either good or evil ; but the willing subject" (Ibid, p. 79). 
Just as there is no "metaphysical subject", some subject over and above individual 
knowing subjects, so there is not a "willing subject", one that stands over and above 
individual ethical subjects. Both aspects, willing and knowing, make up the 
transcendental perspective that can be taken up by individual subjects in the world. 
The aesthetico-ethical aspect of the perspective is more closely tied to willing (in 
the admittedly "strange" sense above), whereas the perspective on the logic of our 
language and its relation to the world as pictured ( chapter two) almost exclusively 
involves pure knowing Gust "seeing"). The idea that the metaphysical subject involves 
both knowing and willing is an important one, for many commentaries on Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus (Hodges, for example) treat the "metaphysical subject" and the "willing 
subject" as two distinct subjects. This is an unnecessary reification of entities. In fact, we 
have seen that there is no need to think of the metaphysical subject as a subject that is 
distinct from particular (knowing and willing) subjects. 
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The term 'subject' ,  then, is inappropriate in that Wittgenstein does not have in 
mind some subject that exists over and above individual willing subjects in the world, but 
a perspective at the limit of the world that can be taken up by individual subjects in the 
world. This perspective shows us that value in an absolute or unqualified sense requires a 
perspective that is at the very limit of the world. 
At any rate, this transcendental perspective on value and the world is best thought 
of as a kind of pure objectivity with respect to the world. The perspective is, to steal the 
title ofNagel 's  book, "The View From Nowhere" ( 1 986), but with a vengeance, in the 
sense that we try to strip away all our attachment to objects and events in the world, and 
view the whole of the world from a disinterested and detached perspective. And this is 
fundamentally a stripping away of our desires and inclinations to shape the world so that 
it suits us. 
Both aspects of Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective, knowing and willing, 
stand at the limit or boundary of the world (NB, p. 79 and TLP, 5.632 and 6.43). And it is 
this perspective that colors the world with value and meaning. Just as this perspective is a 
condition for there being a world that is represented through the logic of our language, in 
a similar way this perspective is a condition for the world being seen as having value: 
"ethics must be a condition of the world, like logic" (NB, p. 77). Ethics is a condition of 
the world in virtue of our seeing the world "sub specie aeternitatis". Wittgenstein says 
that "the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis" (NB, p. 83). This will be 
further amplified in chapter four. 
But how exactly does this transcendental perspective illuminate the good life, the 
"happy" and "harmonious" life (NB, p. 78), and how are we to reconcile the ethical goal 
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of detaching will in the world while at the same time it is the "willing subject" that is the 
"bearer of good and evil" (NB, p. 76)? We will see that Wittgenstein' s  perspective on 
ethics (value) and the world is radically different from the more typical (�d intuitive) 
conception of ethics being tied to our actions and our relations with others in the world. 
Let me start with the second part of the question first: How to reconcile the 
detachment or negation of will as part of "the good life" while simultaneously it is we 
who take a particular attitude toward the world as a "limited whole". It seems that in 
order to see that "the world of the happy is quite another than that of the unhappy" (6.43) 
we must adopt a particular attitude toward the world, and adopting an attitude normally 
involves willing: "The will is an attitude of the subject to the world" (NB, p. 87). But isn't 
this a flat-out contradiction? How can one at the same time take a disinterested view of 
events in the world while taking a particular attitude toward the whole world? I will now 
try to ease this tension. 
Recall that Wittgenstein makes a tacit distinction between the ( 1 )  Metaphysical 
(willing) subject as a limit to the world (5 .633 and 6.43) and (2) particular willing 
subjects that are in the world. The "subject" in ( 1 )  is defined negatively: it "is not the 
human being, not the human body, or the human soul, with which psychology deals, but 
rather the metaphysical subject, the limit of the world - not a part of it" (5.64 1 ). The 
"subject" in (2) is "a phenomenon" that is "only of interest to psychology" (6.423). And 
for Wittgenstein this must be the willing of an individual subject, for it is only individual 
subjects that "alter" the facts of the world, and not the world's "limits". Particular willing 
subjects are engaged in the world - they are in the midst of the world. As such, they 
effect change; they do things. Moreover, we can and do speak about particular willing 
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subjects and the actions taken by them; that is, these actions can be said or described. 
Furthermore, we deem some of the actions taken by particular willing subjects "good" 
and some "bad." But we shall see that the kind of value that attaches to the actions of 
individual willing subjects - the kind that we can speak about in the world - is relative 
and contingent, never absolute. 
According to Wittgenstein, willing that is in the "midst" (NB, p. 83) of the world 
cannot really be separated from our actions: "This is clear: it is impossible to will without 
already performing the act of the will. The act of the will is not the cause of the action but 
is the action itself. One cannot will without acting" (NB, p. 87). Now it is this notion of 
will, I submit, that particular willing subjects engage in. There is nothing transcendental 
about this notion of willing. This way of characterizing will is clearly not an attitude 
toward the world as a whole, but is rather the more ordinary notion of willing as an 
intention to act or simply acting: "But, of course, it is undeniable that in a popular sense 
there are things that I do, and other things not done by me" (NB, p. 88). Wittgenstein also 
'mentions' a subject that stands at the limit of the world at 5.63 1 and 5.632 : 
If I wrote a book The world as I found it, I should have to include a report on my 
body, and should have to say which parts were subordinate to my will and which 
were not, etc., this being a method of isolating the subject, or rather of showing 
that in an important sense there is no subject; for it alone could not be mentioned 
in that book.-
The subject does not belong to the world: rather, it is a l imit of the world.82 
82 It seems that this 'method', if it "isolates" any subject at all, only isolates the individual subject. This is 
the subject that can be mentioned in ''the book". Why then does Wittgenstein think that the subject that is 
isolated is the metaphysical subject here? What reasons does he give us for thinking that this is so? This 
passage is extremely difficult to make sense of. I suggest that what he is getting at is simply that there 
seems to be something about us that enables us to view the world from a disinterested perspective; a view 
of the world that is disengaged from the facts in the world, one that only alters the limits of the world. He is 
intimating that there is some aspect of us, as individual subjects, that is left over, as it were, even after we 
have given an account of the individual willing subject and everything that such a subject can affect in the 
world. It is the perspective on the world as a limited whole that requires a subject that "cannot be 
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Clearly, when Wittgenstein talks about 'the subject' in the above passage he does 
not have in mind a particular willing subject in the world. Again, this would just be a 
"report on his body" - the will that is of interest to "empirical psychology" - a thing that 
is very much in the world. However, the ' subject' as "limit" is best interpreted as a 
perspective that we as individual subjects can attain: in taking up this perspective we 
regard or contemplate the entire world in a very particular way. It is a mistake to interpret 
Wittgenstein as suggesting that there is in fact some meta-subject that stands at the limit 
or outside the world as a limited whole. Rather, we should take him as intimating that 
both the perspective at the limit of the world and the "subject" is one and the same. This 
is in part what he means when he writes: "The self of solipsism shrinks to a point without 
extension, and there remains the reality co-ordinated with it" (5 .64). There is nothing left 
over from the limits of the world other than a complete picture of all the facts. 
The "self of solipsism" just is the "philosophical self', the "metaphysical ( and 
willing) subject"; it is that ' subject' that stands at the limit of the world and collapses into 
the transcendental perspective on the world. This ' subject' is what "shrinks to an 
extension-less point", in Wittgenstein's  language. Put another way, there simply is no 
"transcendental subject" at all ;  only a transcendental perspective on the world. And it is 
this perspective that imbues the world with value in an absolute sense-this is the ethical 
perspective on the world. 
Thus, the notion of will and willing that Wittgenstein thinks must be detached in 
order for us to take the right attitude or perspective on the world as a whole is our 
mentioned" in the world: on my view this is just Wittgenstein's way of characterizing a perspective at the 
limit of the world. 
1 40 
individual wills. As individual willing subjects, in the midst of the world, we are always 
imposing our will on the world and trying to arrange life to suit us. 
We are now in a positi�n to explain how the transcendental perspective 
illuminates the "good life." According to Wittgenstein, it is willing in the world that we 
must attempt to negate if we are to obtain the right attitude: "In order to live happily I 
must be in agreement with the world. And that is what "being happy" means" (NB, p. 75). 
Now being "in agreement with the world" involves detaching from the world in the sense 
that one tries to become free of those desires that fasten on to events and objects in the 
world. Here it is the individual willing subject - Sam or Socrates - that detaches from the 
worlds events and happenings. It is in this way that I can "make myself independent of 
fate" (NB, p. 74). And fate, Wittgenstein thinks, is the "same thing" as "the world" (Ibid). 
Hence, we can make ourselves independent of the world and, by so doing, live a "happy" 
life: "I can only make myself independent of the world - and so in a certain sense master 
it - by renouncing any influence on happenings" (NB, p. 75). 
One might wonder how it is possible to be in "agreement" with the world while 
simultaneously detaching from the world. Is not agreement with the world similar to 
embracing the world as it is? But then to embrace the world as it is - with the unfolding 
of just these particular events - seems to be inconsistent with a disinterested and detached 
perspective on the world. This is only a seeming inconsistency. It is practically 
impossible to "renounce any influence on happenings". After all, "renouncing any 
influence on happenings" is best interpreted as an ideal-and hell, we need to eat. But 
what we can do is recognize that as individual willing subjects, very much in the midst of 
the world, and so in the midst of the world's  "happenings", we are both agents and 
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observers. As agents we do try to affect changes in the world, in our own lives and in the 
lives of others. But we can also notice that our will only goes so far. Events unfold in 
ways that we could never foresee, and we are absolutely powerless in determining what 
the ultimate results of our actions in the world will be. Thus, the detached and 
disinterested perspective is one that observes the individual subject' s  actions as part and 
parcel of the world' s  events and happenings, recognizing that all individual subjects 
impose their will in the world, but at the same time takes a detached and disinterested 
view of the consequences of the individual subject' s  actions in the world. The 
detachment, then, is in part a complete resignation toward the consequences of one's 
actions. We see the limit of our will in the world, and view the results of what we do with 
a kind of disinterestedness. 
However, the case is quite different regarding will "at the limit of the world". 
Here we can choose to embrace the entirety of the world's events and be "happy"83 or we 
can view the world with an unhappy eye, judging that the world is not how it "ought" to 
be. Here will is boundless in the sense that we can be in "agreement" with the entire 
world without simultaneously finding any of the events that unfold in the world agreeable 
to us as individual willing subjects. 
We are now in a position to see that it is the individual willing subject that must 
learn to detach from objects and events in the world. It is will in this sense that wants 
detaching, not the transcendental notion of the 'willing subject' , from which this will-less 
perspective emerges. Indeed, since all individual willing subjects can work at taking up 
83 "Happy" is not the best term here. I think Wittgenstein means something closer to "contentment", "peace 
of mind", or "serenity". For "happy" suggests more of a feeling or emotion than a continuous state. 
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this disinterested and detached perspective, the metaphysical willing subject is best 
thought of ( as I have already suggested) as the individual willing subject after 
detachment from events and objects in the world. Put another way, the individual willing 
subject that takes up the transcendental perspective is all there is to Wittgenstein's talk of 
the "metaphysical subject" or the "the willing subject." This is why I suggested earlier 
that this perspective is a kind of pure objectivity with respect to the world - one that we 
can all obtain - and one that should not be thought of as requiring some kind of 
metaphysical subject in addition to individual subjects. There are not, then, two types of 
subject here. 
The individual willing subject that takes up the transcendental perspective on 
value and the world is detached from the world and thereby is able to take an attitude to 
the world that is independent of what happens in the world. "Will" is, in this sense, 
"independent of the world" (NB, p. 73 and TLP, 6.373). Here will is not cashed out in 
terms of what we do in the world, the actions we take, the ends we try to bring about, etc., 
etc., and thus should not be understood as being on a par with all the other events in the 
world. This notion of willing can "only affect the boundaries of the world, not the facts, 
what cannot be portrayed by language but can only be shown in language" (NB, p. 73). In 
this sense will can only be an attitude toward the whole world. 
The attitude is, as I argued earlier, very much like the artists attitude towards an 
object of art (which needn't be an artifact). In seeing an object as disconnected from any 
and all practical concerns, from a detached and disinterested perspective, the artist sees 
the object as something sublime, significant, and has having value absolutely. Similarly, 
when the individual subject' s will is detached from the unfolding of events and 
1 43 
happenings in the world, a kind of disinterested and detached perspective reigns, and he 
can see and feel the world as something sublime. 
Thus, the entire world becomes ("waxes"? NB, p. 73 and 6.43) something 
miraculous for us, and we lose ourselves in the contemplation of it. We no longer make 
the distinction between our empirical (individual selves) and the world. Thus, our own 
designs and interests, our strivings and longings, and all our carrying' s  on simply 
evaporate into the world. They are simply more facts that make up all there is in the 
world. It is this "feeling of the world as a limited whole" ( 6.45) - what Wittgenstein 
equates with "the mystical feeling" - that results from taking what I have been calling 
Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective on the world. In the end it is a psychic change 
toward the world: we are able to rise above what is happening with this contemplative 
and disinterested perspective. However, at the same time we are not apathetic and 
despairing, for we see the entire world in a different light, as a miraculous whole, and 
become lost in our feeling or sense that there is a world at all . And I contend that it is this 
"sense" of the world that imbues it with value in an absolute sense according to 
Wittgenstein. 
In this part of the chapter we have seen just how Schopenhauer' s "purely knowing 
subject" illuminates what I have been calling Wittgenstein's aesthetico-ethical aspect of 
transcendental perspective with respect to the world. We have also seen that it is a 
mistake to interpret Wittgenstein's remarks about a "willing subject" or a "metaphysical 
subject" as super-subjects over and above individual subjects in the world. Furthermore, 
the detached and disinterested character of the transcendental perspective is detached 
from will in the world, but is not a complete cessation of willing. Willing at the limits of 
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the world as pictured amounts to our taking an attitude toward the worl� that results from 
the transcendental perspective. Finally, the "happy life", the "good life", is the life that is 
lived in agreement with the world-a kind of stoic quietism. 
But what are we to say of ordinary moral claims, such as "stealing is wrong" or 
"one should tell the truth"? What becomes of ethics in the world? Does Wittgenstein 
have no way to accommodate such sentences within his Tractarian Framework? I think 
he does, but we must turn to Philippa Foot's position regarding ethics in the world as 
nothing more than disguised hypothetical imperatives to see how Wittgenstein can make 
sense of ethics in the more ordinary sense. 
(b) Making Sense of Ethical Claims in The World; 
The Hypothetical Status of ethics84 
I want to give a more positive account as to why Wittgenstein thinks that ethics 
and value cannot be contained within the world. In addition, I will explain just what kind 
of value Wittgenstein thought could be attached to facts in the world. Furthermore, I will 
explain how ethics in the world can be "said." By drawing from material in his "Lecture 
on Ethics"85, material that essentially amplifies his comments on ethics and value in his 
TLP, I believe that I can give an account of what he is trying to get us to see in the 
following passages. At 6.4 and 6.4 1 Wittgenstein writes :  
84 I am not suggesting that Wittgenstein would endorse any 'theory' of what ethical judgments mean, but 
rather that what he says regarding the impossibility of expressing what we want ethics to be about resonates 
with Foot's point that morality cannot have the "magical" must that we want to attribute to it. I am only 
arguing that we can make sense of what Wittgenstein calls the "relative" value of ethical judgments by 
interpreting them as hypothetical imperatives. 
85 Philosophical Review; 14, pp. 3- 1 1 ,  (I 965): First read at Cambridge in 1929/30 to the society known as 
"The Heretics". Reprinted in Moral Discourse and Practice; Edited by Darwall, Gibbard, and Railton; 
Oxford Univ.Press: 1 997 
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All Propositions are of equal value. 
The sense of the world must lie outside the world. In the world everything is as it 
is, and everything happens as it does happen: in it no value exists - and if it did 
exist, it would have no value. 
If there is a value which is of value, it must lie outside all happening and being-so. 
For all that happens and is the case is accidental. 
What makes it (value) non-accidental cannot lie within the world, since if it did it 
would itself be accidental. 
It (value) must lie outside the world. 
And at 6.42 Wittgenstein continues: 
So too it is impossible for there to be propositions of ethics. 
Propositions can express nothing that is higher. 
Finally, at 6.42 1 Wittgenstein writes :  
It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words. 
Ethics is transcendental. 
Ethics and aesthetics are one. 86 
These passages continue to baffle and frustrate anyone who tries to say something 
(anything!) about what in the world - so to speak - absolute value amounts to for 
Wittgenstein. It is important to see that all events in the world are on a par for 
Wittgenstein. There is, then, no distinction between the unfolding of some natural event 
versus the action taken by an individual subject in just this sense: All events (including 
human actions) in the world are equally value-less in anything like a "necessary" or 
"absolute" sense. This is what Wittgenstein is driving at in 6.4 1 . 
All events are "accidental" in the sense that they are contingent. There is no 
logical necessity to the world's events turning out as they have. Wittgenstein recognizes 
86 Pears and McGuinness have "ethics and aesthetics are one and the same", but the original German is 
"Ethik und Aesthetik sind Eins". 
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only logical necessity (Wittgenstein does not consider anything like nomological or 
physical necessity in his TLP): "There is no compulsion making one thing happen 
because another has happened: the o�ly necessity that exists is logical necessity" 
(6.37 1 ).87 Since logical necessity is the only type of necessity there is, it follows that any 
event in the world is "accidental" or contingent: "Whatever we can describe at all could 
be other than it is" (5 .643). 
But what is it that makes value in the world "accidental" or contingent? What I 
suggest is this: just as there is no (logical) compulsion that causes one thing to happen 
rather than another, there is no necessary connection between an action and that action' s  
having value as a matter of logic-there i s  no "compulsion" here either. In  order for "non 
accidental" or "absolute" value to attach to ethical judgments about this or that fact in the 
world, the value would have to result from the fact (event, action) as a matter of necessity 
for Wittgenstein. But given that he recognizes only logical .necessity, there can be no 
place in this world for ethical judgments of absolute value. But again, what does it mean 
to say that value must be "necessarily" attached to such judgments? Let us see if we can 
amplify and sharpen this idea by investigating what Wittgenstein has to ' say' about 
"absolute" value in his LE. 
87 Incidentally, the fact that Wittgenstein recognizes only logical necessity explains why his conception of 
free will is so paltry: "The freedom of the will consists in the impossibility of knowing actions that still lie 
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"Absolute" Value and Categorical Imperatives 
With respect to moral claims such as "you ought to keep your promises", we do 
not believe that the "ought" evaporates the moment people decide that they no longer 
want to be regarded as honest or no longer give a flip about morality at all. Wittgenstein 
makes this very point in his "lecture" when he says, in so many words, that the person 
who is "behaving like a beast" is not let off the hook when he says that he "doesn't want 
to behave any better" (LE, p 66). We do not withdraw the ought, but insist that he "ought 
to want to behave better" (Ibid.). Moreover, we believe that everyone should be able to 
see, almost as a matter of logic, that "behaving like a beast", is something that one has 
reason not to do. Wittgenstein is pressing this point when he writes: "The absolutely right 
road . . .  would be the road which everybody on seeing it would, with logical necessity, 
have to go, or be ashamed for not going. And similarly, the absolute good, if it is a 
describable state of affairs, would be one which everybody, independent of his tastes and 
inclinations, would necessarily bring about or feel guilty for not bringing about" (pp, 67-
68). (Of course, Wittgenstein does not believe that the "absolute good'' is "a describable 
state of affairs.") No proposition could ever picture any such 'fact' in the world.  
Wittgenstein' s comments here strongly suggest that he thinks of absolute value as 
being necessary in the sense that it must have an absolutely overriding quality: as a 
matter of necessity or logic, moral principles must, so to speak, force our hand (here we 
in the future. We could know them only if causality were an inner necessity like that of logical inference" 
(5 . 1 362). 
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have a kind of logical "compulsion"). Implicit in all this is the familiar notion that moral 
imperatives are categorical, not hypothetical. 
That something like a hypothetical imperative is tied to, what Wittgenstein calls, a 
"relative" sense of "good" ( or value) is clear from the following example: "The right road 
is the road which leads to an arbitrarily predetermined end and it is quite clear to us all 
that there is no sense in talking about the right road apart from such a predetermined 
goal" (p 67). Now implicit in this is that a particular road is the "right" one because it will 
get me to where I want to go or where it is in my interest to go, etc. But such a use of 
"right" has nothing to do with ethics and value in the absolute sense, Wittgenstein thinks. 
Let us look a little more closely at the difference between hypothetical and 
categorical imperatives in order to see more clearly what Wittgenstein might be driving at 
when we says that ethics and (by extension) absolute value cannot be "contained" in the 
world. 
Philippa Foot on Categorical and Hypothetical Imperatives 
Foot argues that all moral claims are really just disguised hypothetical 
imperatives. Following Kant fairly closely, Foot characterizes a categorical imperative as 
simply an injunction to do or to refrain from doing some act, x, where the reason for 
doing or refraining from doing x is independent of our own or society' s  inclinations, 
desires, and interests. Foot writes: "When we say that a man should do something and 
intend a moral judgment we do not have to back up what he says by considerations about 
his interests or his desires; if no such connexion can be found the "should" need not be 
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withdrawn" (Moral Discourse and Practice; p, 3 1 3). Thus, the determination of what we 
ought to do, in the categorical sense, has nothing to do with what may or may not be in 
our own interests to do. On this view moral injunctions provide us with an overriding 
reason for following them: a reason that is action-guiding independent of our own 
inclinations, interests, and desires. 
Hypothetical ought claims are, however, ultimately tied to our interests, 
inclinations, and aims in the following way: The only sense in which it makes sense to 
say that I "ought" to do y in a hypothetical sense, is a case where y is the best ( or at least 
an efficacious) means of obtaining some goal, z, where z is some end that is either in my 
interest to have realized or that I want realized. But ultimately, in order to justify z, I must 
implicitly will z. The "ought" here only has hypothetical force: "Do y, given that you 
want to accomplish z." Like Kant, we can think of these ought claims as imperatives of 
prudence. Such imperatives are a species of hypothetical imperatives. 
Now according to Foot, all moral claims are disguised hypothetical imperatives in 
a somewhat broader sense than imperatives of prudence. For a moral ought frequently 
demands that I act contrary to my desires and sometimes in conflict with my own self­
interest. For example, when I ought to do something for the greater good. But 
notwithstanding the difference between imperatives of prudence and moral imperatives, 
Foot argues that the latter are ultimately hypothetical. /fl regard being a virtuous person 
as something important and as a goal worth pursuing, then I ought to be fair, honest, etc. I 
can even be held to be inconsistent if I claim to regard morality as something important, 
yet flout certain moral obligations and duties. But if I do not regard moral principles as 
worth pursuing, then it is not clear what force they are supposed to have on me ( or 
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anyone else), other than the usual force of moral sanction such as disapproval, 
punishment, etc. But these "reasons" (motives really) have nothing to do with why we 
think we ought to obey moral principles. 
Foot of course recognizes that hypothetical imperatives are often tacit, and 
frequently have to do with the interests and desires of society or some segment of society: 
The desires on which a hypothetical imperative is dependent may be those of one 
man, or may be taken for granted as belonging to a number of people engaged in 
some common project or sharing common aims (p. 3 14). 
Thus, the fact that one may not want or desire to conform to some moral principle is 
irrelevant in terms of what society or some segment of society deems morally 
appropriate. For example, one may not want to be honest in one's dealings with others, 
but this fact does not make lying morally appropriate or permissible. We must look, 
therefore, not just at the desires and interests of a single individual, but at the desires and 
interests of society in order to accurately represent hypothetical imperatives. Let us take 
something like "human flourishing" to be in the interest of any society. 
But then we have to ask what reason( s) we have been given for thinking that one 
"ought to do what is conducive to (or at least does not thwart) human flourishing"? Why 
should I care about that? To say that I am bound by society is no answer, for I might 
retort that I do not care what society cares about. 
We have simply pushed the problem back a step. What reasons are adduced, 
independent of my ( and society' s) interests, projects and goals, in support of the claim 
that "one should contribute to (or at least not do anything to thwart) human flourishing"? 
Remember that this more general moral principle (whose status is purportedly 
categorical) must provide us with a reason for following it that is independent of the 
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aims, desires, inclinations, etc. of a particular individual or society as a whole. Moral 
principles are supposed to be followed not because society deems them right or 
efficacious, but because they are right. But what role does this mysterious "because" play 
here? Foots point is that here we have no more than the assumption that there exist 
objective values that anyone can recognize and that are essentially action guiding, and 
this is no justification at all . 88 It simply assumes that there are moral facts that serve as 
reasons independent of an agent's inclinations, desires, concerns, etc. There doesn't seem 
to be anything irrational or inconsistent in disregarding all morality as nonsense. As Foot 
notes, such a person might well be "convicted of villainy but not of inconsistency" (p. 
3 1 6). 
What I have tried to show is that in the end human flourishing derives whatever 
value it has from the importance it has for us as human beings. In short, it is only our 
regard for human flourishing as a worthy pursuit, and whatever thwarts this admittedly 
open-ended project is regarded as morally reprehensible. Thus even this philosophical 
construction of what imbues actions with value is ultimately tied to our wills. And it is 
this fact - that morality is ultimately tied to our will ; that is, to our interests and desires -
that gives it its "relative" and "hypothetical" status. 
It therefore appears that our reasons for thinking that moral claims are categorical, 
not hypothetical, has do with our greater concern for ( and our "feeling" about) something 
88 Of course, Foot's ultimate conclusion is that moral "oughts" can be interpreted as hypothetical 
imperatives without destroying morality. Her position is that instead of looking for the chimerical 
categorical "must", we need only see that an agent can be moral without their being an overriding reason 
(one independent of the agent's goals, aims, desires, etc.) for the agent. For example, if l am honest because 
I think that being a virtuous person involves honesty, and want to treat people as I would have them treat 
me, it does not follow that because I have these moral goals in mind, that I am not acting morally. The case 
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like human flourishing. It is more important to us, and this is why we value it. Moral 
principles thus derive from social practices, which are, in the end, contingent and so 
"accidental", in Wittgenstein's sense of t�e word.89 
The implication of seeing morality as a system of "hypothetical imperatives" is 
that there can be no overriding reason to do what one ought to do: there is no logical (and 
hence necessary) connection between facts and absolute value (in Wittgenstein's sense). 
Certainly Foot thinks that it (the "overriding reason" or "must") cannot be discovered in 
morality: it is an "illusion" and no more than an attempt to "give the moral 'ought' a 
magic force" (p 3 1 9) .  Absolute value is the kind of value that would attach to some 
action or some end, independent of prudential reasons, inclinations and desires, either my 
own or the desires and inclinations of society or some segment of society. 
"Relative" Value and Hypothetical Imperatives 
In short, if moral claims are all hypothetical imperatives, then the value that 
attaches to them cannot, to use Wittgenstein's language, be absolute but only "relative" 
(p 66). This means that talk of "human flourishing" or "contributing to human happiness" 
is in the end a contingent matter, and so reducible to the facts. The facts, of course, 
include our regarding such principles as being worthy ends. And thus what we have are 
"facts, facts, and facts, but no Ethics" (LE, p 67). 
is quite different for the shopkeeper who is honest only because it is good for business. His reason (if this is 
his only one) is clearly selfish and self-serving. 
89 Richard Rorty, a strange bedfellow with early Wittgenstein I admit, is expressing a similar take on the 
impossibility of grounding ethics in the world when he writes about the "liberal ironist": "For liberal 
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Another characteristic of judgments of relative value is that they can be 
expressed, unlike so-called judgments of absolute value. Indeed, James Edwards notes 
that relative value c�aims "are just descriptions of sociological facts, so they are perfectly 
capable of being expressed in propositions" (p. 85).90 This enables Wittgenstein to talk 
about ethics in a "relative" sense, but not in an "absolute" sense. 
Hence there can be no further justification as to why we regard such ends ( e.g., 
human flourishing) as having value absolutely other than our feeling that they do. What's 
lacking is the possibility of telling any story as to why we ought to regard such ends as 
having value as a matter of necessity. In the end the facts that lead one to regard human 
flourishing as a "good" thing must ultimately come down to an original regard for 
certain ends or pursuits as having value. And thus the absolute sense of value - the value 
with a "magical force" - cannot be justified or explained. It cannot be expressed at all : "It 
seems to me obvious that nothing we could ever think or say should be the thing" (LE, p 
67). 
Wittgenstein, like Foot, does not think that there is any way to justify the 
supposed logical "compulsion" of ethical value in the way that is needed. Moral claims, 
then, while certainly having this prima facie overriding or absolute quality in the world, 
are all ultimately tied to our (and society' s) interests, wants, and inclinations - in short, 
morality is attached to our wills in the world. 
ironists, there is no answer to the question "Why not be cruel?" - no non-circular theoretical backup for the 
belief that cruelty is horrible" (Contingency, irony, and solidarity, p.xv). 
90 Ethics Without Philosophy ( 1 982) 
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Put another way, morality can be justified for a given person only if that person 
wills its implicit goals; that is, accepts its hypothesis. Hence, it is the apron strings of the 
. will that reduce ethical claims to hypothetical imperatives 
The Will of the Individual Subject 
When I say that it is "the apron strings of the will" that render ethics and value 
"relative" and so "hypothetical" for Wittgenstein I mean will in the world, and not will as 
an attitude toward the world as a limited whole. What gives ethics in the world its 
"relative", "contingent", and "hypothetical" status for Wittgenstein is simply that the 
individual subject's  will is engaged with this or that aspect of the world. This is to say no 
more than that the object of our desires and interests is always some particular part of the 
world; either something that we want to bring about or something that we do not want to 
occur. As subjects in the midst of the world we are engaged only with the facts, and never 
with the world as a whole. Recall Wittgenstein talks about "the will as a 
phenomenon . . .  [that] . . .  is of interest only to psychology" (6.423). This notion of "will", 
at least minimally, includes our wants and desires. What I am suggesting is that it is will 
in this sense that renders ethical judgments in the world hypothetical, and thus as having 
only a relative status. And it does so because the will of the individual subject (the 
empirical will, if you like) always takes some object in the world. And whatever the 
object of our will is, whether the object is world peace or to be a better neighbor, the 
value that attaches to such objects (goals, projects) can only ever be hypothetical. It is 
only our initial regard, interest, and desire - our wills in the world - that confer relative 
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value on this or that aspect of the world. This value is hypothetical because we are 
engaged with the facts in the world; we are not seeing the world sub specie aeterni, but 
are instead seeing "objects as it were from the midst of them" (NB, p 83). 
The World and Absolute Value: Two Problems 
But there are two problems associated with the idea that the transcendental 
perspective points to the world as having value in an absolute sense. First, since feeling 
or experiencing _the world as having value or meaning in an absolute sense is contingent 
upon our seeing the world from its limit, it appears that absolute value is also 
hypothetical. But on my view absolute value is not hypothetical, only relative value is. 
This tension needs to be resolved. 
Second, it seems highly doubtful that anyone who takes the transcendental 
perspective on language and the world must ( or is even caused to) feel the world as 
having absolute value. After all, there is no logical entailment ( or causal connection) 
between our taking a transcendental perspective on language and the world and our 
subsequently "feeling" the world in any way at all . 
I am imagining someone (perhaps Bertrand Russell) who says: "I take the point 
about seeing both language and the world as a "limited whole", but I for one do not have 
anything like a mystical feeling or attitude toward the world as a result of this 
perspective. What's more, if anything the world becomes totally devoid of any value as a 
result of this detached and disinterested perspective. That's how I see it." 
1 56 
I believe that I can answer the charge that absolute value is, like relative value, 
ultimately hypothetical .  Relative value is hypothetical because it is conditioned upon 
some particular fact ( or set of facts) in the world. Here the individual subject is not taking 
a perspective that is detached and disinterested. This is a perspective that is very much in 
the world. The transcendental perspective, in virtue of its being a view that is at the limit 
or outside the world of facts cannot be conditioned by any fact ( or set of facts) in the 
world. Thus, if the world does have value in an absolute sense, that value cannot be 
hypothetical in the way that relative value is. Any notion of absolute value being 
hypothetical in this way is incoherent. 
The second charge is rather more difficult to answer. To the Bertrand Russell's of 
the world what are we to say? Can we demonstrate that by failing to feel the world in the 
way characterized by Wittgenstein - that there is something mystical about there being a 
world at all - that they have missed something? Have they not fully appreciated the 
transcendental perspective on language and the world? Are they suffering from some type 
of cognitive (or non-cognitive) dysfunction? Are they 'meaning' blind? What are we to 
say to someone who says: "The world is a cold place and it is ridiculous to think that the 
world has any value at all." 
I think the best we can do here is explain Wittgenstein's gestures toward the 
mystical as a kind of invitation to see the world in a different light. It is a kind of "seeing 
as" - an aspectual seeing - that some will be lead to appreciate and others will not. One 
can see the world as merely a collection of all the facts and not be moved to feel the 
world' s existence as something miraculous or marvelous or one can RSVP to 
Wittgenstein's invitation to feel the very existence of a world as the manifestation of the 
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mystical - as an experience of the mystical. There can be no reason's adduced in favor of 
one way of feeling the world ( as something miraculous) over the other ( as a cold and 
indifferent collection of facts). 
We have seen how Wittgenstein's transcendental perspective on the world is 
detached from will in the world in much the same way as Schopenhauer' s  "purely 
knowing subject" qua state is. I have also suggested that we interpret Wittgenstein's talk 
of a "metaphysical/willing subject" as simply a colorful way for him to flesh out a 
perspective on the world that is at the very limit of the world. I have also argued that 
according to Wittgenstein the object that we see from a detached and disinterested view is 
the world as a "limited whole". In addition, I have attempted to illuminate what it might 
mean to see the world as having value in an absolute sense by looking at certain mystical 
experiences that Wittgenstein describes in his effort to point toward absolute value (I will 
come back to this in chapter four). Finally, I have demonstrated that Wittgenstein does 
have a way to make sense of ethical judgments made about actions and behaviors in the 
world only if we understand such judgments as having a hypothetical status. There can be 
no judgments of absolute value in the world because the necessary logical connection 
between fact and value is missing. 
Some of the themes in this chapter, specifically Wittgenstein's identifying ethics 
with aesthetics (6.42 1 ), require amplification. In addition, I want to demonstrate that 
others have taken Wittgenstein only to be identifying certain similarities between ethics 
and aesthetics, and have rejected out of hand the idea that when he identifies the two he is 
doing so strictly. I hope to demonstrate that any identity of ethics with aesthetics other 
than the one I propose raises more problems than it solves.  I also need to investigate more 
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thoroughly whether or not Wittgenstein' s  higher-order language can "show" us anything 
about value in an absolute sense. Thus far I have simply assumed that his . 'claims' about 
ethics, aesthetics, value, and the mystical are not nonsense. 
In chapter two we saw that interpreting Wittgenstein's 'propositions' as meta­
linguistic assertions, specifically with respect to the building up of his picture theory of 
meaning, is a nice fit. But how does a higher-order language work when it comes to 
ethics, value, and the mystical? How should we understand the way in which language 
functions when it comes to Wittgenstein's remarks that have nothing to do with the 
picture theory of meaning? I want to begin with this last question first, for if no sense can 
be attributed to Wittgenstein' s  'claims' about ethics, aesthetics and value, then ' saying' 
anything at all about the point of his gestures in the "sixes" appears hopeless. We shall 
see that the function of language here directs us (or, more gently, invites us) to a view of 
the whole world, and so is a kind of higher-order language, but not in the way his meta­
linguistic assertions about the connection between language and the world are. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
"(Ethics and Aesthetics are one)" 
in Virtue of Perspective Alone 
Is any attempt to give some positive characterization of Wittgenstein's ethical 
purpose or point in writing the Tractatus doomed to failure because of his own dismissal 
of his 'propositions' as "nonsense" (6.54)? How do his 'propositions' manage to 
"elucidate" anything at all about ethics, aesthetics, and value? And how on earth, so to 
speak, do his 'propositions' show or manifest what's mystical? 91 Let me begin with the 
last question first. We need to understand the role language plays in the Tractatus 
regarding ethics, aesthetics, value, and the mystical. 
Language of the TLP: Language and the World "Under the Aspect of Eternity" 
The 'propositions' of his work function in one of two ways: either (a) as meta­
linguistic assertions of how a perspicuous language - that is, a language purified of the 
kinds of philosophical confusions that we investigated in chapter two - is related to the 
world or (b) in the manner in which an art critic92 uses language to draw our attention to 
91 Note that simply making the distinction between propositions with sense (those that picture reality) and 
those that are "sinnlos" (literally senseless or without sense) cannot help here. According to Wittgenstein, 
tautologies and contradictions are "sinnloss" in that they do not picture any state of affairs in the world. But 
the 'propositions' in the "sixes" of the TLP, although they are "senseless" insofar as they cannot picture 
facts (like tautologies), they are clearly not like tautologies in other respects. Thus, lumping them with 
tautologies (in terms of their "senselessness") does not help us to ferret out what additional purpose the 
fronouncements about value, ethics, and the mystical serve. It does not get us anywhere. 2 I am not here suggesting that the language of art criticism - I do not even think there is such an animal -
is essentially directive or imperatival. All that I am suggesting is that the directive use of language is a use 
of language that plays an important role in getting us to see some work of art in the right light, so to speak. 
It seems more natural that a directive use of language could get us to appreciate the finished product, rather 
than the process by which the work was created. (It is for this reason that I think Wittgenstein' s  imperatival 
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certain features of a work of art - features that imbue it with value. In (a) Wittgenstein is 
clearing up certain philosophical confusions that result from a misunderstanding of the 
logic of our language ( chapter two). He is clearing the ground in order to "show" us 
certain features shared by language and the world. We should, then, think of his (a) 
metalinguistic assertions as having smaller scope ( even though there are a lot more of this 
type of assertion in the Tractatus than the (b) type); their function is to prepare us for 
"seeing" the world as a "limited whole". The function of (b) is more straightforwardly 
directive, invitational, and evocative in that their purpose is not to direct us to what 
Wittgenstein regards as philosophical confusions or problems about the logic of our 
language, but instead serve to direct our gaze toward the big picture - the forest, as it 
were. The (b )-type directives are more like invitations to see and feel the whole world in 
a certain light; they do not focus on detailed analysis of the language-world connection in 
the way that the meta-linguistic assertions do. Moreover, (b )-type directives are usually 
connected more directly with ethics and value. On my view the 'claims' made about 
use (b) is geared toward getting us to see the whole of language and the whole of the world). In instructing 
us as to how to best appreciate a work of art an art critic might say: "look at it from a greater distance" or 
"dim the lights" or perhaps "note the sense of movement in Van Gogh's flowers" or some such comment. 
These are all commands as to how to look at a particular object of art (it could also be an object in nature). 
Notice that such directives change the way in which we see the object. Nothing about the object has 
changed at all; we simply see it differently. The rabbit-duck is a great example of"seeing-as" or aspectual 
seeing. There is an important parallel here with the "world of the happy man". The unhappy man and the 
happy man occupy the same world of facts, yet Wittgenstein says that the world of the happy is "a different 
world" from that of the unhappy. Why? Presumably because the happy man, as a result of seeing the world 
differently, lives in a different world from that of the unhappy man, who sees the world of facts only from 
the midst of the world. Wittgenstein also talks of the world "waxing and waning as a whole" as "ifby 
accession or loss of meaning"". Again, there is the view of the whole that he is directing us to. What I want 
to say is that for Wittgenstein the value of an object of art is analogous to the value of the whole world in 
that both must be seen in the right way. Another point in favor of reading some of Wittgenstein's  
'propositions' in  this way is that he seems to be committed to the admittedly peculiar idea that the ethical 
perspective on the word is fundamentaJJy an aesthetic view of the world as a "limited whole". So it seems 
natural that he would attempt to get us to see the world as a kind of object of art writ large. 
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ethics, aesthetics, and value are better understood as directives or invitations, not as meta­
linguistic assertions. 
Notice that the goal of both (a) and (b) is to bring us to a view that is at the limit 
of the world. The 'propositions' of the TLP serve, albeit in slightly different ways, as a 
vehicle for the expression of Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective on language and 
the world. In a nutshell this expression is simply that the right view of the world is to see 
it under the aspect of eternity or as a limited whole. In the first part of this chapter I 
clarify and flesh out the function of the (b )-type directives. 
I then critically evaluate what others have taken Wittgenstein to mean by the 
gnomic remark: "( ethics and aesthetics are one)" ( 6.45). Here I show where their views 
fall short (specifically, Diane Collinson' s, Cyril Barrett's, and B.R. Tilghman's). We 
already know that on my view the identity of ethics and aesthetics is not an identity of 
'subjects' in any sense, but indicates rather the same perspective on the world as a 
"limited whole". Fleshing out more fully why this is an identity of perspectives is my 
second concern in this chapter. But before getting to this we need to provide a way of 
understanding how Wittgenstein thinks he can show us anything at all about ethics and 
aesthetics (and the mystical more generally), given that he dismisses his 'propositions' as 
nonsense. I believe that interpreting his 'propositions' in one of the two ways 
characterized above - (a) or (b) - facilitates both an understanding and an appreciation of 
the transcendental perspective. 
More than a few philosophers have regarded the TLP as ironic or tongue-in-cheek 
or even an exercise in disguised nonsense. (On this view Wittgenstein realizes that his 
propositions are disguised nonsense, but uses them as a kind of "transitional" language in 
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order to get us to stop speaking nonsense). 93 Ultimately, I hope to show that they are 
mistaken. The central issue here revolves around attributing some meaning to the 
'propositions' of the TLP that deal with ethics, aesthetics, and value. 
The Language of the Art Critic: A Directive and Invitational Use of Language 
Recall that Wittgenstein places logic, aesthetics, and ethics under what can only 
be shown (and "what can be shown, cannot be said" 4. 1 2 12). I think Wittgenstein could 
be clearer here: what he really means by "said" here is closer to "described": what can be 
shown cannot be described in language. After all, we can and do say things that cannot 
be described or pictured (in poetry for example) by language, but few would claim that 
poetry or music does not "express" anything. At any rate, if Wittgenstein is attempting to 
bring us to a kind of aesthetic perspective on the world, then it seems to me that we 
should take seriously the idea that his 'propositions' - his practice of philosophy 
("philosophy is not a body of doctrine but an activity" 4. 1 12) in the TLP - are carefully 
designed to show (illuminate, highlight or exhibit for) us a view of the world in much the 
same way that an art critic uses language to draw our attention to features of some object 
that lend it (or imbue it with) value. Here, of course, the object in question - the thing that 
is aesthetically contemplated - is the "world as a limited whole". In part this means that 
Wittgenstein' s "gestures" are designed to get us to aesthetically appreciate the world in a 
93 In Chapter Five we wilJ Jook at Cora Diamond's "Throwing away the Ladder: How to Read the 
Tractatus" ( 1 984-85) in her Realistic Spirit: Wittgenstein, Philosophy and the Mind; MIT: 1 99 1 .  She sees 
Wittgenstein's  'propositions' as a kind of ''transitiona] Janguage" - a kind of imaginative nonsense - that is 
used by Wittgenstein to Jead us to the view that nothing whatever is "shown", and that the very 
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certain way - in, he thinks, the "right" way. 94 (Notice that in drawing our attention to 
some object of art, the art critic is attempting to get us to see it in the right way. But the 
directives we are given need not be taken as pointing to "truths" at all .) 
Wittgenstein is using language with the purpose of focusing our attention on 
features of language and the world in hopes of getting us to look at certain aspects of both 
that we would otherwise miss. I have already said that such a use of language is 
analogous to what an art critic does in getting us to attend to certain features of a work of 
art.95 But just how is he using language to do this? If his 'propositions' are similar in 
meaning to the way in which an art critic uses language, then Wittgenstein is using 
language in a directive sense. 
saying/showing distinction is itself another example of the kind of nonsense that Wittgenstein wants to see 
discarded. 
94 Perhaps seeing the world in the "right" way or from the "right" aesthetico-ethical perspective means that 
it is "right" or "correct" not in the sense that the conclusion of an argument is said to be right or correct. His 
claims about the language-world connection can be understood as meta-linguistic truths (chapter two), so 
we needn't worry about them. But here the term "right" means something like what it means in aesthetics 
broadly construed, as when we say that that particular musical note is not "the right" one. Here the 
suggestion is that it does not fit or go with the notes that came before. Examples of this use of"right" and 
"correct" abound in Lectures and Conversations on Aesthetics, Psychology, and Religious belief (Ed. By 
Cyril Barrett; Oxford: 1 966). Helping myself to this material is, I admit, anachronistic, but it might help 
explain how Wittgenstein's overall perspective on the world is "right" without being a "truth". I am 
suggesting that "right" means something like harmony or overall fittingness, etc. Now of course in back of 
such a perspective in most cases is a wealth of knowledge about the artistic medium, and what counts as 
"fitting". For example, someone who knows tailoring will say (Wittgenstein's example in LCAPR) when 
looking at a suit, "that's not right - the sleeves are too long, etc". Now the right perspective on the world as 
a whole is very different from this: Minimally, I think Wittgenstein's idea is that once we see the limitation 
of what we can do with any picturing language, we begin to "feel" the world in the right way. And part of 
this "feel" of the world involves "wondering" at its existence and accepting everything as it is. This is 
meant to be suggestive only. I am not confident that this is right. 95 Thanks to John Nolt for his suggestion that perhaps the way in which Wittgenstein is using language in 
his TLP - in pointing out certain features of language and the world - is closer to the way in which an art 
critic uses language - in focusing our attention on certain aspects of an object of art ( or more generally an 
aesthetic object - than the way in which an artist uses language to draw our attention to features of a work 
of art. An art critic points out certain features of a work of art in order so that we may better appreciate its 
significance or meaning. Originally I had it that Wittgenstein was using language as an artist does. But 
what an artist "says" about a work of art is often too subjective, personal, and lacks the kind of distanced 
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A Directive Use of Language 
Of course, Wittgenstein's use of imperatival or directive language does not have 
the same objective as typical imperatives and commands do. For example, imperatives 
such as "Shut the door" or "leave my classroom", etc., aim instead at getting people to 
perform certain actions in some small part of the world. Wittgenstein's aesthetico-ethical 
perspective has nothing to do with action, but rather with seeing and feeling. And of 
course the function of a directive use of language in art is geared towards getting us to 
view a particular object in the world in a different light. Wittgenstein's directive or 
imperatival use of language is aimed, instead, if I am correct, at getting us to see and feel 
the entire world differently. 
Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see the entire world in a wholly different light -
from a perspective that is at the limit of the world. My interpretation of Wittgenstein's 
'propositions' in the "sixes" gives a voice to the connection between value and the world 
as a whole by suggesting that his transcendental perspective be understood as a species of 
an aesthetic perspective. Such an interpretation makes better sense of the oracular and 
imperatival nature of Wittgenstein' s  propositions. It makes better sense of the idea that 
Wittgenstein's "elucidations" are geared to show us that there is value in viewing and 
feeling the world as a "limited whole": these 'propositions' do not "say" in anything like 
a descriptive sense. This is just to say that he is not guilty of trying to say something 
and objective perspective that is required. Ultimately, as John Nolt has observed, "the artist may say just 
about any damn thing- and usually does !" 
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about value that cannot be said. Thus, on my reading, the ethical aspect of the 
transcendental perspective is not incoherent. 
Indeed, Wittgenstein begins w�th a view of the whole world, and thereby directs 
us to see the world from a God's eye perspective right off the bat. We are being directed 
to consider the entire world, and not some part of it. Wittgenstein begins his treatise from 
a view that is outside the world: "The world is all that is the case" ( I ). In looking at the 
world as ( I )  directs us to we are already being projected out of the world. Let me attempt 
to flesh this out a little more. 
We might preface many of his pronouncements with "Look at the world in this 
way ": "The world is the totality of facts, not of things" ( 1 . 1  ) .  He is imploring us to see 
the world in a certain light; he need not be interpreted as "arguing" for his various and 
sundry ' claims' .  So perhaps we should resist the temptation to understand Wittgenstein' s 
pronouncements as conclusions to un-stated or oblique arguments or as directing us to 
ineffable truths about language and the world. I admit it is hard to do this; however, 
doing so blocks the very troublesome issue of taking Wittgenstein's pronouncements to 
be quasi-descriptive claims or ineffable necessary truths about the world (such as Kant' s 
"synthetic-a priori" claims ).96 
% More evidence that Wittgenstein cannot be giving us necessary truths about language and the world is 
that according to him only contingent propositions are meaningful; for only contingent propositions can 
picture or represent facts in the world. Thus, the ''philosophers" necessary truths about the world cannot be 
meaningful propositions on Wittgenstein's view. In addition, necessary truths about the world ("synthetic a 
priori" truths) are typically taken to be stateable by philosophers. And he gives no indication that these 
truths are what can only be shown. 
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Perhaps the best evidence of the imperatival or directive function of 
Wittgenstein's 'propositions' comes from the "Sixes" of his work. If we consider the 
following pronouncements we see that there is (quite literally) no room for descriptive 
language to do any work in terms of further illuminating Wittgenstein's perspective on 
the world as a "limited whole" (6.432 1 - 6.5): 
The facts all contribute only to setting the problem, not to its solution. 
It is not how things are in the world that is mystical, but that it exists. 
To view the world sub specie aetemi is to view it as a whole - a limited whole. 
Feeling the world as a limited whole - it is this that is mystical. 
When the answer cannot be put into words, neither can the question be put into 
words. The riddle does not exist. 
Now if we preface all of the above instructions as to how to see the world with 
"Look at it this way", we at once see that we needn't argue for or against Wittgenstein's  
'position' because "arguing" only makes sense in the context of "claims" that one is 
attempting to defend or refute. But by Wittgenstein's own admission, what he is trying to 
illuminate "cannot be put into words". Thus, "words", in anything like a descriptive 
sense, either for or against what we take Wittgenstein to be showing us, cannot do what 
they normally do, especially in Philosophy as traditionally conceived (i.e., pre-Tractatus 
Philosophy). (One does well to keep in mind the typical view that metaphysics is in the 
business of giving the most general description - like some type of "super-science" - of 
what there is; a view that Wittgenstein flatly rejects): "The result of philosophy is not a 
number of 'philosophical positions' ,  but to make propositions clear" (4. 1 12). 
Can we interpret the above remarks as meta-linguisitc assertions like we did 
regarding his claims about how language is connected to the world in chapter two? It 
seems that we cannot. For in making pronouncements about "seeing" and "feeling" the 
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world as a "limited whole", that this " is mystical", Wittgenstein is not expressing truths 
at all - not even meta-linguistic ones. He is not talking here about the details of any 
language-world connection here. And thus he is not showing us certain features of the 
language-world relation that can be 'said' in a higher-order language. So we must find a 
different role for language to play here. 
Is the implication, then, that absolutely nothing can be said about the aesthetico­
ethical point that Wittgenstein is trying to make? If we interpret Wittgenstein' s 
'propositions' in the "sixes" as describing any metaphysical facts, or as asserting meta­
linguistic truths, then the answer is "yes". But this does not mean that we cannot interpret 
the 'propositions' of the "sixes" as directives whose main function, once the meta­
linguistic rules for a perspicuous notation are grasped ( chapter two), is to bring us to a 
perspective that is at the very limit of the world. He is imploring us to see the world from 
a God's eye view so that we can see that the "solution" to the "problem of life" (6.52 1 )  is 
to cease to look to the facts of the world for any kind of answer. 
Let us give some voice as to what Wittgenstein is trying to get us to appreciate 
regarding "the problem" here and why he thinks his perspective leads to "the vanishing of 
the problem" (6.52 1 ). First, the "problem" of life or the world, which amounts to the 
same thing for Wittgenstein - "the world and life are one" (5 .62 1 )  - is a felt problem for 
us (or at least for many of us): we feel that there must be some meaning or value to life, 
and we attempt to articulate just what we mean by talking about "the meaning of life." 
Put slightly differently, the "problem" comes into view when we try to attach some 
meaning to the notion that the "absolute value" (LE) of life, and its discovery or the 
discovery that there can be no such thing, must lie in the facts of the world. Where else 
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can the problem and its solution lie? Both ways of framing "the problem" assume that 
there is some fact or set of facts in the world that, once discovered, will enable us to 
breathe easy - to rest. We have the idea that what we are lacking is some bit of 
knowledge or information that will give us the answer to the question: "What is life's 
value or meaning or what makes it really important?" Or perhaps we believe that some 
set of facts or piece of information can at least show us that there is no such thing as the 
value of life, it's meaning, or what makes it truly important. And Wittgenstein is 
suggesting that there can be no such answer to "the problem" (in either direction) in 
anything like a descriptive sense. To realize this is to see "the problem" dissolve. 
(Tolstoy, in his A Confession, came to the same negative 'conclusion' as Wittgenstein 
did, chapter one.) Thus, the solution is simply to see that "The riddle does not exist" 
(6.5). In its shortest form the answer to this "problem" is to stop philosophizing about it, 
and just live: "The man (who is) fulfilling the purpose of existence (is one) who no longer 
needs to have any purpose except to live". But in order to appreciate this insight one must 
first wrestle with the problem as if it were an empirical one. Wittgenstein is I think 
suggesting that it is only in seeing the world sub specie aeternitatis that we appreciate the 
remark that there is indeed no riddle at all, for then we stop looking to the world to give 
us answers. 
The above passage (6.432 1 -6.5) is Wittgenstein's attempt to get us to look at the 
world and language so that we can see that descriptive language cannot solve th� riddle: 
what's illuminated is that descriptive language cannot do for us what we want it to do: 
"The urge towards the mystical comes from the non-satisfaction of our wishes by science. 
We feel that even if all possible scientific questions are answered our problem is still not 
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touched at all. Of course in that case there are no questions any more; and that is the 
answer" (NB; 25 .5 . 1 5  and 6.52). 
The very paradigm of meaningful language in the TLP ( expressed through his 
"picture theory") is quite useless in solving the problem of life. In pointing to the 
"problem of life" this means that Wittgenstein cannot be using language to describe the 
problem. Hence, the use he is making of language must be quite different than the role 
played by contingent propositions. We can, then, see his 'propositions' as being sense­
less in that they do not meet the picture theory criterion of meaning. This is certainly true. 
But we can say more than this :  they do not meet this criterion because they are not an 
instance of the descriptive use of language at all. And so I suggest that the 'meaning' of 
Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' that are about the mystical are akin to 'the meaning' 
language has when the art critic uses language to instruct us to view something so that we 
can see what lends it aesthetic value. 
When we are brought to see that the essence of meaningful language is its 
descriptive nature we are also shown that the felt problem of life cannot be touched by 
language at all .  This is, in part, what it means to see the world "aright" or from the right 
perspective. Part of the "solution" to the problem, then, is just this: having acquired the 
"right" perspective we at once realize that there is no such problem that can be described 
at all: " . .  . I  at once see clearly, as it were in a flash of light, not only that no description 
[ of absolute value or what makes life really important, etc.] that I can think of would do 
to describe what I mean by absolute value, but that I would reject every significant 
description that anybody could possibly suggest, ab initio, on the ground of its 
significance" (LE; p 70). This is purely a result of our seeing the limits of our language: 
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We stop asking such questions about the meaning or value of life and the world, and, 
instead, simply live (and, following Wittgenstein, perhaps live simply). 
But surely there is more to it than this? How is ethical a�tion accounted for in this 
perspective? Does Wittgenstein's perspective have nothing to say (by implication 
anyway) about how we ought to live? I have tried to give some suggestions in chapter 
three regarding some of the practical consequences of Wittgenstein's perspective; 
namely, our living in such a way that our individual, blind striving will is disengaged 
from the world. This is to take a contemplative and disinterested perspective on what 
happens in the world. This is, in part, a recipe for happiness according to Wittgenstein: it 
amounts to a kind of quietism. 
I wrestle with this issue again in my attempt to fill out his aesthetico-ethical 
perspective. We should, however, be aware that Wittgenstein's conception of ethics - in 
the broadest sense of "conception" - has little to do with what we take ethics (in the 
world) to be about; namely, the way in which we "ought" to behave and act towards 
others. 
Another main consideration for interpreting the transcendental perspective as 
falling under an aesthetic perspective has to do with the notion that an aesthetic view of 
things (an object, a world) is not purely intellectual, but involves affect or attitude as 
well. The transcendental perspective has a dual aspect to it: both "seeing" and "feeling" 
( 6.54). Recall that Wittgenstein thinks of the will as an attitude toward the world. And it 
is my contention that this attitude involves feeling or sensing the world in a very 
particular way. 
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If the transcendental perspective on the world involves both "seeing" and 
"feeling" ( affect, attitude), as I think it does, then it is well characterized as an aesthetic 
perspective. For an "aesthetic perspective" is both "contemplative" and "affective". The 
"contemplative" aspect of Wittgenstein's perspective is cashed out in terms of "seeing the 
world as a limited whole", whereas the affective aspect of Wittgenstein's perspective is 
cashed out in terms of "Feeling the world as a limited whole" (6.45). And Wittgenstein is 
enjoining or directing us to see and feel the world from its limit. 
What Do Aesthetics and Ethics have in common according to Wittgenstein? 
I have been emphasizing Wittgenstein's equation of aesthetics and ethics 
throughout this work: "Ethics and aesthetics are one and the same" (Pear and McGuiness, 
6.42 1 ). I should, however, be more cautious here. Diane Collinson ("Ethics and aesthetics 
are one"; 1 98597), B.R. Tilghman ( Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics, 1 99 1 )  and Cyril 
Barrett ["(Ethics and Aesthetics are one)?", 1 98498] make the point that it is a mistake to 
see Wittgenstein as strictly identifying ethics with aesthetics. Barrett points out that a 
strict identity between the two, as suggested by the Pears/McGuiness translation, cannot 
be right. What can be meant by such an identity? Barrett denies that the identity is a strict 
numerical identity (in the sense that we say "the morning star is the evening star", p 1 7), 
and instead interprets Wittgenstein as suggesting that there are relevant similarities 
between the two areas. 
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Following in Barrett's stead, B.R. Tilghman also rejects the idea that Wittgenstein 
is suggesting something like strict identity, and proceeds to look for similarities between 
the two 'subjects: "Wittgenstein is not offering a statement of identity, but is rather 
claiming that there is some kind of important similarity and link between them" (p 45). In 
due course we will investigate what they take the relevant similarities to be. 
Diane Collinson, although she does not deny that ethics and aesthetics are one in a 
strict sense, makes it clear that she reads Wittgenstein as suggesting important similarities 
between the two. For example, she says that "the attitude that is common to ethics and 
aesthetics is a way of seeing" and that both ethics and aesthetics are concerned with 
"absolute value" (p. 267). None of them explore the idea that this "way of seeing" ( and, I 
would add, "feeling" so as to include the affective aspect of this perspective) is the very 
same perspective. I will argue that what Wittgenstein is offering us is an aesthetic-ethical 
perspective on the world as "a limited whole". Thus, the ethical "way of seeing" and the 
aesthetic "way of seeing" are one and the same. 
Thus, Collinson, Barrett, and Tilghman may be begging an important question. 
They bring with them certain presuppositions about what constitutes ethics as a subject 
and what constitutes aesthetics as a subject (to be fair we all do). This is why they regard 
it as absurd to interpret Wittgenstein as suggesting that ethics and aesthetics are "one and 
the same". (Incidentally, the German is "Ethik und Aesthetik sind Eins", which 
minimally says that "ethics and aesthetics are one"; not, as Barrett rightly says, "one and 
the same", as the Pears/McGuiness version has it). However, in saying that both "are 
one" ("sind Eins") Wittgenstein is suggesting that the ethical and the aesthetical 
perspectives are the very same. 
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My point is that we should not presume that Wittgenstein was not strictly 
identifying them (in some sense). What makes this interpretive problem doubly tricky is 
that it is not clear whether Wittgenstein is identifying (in some sense) ethics qua subject 
with aesthetics qua subject or whether he is identifying an ethical and aesthetical 
perspective on the world as being the same. 
Barrett and Tilghman assume that Wittgenstein is identifying the "subjects" as 
being similar ( qualitatively the same), but not identical. If this is what Wittgenstein is 
doing, then I agree that ethics and aesthetics are not identical. But again it seems that too 
much is assumed here. I am inclined to see Wittgenstein as suggesting an identity 
between the ethical and aesthetical perspective with respect to the world. The evidence 
for my interpretation comes from Wittgenstein' s  own words: 
The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the 
world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics 
(my emphasis; NB, 7. 1 0. 1 6). 
What "connects" both art and ethics here has nothing to do with anything like moral and 
aesthetical principles, but rather a certain outlook or way of seeing something; namely, in 
the case of art, seeing some object "under the aspect of eternity", and in the case of ethics 
("the good life"), seeing the world "under the aspect of eternity". Wittgenstein goes on, in 
the same passage, to amplify what he means by seeing anything sub specie aeternitatis: 
"The usual way of looking at things sees objects as it were from the midst of them, the 
view sub specie aeternitatis from the outside" (my emphasis; NB, 7. 1 0. 1 6). At present, 
the most important point to note in all of this is that what links both ethics and aesthetics 
is a way of "seeing" and "looking". Indeed, it may even be the case that the ethical and 
aesthetical perspectives are, as I have already suggested, one and the same. 
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I will come back to this strict identity of "perspective" - rather than similarity of 
'subjects' - shortly. Now let's tum to what Collinson, Barrett, and Tilghman regard as 
th� relevant similarities between the two areas. All three of them attempt to show how the 
'subjects' are similar, marking "sub specie aeternitatis" as simply one of the features that 
both subjects or areas have in common. They do not, mistakenly in my view, identify an 
aesthetic perspective with an ethical perspective, but instead see the view "from the point 
of view of eternity" as simply one feature of what both ethics and aesthetics have in 
common according to Wittgenstein. 
Diane Collinson 
In her "' Aesthetics and ethics are one"', Collinson argues that Wittgenstein's take 
on ethics - specifically his view on the ways in which ethics is similar to aesthetics - is 
not as "idiosyncratic" as it first seems (p 266). Collinson suggests that Wittgenstein is, in 
fact, putting forward a "view of ethics" [ that is] very much part of a mainstream in ethical 
thinking" (p 266). What Collinson attempts to do is show how Wittgenstein's conception 
of ethics is not that far removed from our more ordinary "judgements of good and evil" in 
the world: "Our particular judgments of good and evil are not independent of our 
attitudes to life as a whole, nor of our views as to its meaning or lack of meaning" 
(p 266). This suggests that Collinson interprets Wittgenstein as putting forward a view of 
the ethical that is connected to our way of acting in the world and the "judgments" we 
make about such actions. But however intuitive such a view is, I am not at all sure that it 
is Wittgenstein's position. 
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Collinson rightly point out that Wittgenstein, in his LE, identifies the good life or 
"the enquiry into what is valuable", as falling under "Aesthetics". This, she says, places 
Wittgenstein squarely under the "Kantian strand" of the ethical and the aesthetical as 
dealing with "intrinsic value", and not as directed to some particular end, but rather that 
what's  done in ethics or aesthetics is an end in itself or "for [its] own sake" (p. 267). All 
this is correct in that "absolute value" cannot be means/end related for Wittgenstein. (I 
have tried to show that this is right in section (b) of chapter three, where I discuss how 
Phillipa Foot' s position is related to what Wittgenstein ' says' about absolute value in his 
LE). 
The first important similarity Collinson notes in Wittgenstein's identifying ethics 
with aesthetics has to do with, as she says, a "way of seeing" (p 267); this is simply the 
view sub specie aeternitatis . According to Collinson, this shared "way of seeing" is an 
attitude taken up by the "metaphysical self' (ibid). What makes both attitudes similar is 
that we contemplate things from the "outside", and not, as Wittgenstein says "from the 
midst of them" (7. 1 0. 1 6). This means, Collinson suggests, that just as we take a 
disinterested and "detached" perspective when perceiving some work of art, we do the 
same with the world as a whole; that is, we view the world from a detached perspective 
or take a disinterested attitude toward the world: "We are to think of the ethical as sharing 
this [ detached] attitude" (p 267). The ethical attitude, then, is, according to Collinson, a 
detached and disinterested one toward the world as a whole. In summing up what the 
aesthetical and ethical attitude or "way of seeing" have in common she writes: "Just as 
the aesthetic object is the single thing seen as if it were a whole world, so the ethical 
object, or life, is the multiplicity of the world seen as a single object" (p 269). Much of 
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what Collinson says here I have no quarrel with, except that I think more needs to be said 
about what it means to see the "world as a single object", which is to say no more than 
that what she does say is rather vague. I will get to this in due course. 
There are three other features shared by ethics and aesthetics, and she thinks that 
Wittgenstein tacitly endorses all three of shared characteristics. First, there is a kind of 
dualism inherent in Wittgenstein ' s  view of the absolute good or value. There is a 
"transcendental self' (the "metaphysical subject") which serves as the "logical condition 
of the apprehension of the good" (p 270). According to Collinson, in the same way that 
Kant posits a "noumenal self', Schopenhauer the "will-in-itself', so Wittgenstein has his 
"metaphysical self', to serve as the interface between what's absolutely good and the 
world of facts. Second, she notes that there is in Wittgenstein (as well as Kant, but in a 
very different way) the notion that "absolute value" confers a kind of "logical necessity" 
on our actions; that is, if any state of affairs had absolute value, we would recognize this 
out of necessity, and not from any inclination or desire on our part. Collinson points out 
that this is what Wittgenstein is illustrating with his talk of the "absolutely right road" 
and "the absolute good" in his LE. And thirdly, Collinson thinks that all of this points to a 
real difficulty in Wittgenstein' s take on ethics; namely, the impossibility of 
demonstrating how a transcendental, otherworldly notion of absolute value or good, can 
get any purchase in our world of facts. How can there be any relation between absolute 
value or the absolute good and good deeds or our judgments of what we regard as being 
ethically good in the world? (This was certainly a problem for Plato). She thinks that this 
leads Wittgenstein into a kind of dualism; dualism in the sense that none of the acts 
performed by the "empirical self' can have any value because there can be no connection 
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between the "metaphysical self', which is the "logical condition of the apprehension of 
the good' and particular judgments we make about our actions being good or evil in the 
world. And it is precisely here where I believe that . Collinson goes wrong. 
The fundamental mistake that Collinson makes is this: She assumes that ethics 
must be tied to the actions we take and the judgments we make in the world. Now this is 
not a counter-intuitive assumption on her part. But if what she is doing is giving an 
account of why Wittgenstein regards ethics and aesthetics as one, then such an 
assumption must be jettisoned. 99 It requires great will to leave behind the notion that 
ethics and aesthetics, even if we cannot define them and even if there are no ethical or 
aesthetical "propositions", are fundamentally different subjects: aesthetics deals with a 
"way of seeing" and ethics, whatever else it deals with, has to do with "acting". She has 
retained this assumption about ethics. 
My position is that this "way of seeing" ("under the aspect of eternity") is the 
alpha and omega in terms of identifying ethics with aesthetics. This is just to say, once 
again, that Wittgenstein is identifying ethics and aesthetics solely in terms of perspective, 
and not as subjects. 
This means, on my view, that the "subject matters" of ethics and aesthetics are 
different in the usual ways in which they are taken to be different. But this is only true as 
99 Perhaps it is too strong to say that she simply assumes that ethics involves action for Wittgenstein. Her 
rather loose claim that ethics is not disconnected from our "attitudes to life and the world as a whole", 
while in some sense true, is not the attitude that I think Wittgenstein is trying to bring about in us with his 
transcendental perspective. Moreover, although Collinson refers to a passage in the NB (29.7. 1 6) that she 
takes as relevant in showing that Wittgenstein was "mindful" (p 266) of our more ordinary ideas of ethics 
in the world, what Wittgenstein says there suggests that he was at best ambivalent about the right ethical 
perspective. For example, he considers whether it is best (ethically) to will or not to will: "To love one's 
neighbor would mean to will!" But a few sentences Wittgenstein writes: "Is it, according to common 
conceptions, good to want nothing for one's neighbor, neither good nor evil?" This is tentatively answered 
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these subjects are applied in the world. In the world, ethics and value in the "relative" 
sense is about our actions and the judgments that we make about them. In the world, 
aesthetics is concerned with a way of looking at objects. But at the very limit of the 
world, when seeing the world under the aspect of eternity, the only way in which both 
ethics and aesthetics can be one is in terms of the transcendental perspective on the world 
as a whole. Thus, the aesthetico-ethical perspective has nothing to do with evaluating 
actions in the world. 
Collinson's failure to appreciate that Wittgenstein is (on my view) only 
identifying the two in terms of perspective leads to additional problems, which I believe 
are related to her critique of Wittgenstein' s  view of ethics. She attributes to Wittgenstein 
a dualism based on her idea (common in the literature 1 0°) that Wittgenstein is committed 
to two selves: a "metaphysical self' and an "empirical self'. The former is, on here 
reading, "transcendental" and thus outside the world. It is this self that "apprehends" the 
good or absolute value. While I myself was at one time tempted by such an interpretation 
- an interpretation that is, as Collinson notes, in the vain of Plato and Kant - I now regard 
treating Wittgenstein's "metaphysical subject" or "self' as some sort of noumenal subject 
as an unnecessary reification of his way of getting us to see the world under the aspect of 
in the next remark: "And yet in a certain sense it seems that not wanting is the only good". This is a far cry 
from our "common conceptions" of the ethical. 
100 Janik, for example, in his essay "Schopenhauer and the Early Wittgenstein", suggests that Wittgenstein 
is committed to something like a noumenal subject: . . .  "[That] which is higher than the world, that which 
cannot be said, the sense, value and meaning of the world lies outside the world in the willing subject, its 
limit . .  . In so far as this is the case we may identify will as the noumenal in Wittgenstein's early writings" 
(Essays on Wittgenstein and Weininger; Rodopi; Amsterdam: 1985. p 43). Janik suggests that this is like 
Schopenhauer's noumenal will. But it is not at all clear that Schopenhauer ever conceived of a subject as 
noumenal. Indeed, the sense that can be made of the will as noumena or thing-in-itself in Schopenhauer is 
more of a negative characterization: it is whatever cannot be represented as idea - the stuff that makes up 
the phenomenal world (force, energy, matter). Hence, even if Wittgenstein's willing subject were 
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eternity. In positing a metaphysical subject or self, Collinson at once creates an 
unbridgeable gap between the ordinary, empirical world and a transcendental, 
otherworldly realm. Once we have this rift, it is easy to see the impossibility of tying 
ethics in an absolute sense to anything in the world. And these two problems - that is, 
identifying the ethical with acting and reifying the metaphysical self - are related in that 
once we have it that ethics for Wittgenstein must involve actions, and that the 
metaphysical subject cannot act in the world (for it is transcendental and other-worldly), 
we are forced to concede that it is a complete mystery as to how the metaphysical self s 
apprehension of the good can be the ground for good deeds and actions in the world. 
Recall that it cannot, on this view (as well as on mine) be the empirical subject that 
confers value (in an absolute sense) on actions in the world. For the empirical subject or 
self is just another part of the world, and nothing in the world has or can confer absolute 
value (6.4 1 ). 
But these problems can be avoided - albeit somewhat at the expense of our 
intuitions regarding what ethics is ( or "ought" to be) about in the world - if we instead 
interpret Wittgenstein as strictly identifying the ethical and aesthetical perspective as 
being the very same. On my reading, both ethics and aesthetics involve only a "way of 
seeing" ( as Collinson says), and ethical action per se is not the mark of absolute value in 
any sense. Moreover, if we take my advice in chapter three, and read Wittgenstein's  talk 
of a metaphysical/willing subject as his way of getting us to appreciate a perspective on 
the world that has a "pure knowing" aspect (having to do with the logic of our language) 
noumenal, such a conception would be a radical departure from Schopenhauer's notion of will-in-itself. 
This point is owed to Richard Aquila. 
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as well as an "aesthetico-ethical" aspect (having to do with attitude and feeling), then we 
need not worry over the issue of how to connect the transcendental world of the 
metaphysical self - as the apprehender of absolute value - with the nitty-gritty actions we 
take in the world. 
First, there simply is no transcendental realm and no metaphysical subject or self 
(either outside or at the limit of the world) on my view. 1 0 1  Second, on my account nothing 
in the world can have value in an absolute sense. Thus, there can be no grounding of 
ethical actions and judgments in an absolute sense in the world. Notice that this leaves 
untouched the idea that there are ethical actions and ethical judgments, but such actions 
and judgments will have only "relative" [ see chapter three, (b) ] ,  not absolute, value. 
Therefore, Wittgenstein need not worry over how to connect absolute value to facts in the 
world, since, ex hypothesi, nothing in the world has value in an absolute sense. 
Moreover, even if Wittgenstein were committed to something like a 
"metaphysical self', that stands outside the world and apprehends absolute value, it is 
still a mistake to see Wittgenstein as failing to give an account as to how ethical deeds get 
whatever value they have from this other-worldly "absolute good". The reason is plain: 
Wittgenstein's notion of"absolute value" does not confer value on anything in the world. 
His ' ethics' is not about the actions we take and the judgments we make in the world. (Of 
101 One might wonder how I can account for Wittgenstein's comment: "There is indeed the inexpressible. It 
shows itself; it is the mystical" (6.522, Ogden). Isn't he committed to something standing outside the world 
of facts-something transcendental? No. When Wittgenstein refers to the "mystical" he is referring to 
certain experiences ("wondering at the world", "feeling absolutely safe", etc) that result from our viewing 
the world as a "limited whole". For what can it mean to say that there is something standing outside the 
world that (in some sense) causes us to have the experiences we do? Such a view is not in keeping with 
Wittgenstein's Spartan mysticism - his is not a Gnostic mysticism. Positing some mystical realm does not 
do any work. It is his perspective on the world that leads to our having certain experiences that are 
mystical, and hence inexpressible, and not our experiencing some other-worldly realm. 
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course, we might regard this as a problem for any "account" of ethics. But this is a 
separate matter.) My point here is simply that Wittgenstein is not in the business of trying 
to show how an "apprehension of the Good . . . [can] ground . . .  particular good deeds, 
decisions, and judgments" (p 270) in the world. If Wittgenstein's perspective points to 
anything as having absolute value, then it can point only to the world as a "limited 
whole" as having such value or meaning, and not to anything in the world. 
Now let us tum to Cyril Barrett's position. We will see that he makes (roughly) 
the same mistake that Collinson does in connecting ethics and value with our actions and 
deeds. 
Cyril Barrett's Position on the Connection between Ethics and Aesthetics 
Barrett' s  take on why Wittgenstein regards both ethics and aesthetics as one is 
meant to be suggestive only, and he leaves it "open to discussion" - always a safe move 
with Wittgenstein. At any rate, a few of the points he makes resonate with mine. He does 
a nice job of tying ethics and aesthetics together in terms of their involving "mystical 
experience". I want to pursue the connection between mystical experience and the 
aesthetico-ethical. Such a connection is consistent with my view that Wittgenstein is 
identifying an ethical and aesthetical perspective as being the same. 
As I have already noted, Barrett is explicit in rejecting the identity between ethics 
and aesthetics in a strict sense. Barrett begins by making the obvious point that both 
ethics and aesthetics are the same in the sense that both belong to the "mystical" insofar 
as both are "unsayable" (p 1 7). 
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According to Barrett, there are three substantive similarities between the two 
areas: "( l )  Both involve seeing sub specie aeternitatis; (2) both are concerned with what 
Wittgenstein calls the mystical, the experience of absolute value; (3) [ and both_ concern] 
happiness, the happy life, [ and] being happy" (p 20). All three features remain pretty 
much unconnected in Barrett's  treatment of the similarity between art and ethics. I want 
to see if I can connect them through a strict identity of the ethical and aesthetical 
perspective. 
Barrett quotes the usual passage from Wittgenstein's NB, which I will supply 
(again) for convenience: 
The work of art is the object seen sub specie aeternitatis; and the good life is the 
world seen sub specie aeternitatis. This is the connection between art and ethics. 
The usual way of looking at things is to sees objects as it were from the midst of 
them, the view sub specie aeternitatis from outside; in such a way that they have 
the whole world as background (7 . 1 0. 1 6). 
As further comment on this entry, Barrett quotes the remainder from 7. 1 0. 1 6: 
Is it something like this perhaps - in this view (sub specie aeternitatis) the object 
is seen together with space and time instead of in space and time? 
Each thing modifies the whole logical world, and the whole of logical space, so to 
speak. (The thought forces itself on one): The thing seen sub specie aeternitatis is 
the thing seen together with the whole logical space. 102 
Finally, Barrett enlists one more entry to help shed light on what are, admittedly, very 
mysterious passages. On 8. 1 0. 1 6  Wittgenstein refers to our seeirtg a "stove" as a "thing 
among things" versus viewing it as a "world". As one thing among many, the stove is 
"insignificant", but as a "world each thing ( a "stove", etc) is equally significant". The 
example Wittgenstein offers here is extremely bizarre. 
102 "The whole of logical space" is perhaps a metaphor for "possible worlds" or all the possible ways in 
which the world might be. 
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Barrett suggests that Wittgenstein is intimating that an artists' perspective on an 
object can make whatever it is meaningful and significant by viewing it as a world unto 
itself. Barrett mentions "Van Gogh's chair or Bed, or Cezanne' s apples" as examples. 
These are admittedly ordinary objects, without significance, but seen from the artists' 
perspective they take on meaning and "significance". One could, I suppose, view a 
painting by Van Gogh (or any great artist) as a "world" unto itself. But does this mean 
any more than that artistic appreciation involves our viewing the object in such a way that 
we lose ourselves and everything else in contemplating it? We as it were tune out 
everything else, and focus solely on the object-the rest of the world becoming, as it 
were, mere background. This experience is common enough. But how are we to apply 
this to Wittgenstein's notion of absolute value and the world? 
It is not clear that this really helps us to better understand why Wittgenstein 
thought that ethics and aesthetics involve the same or a similar perspective. Moreover, 
any work of art (or even a particular object in nature) stands out as a discrete thing; and 
we are invited to consider a work of art as a world. The idea that a work of art is to be 
viewed as, in some sense, a world unto itself, as not one thing among many things, is 
fairly intuitive. But how are we to apply this idea to Wittgenstein' s pronouncement that 
"the good life is the world seen under the point of view of eternity"? It seems that there is 
a very important connection between "the good life" and a perspective on the whole 
"world". But what is this connection? 
Barrett suggests that what we can glean from these entries is that ethics and 
aesthetics both "(a) involve viewing sub specie aeternitatis, which in some way involves 
a detachment from space and time; and (b) a relationship with the 'whole world' ,  the 
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'whole logical world' ,  the 'whole logical space"' - which is really just the set of all 
possible worlds (p 1 8). It is not clear that Barrett is mistaken here, but neither is it clear 
that he is right: one simply does not know what to do with these very general remarks. 
Regarding (a) I have already suggested (chapter three) that the detachment that 
Wittgenstein has in mind involves a negation of our will in the world, and that 
Wittgenstein most likely got this idea from Schopenhauer. As regards (b ), although 
Barrett has nothing further to say about it as falling under the "view from ·eternity", he 
does make some points about the "mystical" which I believe are relevant in shedding 
light on what Wittgenstein was driving at with his talk of"the whole world" and "the 
whole logical space" in the context of the ethical . Once again: what is the connection 
between "the good life" and seeing the world "sub specie aternitatis"? Barrett has 
nothing to say here. 
At the very least this connection appears to involve our seeing the world in such a 
way that we are unaffected by anything in the world. When we take this perspective at 
the limit of the world we view the empirical self as simply another object in the world, 
and thus do not identify ourselves with this subject. We are no more concerned with it 
than we are with any other object in the world. From this perspective "a stone, the body 
of a beast, the body of a man, my body, all stand on the same level" (NB, 1 2. 1 0. 1 6). As 
subjects in the world we do not occupy a pre-eminent place. Hence, form such a vista we 
do not worry about what might or might not happen to us, and so we are "absolutely 
safe". But there is more to it than this. 
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From a timeless (eternal) 1 03 perspective with respect to the world as a whole, 
events do not occur, they merely are. The occurrence of events requires time. And to see 
the world "under the aspect of eternity" is to see the world from a timeless perspective. 
Seeing and appreciating the world in this way is to (in some sense) live "eternally". This 
is in part the meaning of Wittgenstein's cryptic remark: "If we take eternity to mean not 
infinite temporal duration but timelessness, then eternal life belongs to those who live in 
the present" (6.43 1 1 ). Nothing can happen to us in the world, for all "happenings" 
require time. And if nothing can happen to us in the world, then, a fortiori, nothing good 
or bad can happen to us. This means that there can be no worries and no harm for there is 
no past and no future, only an enduring now, as it were. If we reside in a kind of timeless 
eternity nothing can touch us. It is in this sense that the transcendental perspective on the 
world consists in "the good life". 
Finally, such a perspective results in a particular attitude toward the world. If we 
can see the world "under the aspect of eternity" we can see the world with a "happy eye" 
(NB, 20. 10. 1 6). Wittgenstein asks: "ls the will an attitude towards the world" ( 4. 1 1 . 1 6)? 
The answer seems to be "yes". But what sort of attitude is it? A kind of awe that there is 
what there is---that there is a world at all (NB, 20. 1 0. 1 6  and 6.44). Thus, it seems that 
Wittgenstein is suggesting that whatever happens to us as empirical subjects in this world 
103 In The Phenomenon of life: Towards a Philosophical Biology ( 1 966), Hans Jonas Suggests that eternity 
consists not in our enduring forever, but rather in the recognition that our deeds, once done, cannot be 
undone, and hence are written into eternity. All actions or deeds have a timelessness about them. And with 
this realization comes an enormous sense of awe and responsibility. Although there is no direct evidence 
that Wittgenstein thought of eternity in any sense other than "timelessness", his life suggests that perhaps 
he thought of eternity in the way that Jonas characterizes it. Throughout his life Wittgenstein took very 
seriously (perhaps too seriously) all that he did, as if he were writing his deeds into an eternal ledger (pp 
278-279), and would one day be judged. In fact, he was fond of saying to his closest friends (Engelmann, 
for example), that they would perhaps meet again "at judgment day". In seeing the entire world "under the 
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is irrelevant, for we no tonger care about wresting satisfaction from life by managing 
well, but are instead projected out of the world, seeing all that exists from the point of 
view of eternity. From such a perspective there can be no good and no evil; everything 
simply is. And that everything is as it is or that there is anything at all is a kind of 
miracle. This is the attitude of the will to the world. (And tall this shows that ethics 
cannot be about our actions in the world for Wittgenstein.) 
Aesthetics and "Seeing"; Ethics and "Acting": A Wrong-headed Approach 
Barrett goes on to say that "The difference, so far, is that whereas art and 
aesthetics is concerned with objects ( of whatever kind), ethics is concerned with a way of 
life" (p 1 8). This, he thinks, shows that aesthetics and ethics are not the same in a strict 
sense. He amplifies what he means in saying that ethics concerns "a way of life" when he 
writes: "Aesthetics has to do with looking at things; ethics has to do with living and 
acting" (p 20). 
Ultimately, Barrett thinks that ethics "involves action and living" and that ethics 
"has to determine which is the preferable way of living (and what constitutes) the good 
life" (p 20). Aesthetics is relevant here, Barrett thinks, because ethics "is a sub-class of 
aesthetics" for Wittgenstein (p 20). The cash value of Barrett's placing ethics under 
aesthetics is his conviction that according to Wittgenstein "if an action is not aesthetically 
acceptable, then it cannot be ethically acceptable either" (p 20). 
aspect of eternity" we see all of our actions as timeless, and so judge them to be momentous not as events 
in the world, but as eternal deeds. 
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Barrett gives a host of examples as to what he has in mind by this last claim. 
There are actions and behaviors that we regard as "ugly", such as: "raping a child of 
eight, robbing old-age pensioners, torturing an innocent victim to death", etc. (ibid). Now 
he admits that the term "ugly", used here, is "metaphorical", but "it is an aesthetic 
concept for all that" (ibid). Barrett sees an "analogy between mugging an old lady, raping 
a child, blowing up innocent people, etc. and a body disfigured by dreadful burns or a 
devastated landscape: neither are as we think they ought to be" (ibid). The implication in 
all this is that nothing can count as an ethically right or appropriate action unless it is, at 
minimum, "aesthetically acceptable". This is an interesting interpretation as to why 
Wittgenstein thinks both ethics and aesthetics share a similar perspective, but I am not 
convinced that this is Wittgenstein' s view. 
First, there is Barrett's assumption that "ethics", whatever else it involves, is 
connected with action. He explicitly says this, and provides us with very colorful 
examples of horrible actions. Barrett quite obviously interprets Wittgenstein's talk about 
"the good life" as involving our actions. So Barrett sets out to find what anyone would 
regard as "ugly" acts. While I find this view intuitive, it seems to ignore Wittgenstein' s 
identifying "the good life" with the whole "world seen sub specie aeternitatis". 
Wittgenstein nowhere provides us with examples of 'ugly' acts, nor does he give us 
examples of how to live an ethical life: his perspective does not seem to be about acting 
and actions at all. 
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Moreover, in all of his discussions on aesthetics 1 04  Wittgenstein never uses terms 
such as "ugly" or "beautiful", but uses instead terms like "right", "correct", etc. But there 
is another reason why this approach is wrong. 
Wittgenstein's ethical perspective does not involve viewing particular actions as 
"ugly" any more than it views them as "right". His perspective is concerned with seeing 
the world as a "limited whole". It is an ethical outlook on the entire world. If we are to 
take seriously the ' idea' that "the good life is the world seen under the aspect of eternity", 
then we must try to make sense of seeing the world "aesthetically" (and, a fortiori, 
ethically): Thus it is the world, not events, actions, states of affairs, etc., that has (or 
lacks) absolute value. 
If instead of focusing on actions as comprising or constituting "the good life" we 
examine the idea that "viewing the world as a whole" is what constitutes the "good life", 
we get an ethical perspective that has little to do with action, yet may still result in (or 
lead to) "the good life", but not in the way that Barrett's analysis suggests. I therefore 
want to explore the idea that viewing the world as a whole ( a "bounded" or "limited 
whole") (6.45) is what leads to "the good life". 
According to Barrett the second characteristic that both ethics and aesthetics share 
is that they fall under the "mystical" and the "experience of absolute value" [point (2) 
above] . Whereas Barrett sees this as a characteristic distinct from ( I )  - the view sub 
specie aeternitatis - I argue that "the experience of absolute value" and the "mystical" is 
not a separate characteristic that ethics and aesthetics ( as subjects) share, but is rather to 
be seen as the result of taking the aesthetico-ethical perspective on the world. Put another 
104 Lectures &Conversations on A esthetics, Psychology and Religious Belief 
1 89 
way, it is seeing the world sub specie aternitatis that leads to the "experience of absolute 
value" and the "mystical" more generally. Let me try to make this perspicuous. 
Barrett lumps the "miraculous", our sense of "wonder" .that there is a world at all, 
and our "experience of absolute value" as falling under the "mystical". This is correct, as 
far as it goes, but it does not go very far. To say, as Barrett does, that such experiences 
show that "the aesthetic and the ethical are linked through the mystical" (p. 1 9) is 
exceedingly vague. It is not so much that Barrett is mistaken here, as that what he says is 
not very informative. At any rate, Barrett's  discussion of the mystical is framed in terms 
of our "experience of absolute value", so perhaps both ethics and aesthetics are similar in 
virtue of such experiences. 
Barrett offers the following 'claims' in support of his observation that both ethics 
and aesthetics are tied up with "the mystical": "Aesthetically, the miracle is that the 
world exists. That there is what there is" (NB, 20. 1 0. 1 6) ;  and, "Not how the world is, is 
the mystical, but that it is" (6.44). Barrett then points out that the "experience of absolute 
value" in Wittgenstein's LE is of a piece with his NB and his TLP: "'How extraordinary 
that anything should exist' (LE, p. 68) etc." (p. 1 9). But he never offers much of an 
explanation as to how the mystical is connected to ethics and aesthetics. He simply states: 
"the aesthetic and the ethical are linked through the mystical" (p 1 9). Nor does Barrett 
make perspicuous why "wondering that anything is" is "directly linked with the 
aesthetic . . .  way of looking at things" (p 1 9). I think I have a way to forge this "link" and 
so make clear the connection between aesthetics, ethics, and the mystical. 
Wittgenstein begins his attempt to characterize "absolute value" with the 
following remark (in italics no less): "If I want to fix my mind on what I mean by 
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absolute or ethical value . . .  I believe the best way of describing it is to say that when I 
have it I wonder at the existence of the world" (p 68). My suggestion is that Das 
Mystische and our attempt to characterize "absolute or ethical value" begins with our 
sense of wonder that there is a world at all. It thus appears that the more substantive 
implication here is not the (rather vacuous) notion that both ethics and aesthetics are tied 
up with mystical experiences, but that the experience "par excellence" of "absolute or 
ethical value" is, according to Wittgenstein, our "wondering at the existence of the 
world'' (LE, p. 68). 
In his LE Wittgenstein spends some time explaining what he means by this 
expression, only to reach the conclusion that the expression is without any descriptive 
sense. It defies analysis according to Wittgenstein because in order for us to properly 
wonder at the existence of anything we must, he thinks, have some idea as to what it 
means for the thing ( whatever it is) not to exist. This is why we can wonder at the 
existence of a very large dog because we have seen small dogs, and are amazed at the 
size of this particular dog (Wittgenstein's  example, p. 68). We can wonder at the sky 
being a particular shade of blue because we have seen other shades, and are struck by just 
this hue for example (Wittgenstein again, ibid.). But what does it mean to say that we 
"wonder at the existence of the world"? Well, we are amazed that there is something 
rather than nothing. This is the most that we can say here. We are in awe at the world's 
existence. But our wonder, awe or amazement at the existence of this world cannot be the 
result of our acquaintance with other non-existent worlds, and thus based on the fact that 
we experience an existing - as opposed to a non-existing - world. We cannot wonder that 
there not being a world. The wonder that Wittgenstein has in mind here cannot parallel 
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typical cases of wondering (as in the case of the dog being so large or the color of the sky 
being so blue). It seems that we cannot give any descriptive meaning to the experience of 
"wondering at the existence of the world". 
I want to anticipate an objection that might be raised against connecting the above 
experience (wondering at the existence of the world) to absolute value. Absolute value, 
whatever it is, is not something that can be reduced to the facts in the world. Wittgenstein 
is really clear on this point when he says in so many words that nothing we can say about 
value in an absolute sense can be "the thing" (LE, p. 69). Now if we take "wondering at 
the existence of the world" to be the paradigmatic mystical experience (6.54), and if we 
take Wittgenstein's claims about the impossibility of saying anything about absolute 
value seriously, then it appears that we can never experience the world as having absolute 
value. The reason is obvious: any experience is an experience in the world, and thus can 
be reduced to psychological facts about us. Such facts can be stated or described. Thus, 
such a fact about us, about how we feel, or about our attitude towards the world, cannot, 
it would seem, be connected to absolute value. It is just another valueless fact in the 
world. 
The way to handle this objection is to see that the expression "wondering at the 
existence of the world" is, strictly speaking, nonsensical according to Wittgenstein. Thus, 
it cannot be reduced to the facts because we cannot say what it qieans. When 
Wittgenstein says he is tempted to give a description of absolute value (what he means by 
"absolute value") by relating his experience of "wondering at the existence of the world" 
(LE, p. 68), this should be taken to mean that the closest he can come to pointing towards 
the meaning of absolute value is by giving us what he regards as a truly mystical 
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experience. I say mystical experience because this experience cannot be described at all, 
according to Wittgenstein. Thus, as an experience it cannot be reduced to a psychological 
fact about us. It cannot, _strictly speaking, be said. And "ineffability", according to 
William Jrunes, is one of the marks of a mystical experience (VRE, p. 4 14). 
I wanted to spend some time fleshing the above "experience" out, because it is I 
believe a key to our seeing that ethics and aesthetics are one and the same in virtue of 
perspective for Wittgenstein. The primary mystical experience (or the experience of the 
mystical-perhaps there is no distinction here for Wittgenstein) that results from the 
identity of the ethical and aesthetic perspective is our "wondering at the existence of the 
world". Such an experience does not involve any judgments about how the world ought 
or ought not to be. We might say that as an experience of the world it is most peculiar in 
that when we have it we "feel" or experience the world at its limit. But more than that, it 
is different from typical experiences because it is not clear that it is reducible to 
psychological facts about us owing to its ineffability and it "noetic quality" (VRE, p. 
4 14). 
Now I want to suggest that this experience results from our seeing the world at its 
limit. Given that Wittgenstein regards "absolute or ethical value" as best characterizfd 
by an experience; namely, our ''wondering at the existence of the world", it seems to 
follow that in taking up the view of the world under the aspect of eternity we also come 
as close as we can to apprehending absolute value. What I am ultimately suggesting is 
that the mystical "shows itself' in our experiencing wonder at the existence of the world. 
The fact that Wittgenstein is committed to there being the "inexpressible" suggests that 
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we apprehend it in some way in having the above type of experience. Again, there is a 
very direct kind of knowing or insight here, and not mere feeling. 
In order to spell this out we must look once again at what Wittgenstein is getting 
at when he talks about "seeing" the world as a "limited whole" versus "feeling" the world 
as a "limited whole". The logic of our language - Wittgenstein's  "picture theory" -
instructs us to see the world as a collection of facts: the facts are the world. But what, 
then, makes the world a "bounded" or "limited whole"? We might put it like this: if the 
world is comprised of all the facts, then a description of the facts; that is, the set of all 
true propositions, constitutes a description of the world. And the world is "limited" in the 
sense that these are all the propositions there are. At 4.5 Wittgenstein expresses it thus: 
"The propositions are everything which follows from the totality of all elementary 
propositions ( of course also from the fact that it is the totality of them all)". The clause 
that occurs in parentheses is what gives the world its "limited" or "bounded" status. 
Seeing the world as a collection of facts, and seeing that these are all the facts there are, 
is to see the world "under the aspect of eternity". As a perspective that is outside of space 
an time it lacks a "here" and a "now". More metaphorically, this is just to see what God 
sees: everything that is the case. 
But what can it mean to "feel" the world as a limited whole and how does it (in 
some sense) result from our "seeing" the world in the way that I have just characterized? 
First, seeing the world in this way involves our grasping and appreciating Wittgenstein's  
picture theory of language. Now my suggestion is  that "feeling" the world as a "limited 
whole" is tantamount to our "wondering at the existence of the world". We are in awe 
1 94 
that there is a world at all. 1 05 To attempt to characterize this experience more positively is 
go beyond what can be said. 1 06 To go farther than this would be to transgress language, 
according to Wittgenstein, as well as to go beyond the textual evidence of the TLP. 
We are now in a b�tter position to make sense of the idea that "the good life is the 
world seen sub specie aeternitiatis" (NB, 7. 10. 1 6). The "good life" or "the happy life" is 
the world "seen under the aspect of eternity" means, first and foremost, that Wittgenstein 
is characterizing "the good life" in terms of our perspective on the world as a limited 
whole, and not in terms of our actions or deeds, as Barrett has it. 1 07 By "good life" 
Wittgenstein does not mean anything like a recipe for living, nor is he suggesting that 
certain actions are morally preferable (less "ugly") than other actions; rather, he is 
105 Like Wittgenstein, Hans Jonas regards the existence of the world as a cause for marvel: . . .  "There is no 
necessity of there being a world at all. Why there is something rather than nothing - this unanswerable 
question of metaphysics should protect us from taking existence as an axiom, and its finiteness as a blemish 
on it or a curtailment of its right. Rather is the fact of existence the mystery of mysteries . . .  " (ibid, p 279). 
Jonas goes further than Wittgenstein in suggesting that instead of taking our existence (and the existence of 
the world) for granted, as simply as a condition for our getting ( or not getting) what we want from life, we 
would do better to see that we (and the world) might never have been. His indirect advice is "be grateful for 
the world". I cannot help but think that Wittgenstein had the same attitude toward there being something 
rather than nothing. 106 B.R. Tilghman (Wittgenstein, Ethics, and Aesthetics, 1 99 1 )  suggests that Wittgenstein's "stance" toward 
the world is like the attitude one might take towards a "gift". It is akin to accepting everything that happens, 
"not just the slings and arrows offortune . . .  as a necessary part of life" (p 74). Tilghman's remarks occur in 
the context of our "being in agreement with the world" and with "the will of God", which Wittgenstein 
identifies as being "the same" in his NB (8.7. 1 6). I think that Wittgenstein's "stance" is something akin to 
this, but it is perhaps a stance or attitude that is only made manifest in how we live in the world-in how 
well we fit in to the world's mold. But this could be thought of as a kind ofresignation, having nothing to 
do with seeing the world as a "gift". Still, I believe that this attitude of resignation would betray itself: 
resignation typically involves accepting things because one must, and hence a man can be resigned and 
miserable; accepting the world just as it is however, is to "happily" resign oneself to the facts. And this 
means that the gratitude that there is a world at all is never put to one side. 
10
7 More evidence that Barrett links ethics with action in his interpretation of Wittgenstein's view of the 
ethical is evinced is his insistence (once again) that ethics involves living and aesthetics involves seeing: "It 
should be noted that the distinction ( ethics tied to action, aesthetics tied to seeing) between ethics and 
aesthetics is preserved. In the context of ethics it is the happy life . . .  and . . .  in the context of aesthetics, it is 
the happy eye or the way of looking at the world" (p 19). Barrett's emphasis of"life" as connected with 
ethics and "looking' as connected with aesthetics is not enough to show that the two are not primarily 
concerned with a way of viewing the world. For it is clear that he has ignored Wittgenstein's identifying the 
"good life" with the view of the world under the aspect of eternity: "The good life is the world seen sub 
specie aeternitatis" (NB, 7 . 10. 1 6). 
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intimating that the happy and "harmonious" life - the good life - is the life that takes a 
very particular attitude toward the world as a result of seeing the world "under the aspect 
of eternity". "The good life" results in our feeling "absolutely safe"; it is_ a kind of 
"peculiar immortality", for, seen from this perspective, nothing can harm us. The world is 
both "distant and sublime". This perspective on the world as a limited whole leads to an 
attitude that is best characterized as our "wondering at the existence of the world", and 
this attitude or experience is as close as we can come to seeing the world as having value 
in an absolute sense. In all this we can clearly see that Wittgenstein's identity of ethics 
and aesthetics is, from first to last, an identity of perspective on the world, and has little 
to do with our actions and deeds in the world. 
And so it is the "happy eye" that makes for a "happy world" and "the good life": 
it is our way of seeing and feeling the world that makes it a happy one. And this way of 
seeing is completely within our power, Wittgenstein thinks. This is why nothing that 
happens in the world need affect our attitude toward the world as a limited whole: "I can 
only make myself independent of the world - and so in a certain sense master it - by 
renouncing any influence on happenings" (NB, p. 73). Such a "renunciation" entails our 
being "in agreement with the world", and being in agreement with the world is what 
"being happy means" (NB, p. 75). 
This brings me to the final characteristic that Barrett sees in what he regards as 
Wittgenstein' s loose connection of ethics with aesthetics: both involve (3) "happiness, the 
happy life, and being happy". It should be clear by now that the "happy life" has far more 
to do with the way we see the world than with how we live in the world. But obviously 
( one wants to say) the two are connected in some sense. Barrett suggests that we 
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understand the "happy life" ( or the "good life") in terms of "harmony" or fitting in. But 
how are we to understand this? Wittgenstein says that the happy life is more 
"harmonious" than the "unhappy"; but then asks, "In what sense?" (NB, 30. 7 . 1 6). Barrett 
suggests that "harmony" be understood in terms of our intuition that some things in the 
world are not as "we think they ought to be" (p 20). We have already seen his 
unharmonious and "ugly" list of actions. But this cannot be what Wittgenstein means by 
the happy life (at least if I am right) because this would mean that the happy life is 
constituted (at least in part) by the absence of ugly acts and events. Moreover, such a 
perspective, insofar as it makes a judgment about how this or that part of the world ought 
or ought not to be, is a perspective from within the world, not from its limit. Recall that 
on my view the distinction between the way the world is versus the way it ought to be 
collapses from the point of view of eternity. 
Wittgenstein asks: "what is the objective mark of the happy, harmonious life?" 
and answers, "here it is again clear that there cannot be any such mark that can be 
describe<f' (ibid.). Thus, it seems that nothing in the world - no actions or events, 
however "ugly" - can constitute or mark the "happy life". On my view it is only the 
transcendental perspective that marks the "happy life" - the view of the world seen under 
the aspect of eternity. Indeed, Wittgenstein's next comment is instructive: "This mark 
cannot be a physical one, but only . . .  a transcendental one" (Ibid.). 
But can we characterize this transcendental mark at all? Only negatively, but at 
least we can see what it can not be and thus perhaps have a better idea of what must be 
left over to "mark" it. If it is not constituted by anything in the world, nor by anything 
outside the world (for Wittgenstein, there is no 'world' of absolute value - like Plato's  
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"Good" for example), then it must be marked by our accepting the world just as it is, and 
perhaps seeing that we must cease to even make the distinction between the world as it is 
and the world as it ought to be. Again, this is just to say, as Wittgenstein does, that the 
happy and harmonious life is the one that is in "agreement with the world." This implies 
that the harmonious life is the life that does not resist the world, whatever the reason and 
motives we have for doing so. Note that within the world we can and do make the 
distinction between some events and actions that are not as they "should be", but this is 
not an absolute sense of value, but is our ordinary conception of what ought or ought not 
to be done. This can be accommodated by Foot's notion that all morality is a "system of 
hypothetical imperatives" (see part b of chapter three). At any rate, in "wondering at the 
existence of the world", in being struck by this experience, there can be no distinction 
between the world as it is and the world as it ought to be. 1 08 "The good life" (the happy 
and harmonious life) consists in this perspective. 
By identifying ethics with aesthetics solely in virtue of perspective, we can make 
sense of the idea that "the good life is the world seen sub specie aeternitatis". My view 
also makes better sense of what I have been calling Wittgenstein's "quietism", for on this 
1 08 Some indirect evidence that the distinction between the way the world is and the way it ought to be 
collapses from the transcendental perspective is Wittgenstein's comment at 6.432:  "How things are in the 
world is a matter of complete indifference for what is higher. God does not reveal himself in the world." I 
suggest that by "complete indifference" Wittgenstein means that any other happenings or events in the 
world have no more and no less value than any other set of events or happenings ( and not that God simply 
does not care). (Indeed, it is not clear that in speaking of"God" Wittgenstein is referring to some being that 
is "higher", but rather that any such being could not be concerned with how the world actually is given that 
any other way in which the world might be would be equally without value). Now if the transcendental 
perspective is a God-like view of the world, then in taking up such a perspective whatever is happening in 
the world is a "matter of complete indifference" to us as well. This must be true of whatever contingent 
events are realized in the world. Moreover, any set of contingent events that we could imagine would 
remain a matter of indifference from the transcendental perspective. There can thus be no distinction from 
the transcendental perspective between the way the .world is and the way it ought to be. For any other set of 
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view anyone who is really involved in the world 1 09 - seeking to change some part of the 
world either for the better or for the worse (making it beautiful or ugly, as the case may 
be) is not, on the view I am at:tributing to Wittgenstein, taking up the aesthetico-ethical 
perspective on the world, 1 1 0 for indeed we can only make sense of "better" and "worse" 
as judgments of relative value about this or that part of the world. 
Such a perspective leads us to want for nothing: "in a certain sense it seems that 
not wanting is the only good". Finally, my view makes sense of Wittgenstein's seemingly 
bizarre comment that "ethics does not treat of the world . . .  [but] must be a condition of the 
world, like logic" (NB, 24. 7 . 1 6). Both are conditions of the world, but in very different 
ways: Logic is primary in than it is the logic of our language that represents any world in 
the first place. Once we see the world as nothing more than a collection of all the facts, 
we see also that there can be no place for the sublime in the world. Instead, it is the world 
at its limit that waxes and wanes with meaning and value, and this will depend on how 
diligently we maintain the transcendental perspective on the world. Wittgenstein's 
position seems to be that without this transcendental perspective, the meaning and value 
of the world wanes, and with it, the world's meaning and value waxes. And thus it is the 
events would have as little value as the actual set given that there can be no value in an absolute sense in 
the world. 
109 Wittgenstein's distaste for ethical plans and projects can be seen in his contempt of Russell's practical 
work in a society for peace. Russell said to Wittgenstein: "I suppose you would rather be for the 
advancement of slavery and war". Wittgenstein replied "rather that, rather that" ! (McGuiness, Brian: 
Wittgenstein: A Life: 1 986, p ?) 
1 10 In "Wittgenstein, Schopenhauer, and Ethics", A. Phillips Griffiths nicely expresses what makes 
Wittgenstein 's ethical attitude toward the world very different from our ordinary conception of ethics: "So 
what ethics is about is a will which is not in the world and therefore cannot be spoken about; it (ethics) is 
not in any way about how we should act, what attitudes we should adopt to others and to our lives and to 
what happens to us; it does not speak to a man as he is in the midst of things" (Understanding Wittgenstein; 
Royal Institute of Philosophy Lecture, VII; St. Martin's Press; NY: 1 974, my emphasis). I think Griffiths' 
talk about a ''will which is not in the world" should be replaced with my "transcendental perspective on 
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aesthetico-ethical aspect of the transcendental perspective that permeates the whole with 
"absolute value". This permeating the world with absolute value is what makes ethics "a 
conditi9n of the world." Wittgenstein would have done better to say that "the ethical and 
aesthetical perspectives are one", not that "ethics and aesthetics are one" (6.42 1 ). 
B.R. Tilghman's Position on Wittgenstein's  Identity (in some sense) of Ethics with 
Aesthetics 
In setting out to make the connection between ethics and aesthetics, we see 
Tilghman make the same kind of mistake that so many make when they begin digging 
around in the TLP with the purpose of saying how ethics and aesthetics are similar. This 
is recognized by Tilghman as a breach of the very conditions of what counts as 
meaningful language, and hence, on Tractarian grounds, is an exercise in speaking 
nonsense. After all, Wittgenstein writes: "It is clear that ethics cannot be put into words" 
(6.42 1 ). And if this is true, then aesthetics cannot be put into words either. So how, 
Tilghman want to know, can we possibly say how the two are similar or related when 
neither subject can be spoken about? Tilghman' s approach is one that I am sympathetic 
with: 
A good bit can be said about them ( ethics and aesthetics) even if that entails 
stepping for the moment beyond the limitations of the Tractatus structure of 
concepts or at least constructing some ladders that can be pulled up after us and 
thrown away once we have achieved a clearer view of what we are looking for (p 
46, my emphasis). 
value and the world". Once again we see an unnecessary reification of a metaphysical will . Still, I agree 
with his account of what ethics is not about. 
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It is very tempting to put aside Tractarian restrictions on meaningful discourse so 
that one can say how ethics and aesthetics are similar: we feel we must say something 
about the nature of ethics and the nature of aesthetics, so that we may then compare the 
subjects and see how they are relevantly similar. But this is somewhat of a cheat because 
one can help oneself to a more usual understanding of ethics and aesthetics, and then 
insinuate this material into Wittgenstein's admittedly cryptic remarks about either area. 
More importantly, on my view it is not essential that we step outside Tractarian bounds 
and say something about what we take their nature to be or what Wittgenstein, ifhe could 
say something about them, took their nature to be. It is not necessary to do this on my 
view because Wittgenstein is not putting forward - as I have been at pains to show - a 
view of ethics or aesthetics, however inchoate his view might be, but is rather expressing 
an ethical and aesthetic view (perspective) toward the world. An aesthetico-ethical stance 
is not a view on the nature of either 'subject': it is rather a perspective on the world. 
Thus, it is not the subject matter of ethics and the subject matter of aesthetics that needs 
to be compared. For Wittgenstein this is not possible since there are no such 'subjects' .  
What do the Aesthetic and Ethical Perspectives have in Common? 
I suggest, then, that when Wittgenstein says that 'ethics and aesthetics are one", 
he is not suggesting that the "subjects" are similar, but that the ethical and aesthetic 
perspective is identical. Such an approach does not involve breaching Tractarian 
constraints on what constitutes meaningful language. Why? Because we are not trying to 
say anything about the nature of either ethics or aesthetics, and how such subjects are 
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related, but are instead only pointing to the ethical and aesthetic perspective on the world 
being one and the same. 
It is only "from the point of view of eternity" ( 6.45) that the relation of language 
and ethics (absolute value generally) to the world can be seen. To view the world sub 
specie aeternitatis or "under the aspect of eternity" comes from Spinoza's Ethics (Part II, 
prop. XLIV). Spinoza means by the expression "under the aspect of eternity" something 
like our grasping the essence of a thing. Tilghman writes: "for Spinoza it is to see 
something . . .  in its logical connections, its necessary connections, with everything else" 
(p 53). Tilghman goes on to remark that seeing the world under the aspect of eternity "is 
very much the same thing for Wittgenstein" (Ibid.). But what can Tilghman mean by 
this? He writes: "the essence of the world is that it consists of just these logically 
independent facts amongst all the logically possible state of affairs" (ibid.). But this is 
nothing more than Wittgenstein' s idea that "the world is all that is the case" ( 1 ). What 
work is the term "essence" doing here? It seems otiose. Furthermore, "essence" cannot be 
right for another reason; this term usually implies that we can give a logical definition or 
the nature of a thing - in this case the world - and Wittgenstein is certainly not up to 
anything like that. On Wittgenstein' s  view the whole of reality is pictured or depicted by 
the totality of true propositions. And such propositions are contingently true, not 
necessarily true. But talk of the "essence" of the world suggests that we are being given 
metaphysical super-facts about the world as a whole. Finally, the view of the world 
"under the aspect of eternity" is the view of the world as a "limited whole", a view that is 
outside of space, time, and, more importantly, descriptive language. Thus, one cannot 
give the "essence" of something that is quite literally outside of language. 
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In my view the main theme of the Tractatus is Wittgenstein's view of the world 
from "the point of view eternity", the transcendental perspective, and the other elements 
of this work ( such as the picture theory, the nature of logical propositions) are all 
designed to bring us to such a perspective. They do so by bringing us to the limits of what 
can be represented or described in language. Once we see the limit - that is, once we 
view the world as a "limited whole" - we are 'urged' or invited to "feel" the world as a 
limited whole. 
The 'propositions' of his work serve as "elucidations" in the sense that they are 
designed to get us to see language and its relation to the world from on high - from the 
transcendental perspective. And here it is important to see that Wittgenstein is not, 
strictly speaking, providing us with a perspective on language and the world that can be 
articulated outside the world and the language that we use to represent it ( a view that is 
suggested by Tilghman's talk of Wittgenstein's giving us the "essence of the world" in 
our view of the world "sub specie aeternitatis"). Wittgenstein makes it clear that he is 
drawing the "limit . . .  [ to the expression of thought] in language" (preface, p 27, my 
emphasis). We cannot speak about, i .e. , describe, what lies outside of language and the 
world; and Wittgenstein' s transcendental perspective does not make this illicit move. 
Thus, on my view Wittgenstein is not transgressing the bounds of sense. 
But there are some who think the perspective from which the TLP is written is 
itself an over-reaching - a going beyond the bounds of sense - and is thus an incoherent 
view of language and the world and that Wittgenstein intended it this way. The 
implication is that the view of the world that I have been pressing - the transcendental 
perspective - cannot even be articulated. Let us now consider a position that regards the 
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theme of transcendence in Wittgenstein's work as a view of language and the world that 
is ultimately incoherent. 
Michael Hodges: The TLP as an Impossible Project 
In his work, Transcendence and Wittgenstein 's Tractatus ( 1 990), Hodges is the 
first to see transcendence as a major theme in the Tractatus. Moreover, Hodges argues 
that for Wittgenstein a "right view" of the world leads to "willing" the world in the right 
way: that seeing the "world aright" and willing it aright are closely united for 
Wittgenstein. He sees Wittgenstein's ethical project as being very closely tied to 
aesthetics in the sense that the world, as "a limited whole", is "appropriated" as an 
aesthetic object. All this I believe is (more or less) on the right track, and indeed much of 
what Hodges says about Wittgenstein's overall project is on target. Many of Hodges' 
ideas resonate with mine. On the other hand, Hodges goes too far in rejecting 
Wittgenstein's transcendental view as incoherent and thus ultimately "an impossible" 
project (p. 23). 
Hodges argues that Wittgenstein's early work is essentially concerned with 
"transcendence" in the sense that the work aims to offer a perspective on language and 
the world that is beyond language and the world. Now there is a sense in which this is 
correct, but Hodges view of how transcendence works is, I think, mistaken. He finds such 
a position fundamentally paradoxical and even incoherent. Hodges overall aim is to shed 
light on the early work and why Wittgenstein later repudiated it by taking Wittgenstein at 
his word when the latter suggested in his preface to the PI that his later work would be 
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best understood alongside his early work-that "the two should be published side by 
side" . 1 1 1  Hodges thinks that such an approach ultimately illuminates the failed project of 
the Tractatus in addition to illuminating the later work. Such a comparison of this early 
and later work aside, Hodges thinks that the failure of the Tractatus results from the 
incoherent theme of "transcendence" and the "saying vs. showing" distinction. According 
to Hodges, it is not clear how we are able to say what insight we glean from the text, 
since there are no philosophical "propositions" according to Wittgenstein. Moreover, the 
idea of "showing" as opposed to "saying" only highlights the problem given that 
anything that is shown cannot be put into words. How does "showing" ( whatever it 
means) help? This is what Hodges has to say about Wittgenstein's  early work: 
The 'transcendental point of view' is, of course, explicitly rejected in the 
doctrines of the Tractatus, so the positions expressed in it stand in dramatic 
conflict with the perspective the work takes. There can be no resolution of this 
conflict within the philosophical framework of the Tractatus. Wittgenstein' s  
famous distinction between what is  said by a sentence and what that sentence 
shows is designed, at least in part, to overcome the difficulty. Even ifwe cannot 
"say" what the Tractatus seems to express, language nonetheless shows it. If we 
1 1 1  In his Tractarian Semantics ( 1 989), Peter Caruthers argues that we should attach almost no significance 
to such a proposal (even though made by Wittgenstein). Caruthers argues first that there was an "eleven 
year gap" between the publication of the TLP and "the conversation recorded by Waismann . . .  in 1 929". 
Wittgenstein didn't do any Philosophy in these eleven years. Second, Caruthers points out that the TLP was 
written over a ''two month period . . .  at the Italian front . . .  under desperate urgency, [and that] this was not a 
frame of mind in which to distinguish carefully between ideas, and in which to set out and assess the 
strengths of competing arguments - even had he normally been disposed to such modes of working" ( and, 
of course, we know that Wittgenstein was not so disposed). Caruthers goes on to point out that it is "small 
wonder" that Wittgenstein found it "impossible to think himself back into the full richness and complexity 
of his finished text" (p 7). But in addition to these considerations, Caruthers also notes that Wittgenstein 
was drawn back into Philosophy by new ideas - ideas with which he was unfamiliar; "phenomenalism" via 
the Vienna Circle and "Brouwer's  lntuitionism" in mathematics. (Incidentally, Wittgenstein's initial 
interest in Philosophy began with topics about which he new very little and had no formal training in). 
Carruthers suggests that these unfamiliar ideas ''turned Wittgenstein's thinking in new directions" and that 
this fact, "coupled with the restless and forward looking nature of Wittgenstein's intellect, suggests that he 
would have viewed his earlier writing very much through the medium of his new interests, rather than from 
the standpoint of dispassionate memory and self-interpretation" (Ibid). This shows that the facile and 
attractive idea that we can better understand the failed project of the TLP by comparing it with 
Wittgenstein's Pl is not only mistaken, but is an approach that may lead to a distortion of the ideas in his 
early work. 
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will pay attention not to what is asserted or denied, that is, to what facts are "said" 
to obtain, but rather to what is displayed in the very saying itself, the doctrines of 
the Tractatus will become accessible. Unfortunately, that distinction does not 
solve the problem; it merely gives it a name. If we ought to attend to what 
language shows and remain silent, what are the "propositions" of the Tractatus 
supposed to do? Do they attempt to "say" what language "shows?" But what can 
be shown cannot be said" (T 4. 1 2 1 2) [pages 24-25]. 
And later he writes: 
The attempt to think and will from the transcendental point of view is finally and 
unavoidably incoherent. What it requires us to do is to treat ourselves both as 
individuals in the world and as transcendental subjects seeing and willing the 
world from outside as "the totality of facts". We are, at one and the same time, 
individuals - items in the world - and "conditions of possibility of the world." 
The ethical and logical goal of the Tractatus is to achieve a relation to the world 
such that "there are two godheads: the world and my independent I" (NB p. 74, 
8. 7 . 1 6). This requires on its logical side the apprehension of the world as a limited 
totality. Ethically it involves not merely that apprehension but the willful 
appropriation of the whole as an aesthetic object. Of course, the subject 
apprehending or appropriating must be set over against and beyond the "totality of 
facts", that is, the world. It must be a transcendental subject. At the same time, 
this "independent I" - this godhead - as actually achieved, is a particular thinking 
and willing individual situated within that totality. The project of the Tractatus as 
a theory of language, as an account of the world, and as an ethical vision is "the 
project to become God". But that project is incoherent. The Tractatus cannot be 
written because the perspective from which it would have to be written is said to 
be inaccessible on the basis of "seeing" what can only be seen from that 
perspective (pages 26-27). 
Seeing the world and willing the world from a God's eye view, is, according to 
Hodges, impossible. The perspective that Wittgenstein' s view of language and value 
requires is more than simply paradoxical on his view. Whereas I admit that the Tractatus 
is paradoxical, I reject Hodges claim that the "project is incoherent" and ''impossible". 
Why does he think that a transcendental perspective is "impossible"? 
Now if one takes Wittgenstein to be applying his picture theory of meaning to the 
meaning or significance of his transcendental perspective, then the perspective is 
impossible and incoherent. But by now it should be clear that Wittgenstein need not be 
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interpreted as describing the world seen "under the aspect of eternity". A second 
assumption that Hodges makes is that Wittgenstein is committed to two selves, an 
empirical self that is in the world (the "empirical self'), and a "transcendental subject" 
that quite literally sees the world from "outside" the world, as the ''totality of facts". Such 
an interpretation of the transcendental perspective posits a subject that stands outside both 
language and the world ( since "the limits of my language means the limit of my world" 
5.6), and thereby creates an unnecessary dualism. The same mistakes made by Collinson 
are being made by Hodges. With these two presuppositions in place: ( 1 )  Wittgenstein is 
describing a transcendental perspective on the world; and, (2) Wittgenstein is positing the 
existence of a transcendental subject outside the world ( and, a fortiori) meaningful 
language, it is not hard to reach the conclusion that such a perspective is incoherent and 
impossible. 
Hodges has two main arguments. The first and more fundamental is his idea that 
the very propositions of the Tractatus must be a language that is not a language, 1 12 for 
( on Hodges reading) the entire project is an attempt to articulate a vision that is beyond 
language and the world. But of course there can be no such language. Thus the project is 
incoherent. 
I have already shown that this is not the best way to interpret the "sense" or 
"meaning", nay, the very point of what Wittgenstein is trying to achieve with his 
1 12 Which in a sense is certainly right, but it must be qualified: on my view many of the propositions of the 
Tractatus are meta-linguisitc. And any metalanguage is not a language according to the picture theory of 
meaning. 
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Tractarian 'propositions'-namely a transcendental perspective with respect to language 
and the world via metalinguisitc assertions and directives. 
His second argument focuses more on Wittgenstein' s ethical vision. Here he _ 
thinks that Wittgenstein' s "metaphysical subject", being something outside the world, 
and thus transcending it, is at odds with individuals that are in the midst of the world. It is 
only particular individuals that are ethical subjects, but such subjects need to view the 
world from outside the world, like the metaphysical subject that stands outside or at the 
limit of the world. This he finds incoherent. My solution to this is pretty straightforward: 
there is, strictly speaking, no "metaphysical subject" that stands outside or beyond the 
world. We can take up Wittgenstein's ethical vision as subjects situated in the world. 
Let's begin with the paradoxical nature of the work. Certainly Wittgenstein's 
paradigm of language that means or has sense is the language that "pictures" (truly or 
falsely) states of affairs in the world. But the propositions of the Tractatus do not picture 
facts in the world. Thus, based on the picture theory of meaning only, the propositions of 
the Tractatus are absolutely meaningless. 
However, ifwe construe meaning in a broader manner than the narrow criterion 
of meaning propounded in the Tractatus, we see that Wittgenstein's 'propositions' or 
"elucidations" are meaningless only in the sense that they do not meet his picture theory 
criterion. It is a mistake to take Wittgenstein as stating or suggesting that the only use that 
can be made of language is the one provided by his criterion for the picture theory of 
meaning. Strictly speaking, Wittgenstein does restrict meaningful propositions to the 
class of contingent propositions of science, both natural and social. Still, he takes himself 
to be doing something intelligible with his propositions or "elucidations". 
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Indeed, one could argue that if this were Wittgenstein's view - ifhe genuinely 
believed that the only legitimate function of language is descriptive - then his attempt to 
show anything at all by his Tractarian propositions is all for nothing. But to attribute to 
him the view that we can only do something with descriptive language - that only those 
propositions that picture reality have a use - is a blunder. 'Propositions' which do not 
have sense in the way that the bivalent contingent propositions that picture reality do, do 
not by that criterion cease to have a use or a function or a meaning. Remember, he took 
himself to be showing us something important, and not "just gassing". But then of course 
he must take himself to be using language in such a way that we can at least follow his 
directions, so that we can see where he is pointing. The propositions of the Tractatus 
serve to show us something about value and the world according to Wittgenstein. 
Now we have already seen that an art critic uses language in a very different way 
from someone who is trying to communicate to us some fact in the world. The former is 
trying to get us to look at certain features of a work that we otherwise might pass over. 
Isn't this just what Wittgenstein is doing? Isn't Wittgenstein directing us to see the world 
and features of our language in such a way that we see the "world aright" ( 6.54 )? And 
seeing the world in the right way involves at least two things: First, it is to see that when 
we take ourselves to be articulating thoughts about ethics or absolute value we are "just 
gassing". Philosophers who think they are communicating information about the nature 
of absolute value or the meaning of life are speaking nonsense. Secondly, and I think 
more importantly, Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see that descriptive language 
(although the paradigm of meaning for the scientist) is good as far as it goes, but it 
doesn't go very far. Indeed, when it comes to all that is important in life it is useless. 
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Whatever is beyond language and the world is beyond description, but saying and 
describing are not coextensive. Many things can be said that are beyond description. If I 
am right, Wittgenstein is "elucidating" things that cannot be said or, more accurately, 
described, but that point us in certain directions-that get us to look at the world in ways 
that we otherwise would not have done. It is the 'nature' of ethics and value, logical 
form, and "the mystical" generally, that it cannot be described, but can instead be shown. 
Hodges also maintains that the saying/showing distinction is also ultimately 
incoherent for the same basic reason: Wittgenstein cannot tell us what his 'propositions' 
show us - "for what can be shown cannot be said" (4. 1 2 1 2). But ifhe cannot "say" what 
his 'propositions' "elucidate", then it is not clear what it is they are supposed to make 
manifest. 
Hodges interprets Wittgenstein as using a language that is beyond language and 
the world. Hodges writes: "the positions expressed in [the Tractatus] stand in dramatic 
conflict with the perspective the work takes" (p 24). Presumably the "positions 
expressed" are in "conflict" with the overall "perspective" because the overall 
perspective on the work denies that we can take a transcendental perspective about the 
ultimate nature of language and the world, whereas the "positions expressed in the TLP" 
appear to be claims about the ultimate relation between language, value, and the world. 
But I find Hodges distinction between "positions expressed" within the TLP over 
against the "perspective the work takes" to be puzzling because they are so vague. 
Perhaps Hodges means that Wittgenstein is illicitly describing language-world relations. 
That this description is illicit is evinced by the "perspective the work takes" because the 
overall perspective (the conclusion of the work?) is that we cannot describe language-
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world relations, and that any 'claims' that purport to describe or explain or give an 
account of this relation must be nonsense: must be "a language that is not a language" (p 
24) in Hodges' words. 
One thing is clear. By the phrase " the perspective the work takes" Hodges does 
not mean what I mean by the expression "transcendental perspective", for on the view 
that I am attributing to Wittgenstein his transcendental perspective turns out to be a kind 
of wordless meta-view ( quite literally). The perspective of my Wittgenstein is a wordless 
one and thus does not involve truth at all, effable or ineffable. 1 1 3 Perhaps, then, Hodges 
simply means that Wittgenstein has built a view of language and the world that is 
incoherent in just this way: the transcendent view of the world is built up from 
'propositions" dealing with the ultimate relation between language and the world; and, 
since the conclusion of the work regards any such descriptions as impossible (because 
nonsensical), any transcendental view of the language-world relation must be incoherent. 
Thus, according to Hodges, Wittgenstein is saying something ( or takes himself to 
be saying something) in his work that his ultimate conclusion (the perspective of the 
work as a whole) cannot countenance. Hodge' s  view of the Tractatus amounts to the idea 
that Wittgenstein's transcendent perspective is ultimately an impossible one. It is 
impossible because we cannot get outside language and the world, yet Wittgenstein's 
"positions" in his work all express the idea that the main aim of the work is to do just that 
- with his talk of the "limit" for example. But one cannot do what is impossible. 
1 1 3 Except in the sense that Wittgenstein 's  metalinguistic assertions express truths about the connection 
between descriptive language and the world. Wittgenstein, of course, would not be happy with this way of 
putting it. 
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And so perhaps it is something like this that Wittgenstein intended: we should all 
shut up once we see that any perspective that purports to transcend language and the 
world (which will include the nature of absolute value or ethics) is incoherent, and 
therefore must be abandoned. But if this is so, how in the world can Wittgenstein even 
bring us to see the "world rightly" (6.54) if the 'propositions' of the Tractatus are 
themselves beyond language and the world? Hodges thinks that Wittgenstein' s overall 
perspective requires that "the propositions of the Tractatus, in order to accomplish their 
purpose, must be a language that is not a language ! They must give linguistic expression 
to what cannot be said. And this is exactly what Wittgenstein thought they did" (p. 24). 
Of course, Wittgenstein thought the propositions of the TLP conveyed meaning 
by showing, not by saying. But we must at least understand the propositions (in some 
sense) if we are to see what they show us. This seems to be Hodges main point. And the 
moment we admit that we understand what Wittgenstein' s propositions show us we have 
the paradox because we have then admitted that Wittgenstein's propositions "give 
linguistic expression to what cannot be said" (p. 24). 
In my view Hodges is too narrowly focused on Wittgenstein's criterion of 
meaning vis a' vis the picture theory. Wittgenstein's propositions do indeed point to 1 14 
that theory, but they do not themselves satisfy the conditions of that theory. This is no 
different from the positivists' notion that meaningful propositions are only those 
propositions that can be verified or falsified. 
1 14 One can grasp a view or theory without the theory satisfying itself. 
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The verifiability criterion of meaning cannot be itself verified or falsified. Are we then 
led to the conclusion that the theory itself is meaningless? We are forced to accept this 
conclusion only if we apply the very criterion to the theory. But it is not clear that we 
must do this. That we needn't do so can be seen by the fact that we all understand the 
verifiability criterion of meaning notwithstanding the fact that it does not pass its own 
test. My point is simply that just as we need not interpret the criterion's scope as being 
unlimited, we need not interpret Wittgenstein's picture theory criterion's scope as being 
unlimited. We can then see what both the verifiability criterion of meaning and the 
picture theory of meaning are pointing out, without at the same time rendering either 
theory meaningless. 1 1 5 It is this kind of mistake that Hodges is making. (I look more 
closely at the analogy between Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning and the 
verifiability criterion of meaning in the next chapter). 
Wittgenstein was quite aware that his propositions did not meet his picture 
theory's conditions for meaning. So Wittgenstein's ultimate view is paradoxical in this 
sense: the way he is using language in the TLP fails to meet his criterion of meaningful 
descriptive language. But notice that we only get to Hodges conclusion that the 
Tractarian project is "incoherent" and "impossible", if we take Wittgenstein to be saying 
something in a descriptive language about what it means to transcend the world and 
language. 
i is  It may well be that Wittgesntein intended in the end to apply his picture theory criterion of meaning to 
the very 'propositions' of the nP. This is why he says that his 'l)ropositions are nonsense" to "those who 
have understood me". The most plausible way in which his 'propositions' can be said to fail to meet his 
picture theory criterion of meaning is by interpreting them as metalinguisitc assertions about the connection 
between language and the world. Such assertions cannot describe contingent facts in the world, and thus 
can be regarded as non-sense, but they needn' t be thought of as out and out nonsense. 
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And this is just what Hodges does when he says that the Tractatus, in order to 
bring us to the God's eye view of language and the world, a view that transcends the 
world and language, requires "a language that is not a language": that the TLP requires 
the expression of thoughts for which there is no linguistic medium of expression. Put 
another way, he takes Wittgenstein to be describing a view of language and the world 
that is quite literally outside language and the world: an impossible task. 
On my view Wittgenstein is providing a meta-description of the relation between 
language and the world. Wittgenstein is not "saying" (in the sense of describing) anything 
about language and the world from within language-world relations - that is, his 
descriptions do not meet his picture theory criterion of meaning at all . Thus, Wittgenstein 
can say that his "propositions" are nonsense ( owing to the fact that they do fall under his 
picture theory of meaning), while at the same time expressing a transcendental 
perspective on language and the world ( owing to the fact that he is using language meta­
descriptively ). 
In this chapter I have shown that Wittgenstein 's  transcendental perspective on 
language, value, and the world is not incoherent. By attributing to Wittgenstein a 
directive use of language in the "sixes", we can avoid convicting him of the charge that 
he is tacitly and illegitimately making use of a meaningless language. I have also shown 
that Wittgenstein's identification of ethics and aesthetics is an identification of 
perspectives, rather than an attempt on his part to show relevant similarities between the 
two "subjects". This nicely avoids the problem of how ethics and aesthetics can be (in 
some sense) the same given that there can be no such "subjects" within the Tractarian 
framework. It is the aesthetical and ethical perspective that is the same. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
Nothing is Shown: 
(Or) Where "Austere" Interpretations 
Go Wrong 
There are philosophers (Cora Diamond, James Conant, and Warren Goldfarb 
being the principles) who are of the opinion that Wittgenstein is solely concerned with 
demonstrating to us that there is only one kind of nonsense - pure and simple nonsense ­
and that Wittgenstein himself was engaging in disguised nonsense ( or a "transitional" 
language", to borrow Diamond's  phrase) so that we might all stop blathering. 1 1 6 On their 
view we are left with nothing at all once the rungs of the ladder have been discarded; 
nothing, save the cold consolation that we are now aware of the happy distinction 
between sense and nonsense, including the nonsense that makes up the Tractatus. 
According to "austere" or "resolute" readings of the Tractatus we are not left with 
any insight into the nature of the connection between descriptive language and the world 
- all that we have insight into can be said. Indeed, the very distinction between saying 
and showing is regarded by them as another piece of nonsense that Wittgenstein wants to 
see thrown away. In my view such a position is wrongheaded for a number of reasons. 
The first, and most important, reason is that Wittgenstein says to Russell that the 
saying/showing distinction is the "cardinal problem in philosophy" (in a letter previously 
quoted). Now I suppose that one could interpret this to mean that the "cardinal" problem 
lies in anyone thinking that any such distinction between saying and showing can be 
1 16 This of course is not all wrong, but it is only, on my reading, part of what Wittgenstein was attempting 
in his work. Moreover, on my view - and against austere readings - Wittgenstein's own propositions are 
not in the end pure nonsense, however disguised. 
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made; that those who take themselves to be speaking sense when they talk about what is 
said versus what is shown are really talking nonsense. But this implies that others (before 
Wittgenstein) had been concerned with such a distinction, and that Wittgenstein was 
determined to disabuse them of the idea that they were making sense. The problem here 
is that there does not seem to be any such nonsense going on in philosophy ( at least 
before Wittgenstein) regarding this distinction. Wittgenstein is the first to bring it up! 
Why would he feel the need to invent a nonsensical distinction to demonstrate a problem 
- and a cardinal problem at that - that no one seemed to be making? 
In Wittgenstein's mind the problem is that thinkers as astute as Bertrand Russell 
were attempting to say things about the structure ( or logic) of any language that cannot be 
said, but only shown. Thus, far from being nonsense, the distinction between saying and 
showing is the solution, in Wittgenstein's mind, to the rampant nonsense going on in 
philosophy. The distinction is not the problem. But it seems that the new 
Wittgensteinians want to lump the saying/showing distinction - used to straighten out the 
many problems we have in understanding the logic of our language, at least according to 
Wittgenstein - in with the nonsense that results from our missing the distinction. Are they 
being deliberately obtuse here? 
The second reason against austere interpretations is that there seems no way to 
explain (or even explain away) why Wittgenstein thought that his work constituted an 
"ethical deed". 1 17 Indeed, on the view that all Wittgenstein is doing is laying bare the 
distinction between sense and nonsense we cannot even hint at what might have been his 
1 17 Unless one wants to say that Wittgenstein's making sharp the distinction between sense and nonsense 
constitutes an ethical deed. But then why does he make the remarks he does about ethics, value, God, and 
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motivation for the esoteric remarks he makes on value, ethics, and "Das Mystische." It 
certainly appears that the "sixes" of his TLP were designed by their author to do more 
than just draw the line between what can be said and what is plain nonsense. His 
comments seem to have a more positive purpose than this. What's more, it is not even 
clear how the remarks about value and the mystical help draw the line between sense and 
nonsense. But what other purpose could they serve on a resolute reading of the 
Tractatus? 
Another reason against such an interpretation of Wittgenstein's early work is that 
it seems to make everything he 'says' about a host of issues pointless: the problems with 
Russell's  type theory; the building of his own picture theory; the nature of the proposition 
- such concerns must either be ignored or explicated only insofar as they highlight or 
illuminate the distinction between sense and nonsense. It seems wildly implausible to 
claim that these concerns are simply more examples of the kind of nonsense that 
Wittgenstein wants to see exposed. Such an approach brushes aside some of the most 
interesting concerns of the author by making everything subordinate to the following 
theme: Wittgenstein's writes nonsense to get us - i.e., philosophers - to stop engaging in 
it ourselves. There must be more to his early work than that. I am not alone in thinking 
this. If this was Wittgenstein' s only purpose, then such thinkers as Bertrand Russell, 
G.E.M. Anscombe, David Pears, Brian McGuiness, Peter Geach, Max Black, Jaakko and 
Merrill Hintikka, and P.M.S.  Hacker (and this is not an exhaustive list) have all been way 
off track. Indeed, they have all been talking nonsense. 
"the mystical"? This seems a very strange way to draw the line between sense and nonsense, if this is his 
only goal. 
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We have already seen that Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' are best interpreted as 
metalinguisitc instructions on how to look at the world as a whole: Wittgenstein is at least 
minimally using language to talk about the connection between ordinary language and its 
connection with the world ( even if we think that his view is wrong, Wittgenstein is 
talking about language and its connection with the world). This permits one to make 
sense of the idea that Wittgenstein is attempting to say what - by his own criterion of 
meaning; that is, the picture 'theory' - cannot be said. His metalinguistic propositions 
show ("elucidate") the nature of language and the world. They are clarifications about 
how ordinary descriptive language connects to the world. However, since they are not 
part of ordinary descriptive language they are, strictly speaking, nonsense. 
My own view on the kind of nonsense that Wittgenstein says attaches to his 
'propositions' is closer to the views of P.M.S. Hacker and Jaako Hintikka. 1 1 8  Hacker 
makes the following points regarding Wittgenstein's use of the term "elucidations" in the 
TLP. First, Hacker points out that the term "Erlauterung" is best translated as 
"clarification", a "garden variety" term, one that does not suggest that we are dealing 
with a "term of art" ("Wittgenstein and the New American Wittgensteinians", 2003). 
Second, Hacker points out that it is not clear that the term has a univocal sense, for there 
are different ways in which something can be clarified. 
Indeed, according to Hacker there are three uses of the term "elucidation" 
(clarification) in the TLP. At 3 .263 Wittgenstein is "concerned with explaining the 
meanings of primitive signs" or indefinables (p 2 1  ). At Tractatus 4. 1 1 -4. 1 1 6  Wittgenstein 
I IS I will discuss Hintikka's view on this matter later. 
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is "concerned with specifying the status, aim and nature of philosophy"119, which is to 
clarify the logic of ordinary sentences. And finally, at 6.54 Wittgenstein does not speak 
of "elucidations" or "clarifications", "but merely says that 'my sentences clarify' , in as 
much as someone who understands their author will eventually recognize them as 
nonsense" (p 22). According to Hacker, such clarifications are "the self-conscious 
attempts of the author to say what can only be shown, and which is shown by the well 
formed propositions of language. They (the propositions of the Tractatus) transgress the 
bounds of sense, and, in so doing, they gradually bring the perceptive reader to a correct 
logical point of view" (Ibid. ). I am most concerned with the way in which Wittgenstein 's 
sentences "clarify" at 6.54. Hacker leaves the issue of exactly how Wittgenstein's 
sentences are nonsense and simultaneously "elucidate" the "correct logical point of view" 
a mystery. Hacker says Wittgenstein's propositions "show" by making clear what the 
"well formed propositions of language" are. Such propositions are presumably those that 
picture states of affairs. But this is all rather vague, and we are not told how 
Wittgenstein's propositions accomplish this task. Interpreting Wittgenstein's propositions 
as meta-statements about language and the world fills in the gaps. 
Notice that Hacker says that Wittgenstein is himself attempting to say what can 
only be shown. This resonates with my idea that Wittgenstein's use of a higher-order 
1 1
9 Hacker makes the astute point that Wittgenstein's specification of the aim and status of philosophy (the 
way it is practiced in the TLP) is ''programmatic" and that it is a "moot question" as to "whether the 
conception of philosophy that is adumbrated applies to the Tractatus itself' (Ibid.). Instead, Wittgenstein is 
concerned with a "programme for future philosophy, envisaged as the only correct way to proceed once the 
lessons of the Tractatus have been learnt." (Ibid) An important implication here is that it is not clear what 
there is to be "learnt" if we suppose that the 'propositions' or "clarifications" of the TLP are pure nonsense. 
Moreover, even ifwe apply the criterion of meaning or sense (the picture theory) adumbrated in the TLP to 
the 'propositions' of the TLP, it would seem that any understanding of the nature of philosophy in the TLP 
"once the lessons of the Tractatus have been learnt" requires admitting that something is shown by 
Wittgenstein's clarifications. All this is incoherent on austere and resolute readings of the TLP. 
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language is, at bottom, an attempt to say what, by his own picture theory of meaning, 
cannot be said, but only shown. This is undoubtedly why Hacker says that Wittgenstein's  
own propositions "transgress the bounds of sense" - that is, Wittgenstein' s own 
propositions do not meet the conditions of his picture theory of meaning. In all this the 
distinction between saying and showing is far from nonsense, but rather the very heart of 
what Wittgenstein is trying to get us to appreciate. Let us now tum to the foremost 
authority on nonsense in Wittgenstein, Cora Diamond. 
Cora Diamond: Nonsense is nonsense 
We will discover that the so-called "new" Wittgenstein is not so new. In fact, we 
will see that the views of Diamond, Conant, and Goldfarb, respectively, are variations on 
a positivistic reading of the Tractatus. They all ignore what I take to be the main point of 
Wittgenstein's work - namely, that what is most important cannot be said, but only 
shown, and that this distinction is especially crucial in appreciating Wittgenstein's 
transcendental perspective on the world. Their interpretations appear to tum Wittgenstein 
into what he never was - a logical positivist. 1 20 
120 Even though both Diamond and Conant claim that they do not want to place Wittgenstein in the 
positivist camp, I maintain that they do just that. It seems that the only legitimate conclusion that they can 
draw from the Tractatus is that philosophers speak nonsense and that Wittgenstein is joining in with them 
in order to get them to see that they are speaking nonsense. Thus, Wittgenstein must be lumped with the 
positivists, whatever the protestations of Diamond and Conant. I do not wish to imply that Wittgenstein has 
no affinities with the positivists, far from it. He did think that much of what passed for philosophy was 
nonsense. But Wittgenstein is trying to show us a way out without throwing away important insights into 
the connection between language and the world, and the aesthetico-ethical stance that his perspective 
engenders. The positivists and the 'new' Wittgensteinians are happy to see the baby go with the bathwater. 
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In order to understand and appreciate much of what Wittgenstein 'says' about the 
connection of language to the world, the problems with Russell's theory of types, and the 
"mystical" it is essential once and for all (if possible) to destroy the popularity had by 
what Cora Diamond has called ( as a proponent of the view in her essay "Throwing Away 
the Ladder : How to Read the Tractatus" 12 1 ) an "austere" reading of that .work. Put baldly, 
the "austere" interpretation of the Tractatus is that there is no meaning whatsoever (save 
for a kind of imaginative one) in any of the 'claims' that purportedly shows us something 
about the connection between language and the world as a whole. This means that 
anything like an ethical attitude or stance to the world cannot be attributed to 
Wittgenstein since his "propositions" are quite literally nonsense. Any such ethical 
attitude is an attitude that we read into his work. In a recent article, "Ethics, Imagination 
and the Method of Wittgenstein's Tractatus" (New Wittgenstein: 2000), Diamond 
describes what can be called the "plain nonsense" view thus: "I believe that the Tractatus 
takes what you might call an austere view of nonsense. Nonsense is nonsense . . .  So if 
there are no ethical propositions . . .  then there are no propositions through which we are 
able to gesture, however ineptly, at unspeakable truths, and anything we take to be an 
ethical proposition has no more sense than 'piggly wiggle tiggle"' (p. 1 53). 
In this article Diamond makes a distinction among three types of sentences: ( 1 )  
"straightforwardly intelligible sentences", (2) "sentences that are nonsense but that would 
mean these things if they could count as sense" 122, and (3) "mere nonsense" sentences 
121 Printed in Diamond's Realistic Spirit ( 1 99 1 )  
122 Sentences of type 2 originally come from G.E.M. Anscomb' s  Introduction to The Tractatus. Anscomb 
suggests that when Wittgenstein talks about what is shown by his propositions he means something like 
truths that we recognize but that cannot be articulated by us. 
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She then pairs sentences of type ( l )  with "what can be spoken about" and sentences of 
type (2) with "what cannot be spoken about", but that we would recognize as true if they 
could be articulated (p. 1 50). Her position is that Wittgenstein' s view, if carefully 
interpreted, commits him only to sentences of type ( 1 )  and that he is trying to get us to 
see that sentences of type (2) are just disguised type (3) sentences. There cannot be 
sentences that gesture, "however ineptly", at unspeakable truths. Strictly speaking there 
are no sentences of type (2), just type ( 1 )  and nonsense. Thus, all sentences that have 
sense are those that meet the picture theory's criterion of meaning, and any other 
sentences are quite literally nonsense. 
On her view, the chief aim of Wittgenstein's gesturing in the Tractatus is to get us 
to appreciate that whenever we think we are showing something that is true or correct, 
but that language cannot quite get at, we are really talking out of out hats. In order to 
sharpen her view and our objections to it, let us examine in more detail what is meant by 
type (2) 'claims' .  
Any and all talk of what can be shown, but not said; that is, 'truths' that cannot be 
spoken about in principle, count as strict nonsense for Diamond. One of the implications 
here is that philosophers who do mental gymnastics to attribute some type of meaning to 
sentences like "ethics and aesthetics are one" or "there is indeed the mystical", etc. are 
really just "chickening out" according to Diamond. They "chicken out" in the sense that 
they want to have their cake and eat it to: "the 'propositions' of the TLP are nonsense, for 
Wittgenstein tells us so, but not really nonsense." This is to chicken out. On her view, to 
admit that Wittgenstein's propositions are nonsense and then to attribute some meaning 
to his pronouncements on ethics, value, or the mystical is to "chicken out. According to 
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Diamond this is to fail to appreciate that Wittgenstein is himself trying to demonstrate 
that most of what passed for philosophy was nonsense and that the propositions of the 
TLP are a kind of self-consciously disguised nonsense geared towards unmasking the 
distinction between sense and nonsense. On Diamond's view this is all that Wittgenstein 
is trying to accomplish with his pseudo-propositions. I have more than a few misgivings 
about her view. 
However cryptic some of Wittgenstein's remarks are - however "ineptly" he 
gestures - it seems rash to dismiss his 'claims' as, in the end, "mere nonsense". He 
agonized over the "sixes", when he could have just said "piggly wiggle tiggle". Diamond 
is at pains to soften some of her austerity when she writes: "I read it (the Tractatus) in the 
austere view of nonsense; yet I then try to articulate what I think Wittgenstein is 
committed to in ethics, and I find myself using language incompatible with the ascription 
to him of that austere view" ("Ethics, Imagination and the Method of Wittgenstein's 
Tractatus", p. 1 53). 1 23 This is surely an indication that something is wrong with her view. 
If Wittgenstein intended the book to be taken as "an ethical deed", it is only natural that 
we should try to discover what sort of deed has been done - even if the "deed" is to show 
that all of ethics, when treated as a science or subject about which one can speak, is 
nonsense. But on the austere reading no sense can be made of anything like an ethical 
stance or position being evinced or shown in the Tractatus, since, on such a view, the 
very distinction between saying and showing is simply another bit of nonsense that 
Wittgenstein wishes to uncover for us. 
123 Printed in Diamond's Realistic Spirit ( 1 991)  
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Another difficulty with her interpretation is that it places Wittgenstein in the 
unhappy role ( and unhappy he was) of the father of logical positivism. Diamond herself 
says just this: "This (the austere reading), however, looks like the view of the logical 
positivists . . .  and yet I do not believe that Wittgenstein's consigning of ethical talk to the 
realm of nonsense should be likened to that of the positivists" (p. 1 53). And so the 
problem, as she sees it, is to "distinguish Wittgenstein's view of ethics from that of the 
logical positivists, without giving up the ascription to him of what (she has called) an 
austere view of nonsense" (p. 1 53). 
Does Diamond have any "Wiggle" room? 
The first direction in which she is inclined to attribute to Wittgenstein an ethical 
view while holding onto her austere reading is to ascribe to him a stance or "attitude" 
"toward the world and life" that rejects any notion of ethics as a subject matter (p 1 53). I 
think she is quite right in doing this. Clearly Wittgenstein thought there could be no 
"philosophy of ethics": "It is clear that ethics cannot be expressed" (6.42 1 ). So what 
Diamond does is make a distinction "between ethics as a sphere of discourse among 
others and ethics tied to everything there is or can be, the world as a whole, life" (p. 1 53). 
The second way that she is inclined ( again, in tension with her austere reading) to read 
Wittgenstein is to interpret him as suggesting that we human beings need (or ought) to 
make our wills as independent from the world as possible in order to be happy. The idea 
here is to accept the world and all that happens in it just as it is. What is suggested is that 
being happy requires making peace with things just as they are, and so not making one ' s  
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contentment contingent on any worldly state of affairs. It amounts to, as Diamond notes, 
accepting that one is "in a sense 'powerless"' (NB, p. 73) over all that happens in the 
world. Now whether the temptation to interpret Wittgenstein in either of these ways is 
correct (actually, as should be obvious from Chapters Three and Four, I think that 
Diamond is correct here) irrelevant. The main difficulty, again, is how to reconcile 
finding anything in the Tractatus that is even remotely connected to an ethical attitude 
while at the same time hanging on to the idea that everything he says about the ethical is 
quite literally nonsense. 
Diamond's Attempted Reconciliation 
The way in which she tries to ease this tension is to suppose that Wittgenstein is 
trying to get those who are steeped in philosophical nonsense to see what he is driving at 
by engaging in the same nonsense himself: " . . .  The Tractatus . . . supposes a particular kind 
of imaginative activity, an exercise of the capacity to enter into the taking of nonsense for 
sense, of the capacity to share imaginatively the inclination to think that one is thinking 
something in it ( the nonsense)" ("Ethics, Imagination, and the Tractatus", p. 1 5  8). 
Diamond never really makes clear what is involved in imagining that one is making sense 
when one is not. She does say that that "there is an important resemblance between 
ethical sentences and philosophical ones, seen imaginatively as apparently making sense: 
both ethical and philosophical nonsense reflect the attractiveness of the idea of a point of 
view on the world as a whole, whatever may happen in it" (p. 1 6 1 ,  my emphasis). But it 
seems to me totally mysterious how any type of literal nonsense (imaginative or 
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otherwise) could "reflect" a "point of view", a Weltanschauung, or even a stance toward 
the world. 
A Reductio of Diamond's view 
If in fact any of Wittgenstein's pronouncements on value, ethics, and the meaning 
of life in the "sixes" are just as nonsensical as "piggly wiggle tiggle", then we ought to be 
able to substitute this phrase, or a suitably nonsensical one, for any of the remarks in the 
sixes without losing any meaning. We shouldn't lose any meaning because on her view 
there is no meaning to be lost. But it seems obvious that the phrase "piggly wiggle tiggle" 
cannot perform the same function as Wittgenstein ' s  admittedly cryptic remarks that 
"ethics and aesthetics are one" or that "how things are in the world is a matter of 
complete indifference for what is higher" (6.432). 
We ought not to confuse what is mysterious, cryptic, and perhaps even wholly 
unclear with pure nonsense. There are many things that we can ask regarding the 
meaning of Wittgenstein' s remarks here. But there is little to be asked about the 
'meaning' of "piggly wiggle tiggle". What does Diamond think can be done with this 
phrase or another that is suitably nonsensical? She does not tell us. It will not do to let 
this phrase stand for something else, for this would be to give it meaning it doesn't have. 
But there is much that we can ask regarding the meaning of the "sixes" in the TLP. We 
can ask for the point of his remarks. At bottom, there is prima facie evidence that there is 
some meaning in Wittgenstein's sixes since we can ask just what he is trying to get us to 
see. This is an appropriate question. It may tum out that there is nothing he is attempting 
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to show us or that what he is saying is so hopelessly mysterious that we don't know 
where to look. But these answers only make sense on the assumption that what he has 
said has some sense to it. 
But can we ask the meaning of the phrase "piggle wiggle tiggle?" We can, but 
there are few options here. The person who utters this phrase might simply be dismissing 
something else as nonsense in a humorous way, or she might be letting the phrase stand 
in for some other expression that does have meaning. It seems that Diamond is using such 
a phrase to dismiss the propositions of the Tractatus as, in the end, straightforwardly 
nonsensical. But if she is correct here, how does she think Wittgenstein gets us to see that 
his propositions are, in the end, real nonsense without there being some meaning, sense, 
or significance in the propositions he uses to bring us to this conclusion? He obviously 
cannot do so with phrases like "piggly wiggle tiggle." 
There is, as I have said, little we can do with such an expression, save taking it as 
an example of the kind of plain nonsense that Diamond thinks the Tractatus is trying to 
uncover for the perceptive reader. Diamond's position is that Wittgenstein's program is 
to get us to stop talking nonsense by engaging us in language that is only apparently 
intelligible, but that is nonetheless, at the end of the day, plain nonsense. But it would 
seem, then, that there must be more that the sixes can do than a phrase such as "piggly 
wiggle tiggle" can. 
But perhaps I am being uncharitable here. After all, Diamond only says that the 
propositions of the Tractatus ( except the frame of the work - that is, the preface, 6.54 and 
7) are, in the end, just as nonsensical as the expression "piggly wiggle tiggle." She does 
not say that Wittgenstein's propositions appear to be as nonsensical as this phrase, only 
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that, at bottom, they are just as nonsensical. Indeed, they seem to make a kind of sense 
and they appear to be intelligible. But how do they appear to be meaningful and how are 
we to understand how his apparently meaningful assertions are really nonsense? 
Understanding Him, not His Propositions: Pushing the Problem Back a Step 
Diamond sees Wittgenstein as engaging the reader in language that seems to have 
meaning (but doesn't) in order to get the confused metaphysician to see that, ultimately, 
all talk about philosophy, ethics, and the mystical is nonsense - pure, plain, and simple 
nonsense. The problem, then, is this: how does anyone understand anything that 
Wittgenstein says in his work? It is here that she makes much of the claim near the end of 
the Tractatus where Wittgenstein writes: "My propositions serve as elucidations in this 
way: anyone who understands me finally recognizes them as nonsensical" (6.54; Pears & 
McGuiness Trans.). The point she makes is that understanding him, and not the 
propositions he uses to clarify or "elucidate", permits one to reconcile his project as an 
intelligible while maintaining that his propositions are, strictly speaking, nonsense : 
Wittgenstein makes himself understood, and so the point of his work intelligible, through 
elucidations that are plain nonsense. 
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Proposition 6.54 is part of the "frame" of the work ("Ethics, Imagination, and the 
Tractatus, p. 1 55), 1 24 according to Diamond, and is therefore not to be taken as a piece of 
nonsense, but as an instruction on how to read the work. Diamond writes: 
So my claim now is that we cannot see how we are to read the remarks on ethics 
in the Tractatus without seeing how Wittgenstein thought of its philosophical 
method, and crucial to that is his conception of what it is to understand a person 
who utters nonsense. What is it then to understand a person who talks nonsense? 
(p. 1 56) 
Notice the emphasis on understanding a "person" uttering "nonsense." This is a 
key point for Diamond because she takes Wittgenstein really and truly to be speaking 
nonsense: there is no "that" clause that can be made sense of - we cannot fill in a "that 
clause" with any of the propositions of the Tractatus and thereby obtain an intelligible 
sentence: 
The understanding of a person who talks nonsense uses the type of linguistic 
construction that we use when we understand someone who talks sense. ' You are 
under the illusion that p' is modeled on 'you believe that p. ' But sentences of that 
structure make sense only when they contain, in the clause giving the content of 
what is believed or thought or denied or said or whatever, an intelligible sentence. 
'You are under the illusion that p' does not do that (p. 1 57). 
The "method" of the Tractatus is to pretend to talk sense so that those who are 
under the impression that they are saying something intelligible when they utter a 
philosophical statement can be brought to see that they have "failed to give a meaning to 
certain signs in [their] propositions" (6.5 3). This is true of all the propositions of the TLP, 
excluding the preface, 6 .54, and 7 (the "frame"). Thus, there is absolutely nothing but 
nonsense in any of Wittgenstein's remarks about ethics. But still we want to know how it 
124 The other part of the "frame" is the preface, specifically the bit about the main point of the work: "to 
draw a limit . . .  to the expression ofthoughts . . .  and that what lies on the other side of the limit will simply be 
nonsense" (TLP, p 3). 
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is that Wittgenstein can seem to say anything at all with out-and-out nonsense. How does 
all this "pretending to make sense" work? According to Diamond, Wittgenstein's 
propositions have an imaginative sense in .that psychologically they are significant, but, 
from a strictly logical point of view, they are nonsense. But what, exactly, is this 
supposed to mean? Diamond leaves this rather vague when she writes: 
. . .  The Tractatus, in its understanding of itself as addressed to those who are in the 
grip of philosophical nonsense, and in its understanding of the kind of demands it 
makes on its readers, supposes a kind of imaginative activity, an exercise of the 
capacity to enter into the taking of nonsense for sense, of the capacity to share 
imaginatively the inclination to think that one is thinking something in it 
(nonsense) (Ibid.). 
I for one find this really thin as well as mysterious. In order for a person to be 
understood, however murkily, it would seem that there must be some sense in what he 
says, and that that sense must be the result of the intentions with which the words are 
uttered. So for my part the distinction between sentences that have real sense (though not 
in the technical way in which this is meant in the Tractatus) and sentences that have 
sense only imaginatively does not do any real work. I cannot even make sense of this 
distinction. For in either case we must grasp the significance of what is being said in 
order to follow the author. 
So my own view (which is hardly just my own) is that there is a distinction 
between nonsense that attempts to say what can only be shown [sentences of type (2) 125] , 
which would include "logical form", the "picture theory of meaning", and anything like 
125 To explain showing in terms of truths that cannot be articulated or in terms of propositions that, if they 
had sense, would be seen to be true is perhaps the worst way to understand sentences of type 2. The 
recognition of something' s being true presupposes that it can, in principle, be thought or otherwise 
articulated. This is why I think it best to explain showing in terms of a higher-order language, a language 
that instructs us as to how to look at descriptive language and its connection to the world. Now we needn't 
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an aesthetico-ethical perspective on the world, and plain nonsense which would include 
such phrases as "piggly wiggle tiggle". 
A consideration that is perhaps equally important in any rejection of Diamond' s  
reading is that it does not do justice to Wittgenstein's seriousness when it comes to that 
which is higher: "There is indeed the inexpressible. This shows itself; it is the mystical" 
(Ogden, 6.522). No doubt this is mysterious, and he may be wholly mistaken or even 
deluded-but pronouncements such as these are a far cry from "piggly wiggle tiggle." 
What I am suggesting here is that pure nonsense (however disguised) cannot 
account for the grave attitude Wittgenstein took toward ethics, value, and, if I am correct, 
for the peculiar attitude or perspective he took toward the world as a "limited whole". 1 26 
On an austere reading, these expressions must either be ignored or taken as ironic 
remarks, that serve only to point towards the opposite - namely, that nothing is 
inexpressible, except of course pure nonsense ! And at the end of the day we still do not 
have a good explanation as to how pure nonsense can elucidate or clarify anything at all .  
Still, there are other proponents of the "new Wittgenstein", James Conant and 
Warren Goldfarb being the two most prominent players. Let us see how they have taken 
Diamond's view and made it their own. 
suppose that Wittgenstein is gesturing towards truths that cannot be said, but rather getting us to appreciate 
how any representational language gets anchored to (or corresponds with) the world. 
1 26 Wittgenstein continued to think of certain talk as nonsense, but very important nonsense. In his LE, for 
example, he speaks about our using language in an ethical or religious context "to go beyond the world and 
that is to say beyond significant language . . .  [and that this] . . .  running against the walls of our cage is 
perfectly, absolutely hopeless . . .  [but that] . . . it is a document ofa tendency in the human mind which 
[Wittgenstein] personally cannot help respecting deeply and [that he] would not for [his] life ridicule"(p. 
70). This passage, far from suggesting that all nonsense is on a par, and that Wittgenstein is concerned to 
stop all the nonsense, as Diamond intimates, implies instead that important nonsense is the best talk there is 
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James Conant: "Resolute" Versus "Substantial" Nonsense 
Like Diamond, James Conant is opposed to any reading of the early Wittgenstein 
that hints at the idea that there might be something toward which Wittgenstein is 
gesturing, something that cannot be said but only shown, or, to use Kierkegaard's 
wonderful phrase, "indirectly communicated". If there is anything that is shown for 
Conant, it is the "activity of unmasking nonsense", but there is no "it" that is shown, and 
nothing to which Wittgenstein is attempting to draw our attention; rather, there is only the 
discovery that we are (or have been) speaking nonsense (p. 344). 1 27 Conant follows 
Diamond's lead here: anyone who thinks that some features or characteristics of language 
and the world are being pointed toward after the ladder has been discarded is guilty of 
"chickening out" ("Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder" ( 1 989), p. 338). 
Conant' s salvos are fired at so-called "ineffable truth" interpretations of the 
Tractatus. Included in this group are the Hintikkas (Investigating Wittgenstein: 1 986), 
P .M.S. Hacker (Insight and Illusion: 1 972), and Brian McGuiness ( Wittgenstein: A Life: 
1 988) - though frequently Conant does not mention whose views he is taking issue 
with.)128 Conant says of McGuiness' work ( Wittgenstein: A Life) that McGuiness is 
and that we should carry on with it. Why would anyone want to carry on speaking nonsense if it all 
ultimately amounted to "piggly wiggle tiggle"? 
1 27 "Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder", The Yale Review, vol. 79, 1989, pp. 328-364 
128 Perhaps it does not matter that he does not name names, given that on Conant's reading any 
commentator who wrestles with Wittgenstein's comments on solipsism, value, or indeed any topic other 
than sense and nonsense has missed the point of Wittgenstein's work. 
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"sensitive in places to the "problem of chickening out" ("Throwing Away the Top of the 
Ladder", p 338), but that in the end McGuiness (like so many others) wants to get rid of 
. "the top of the ladder", keeping some of the lower level rungs as providing real insight 
into, for example, the distinction between saying versus showing or the inexpressible 
nature of the language-world connection. Conant thinks that any interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's early work that makes it look as if there is something that cannot be 
expressed or stated, something that we cannot do, is completely misguided. 
It is rather doubtful that all these authors (above) see Wittgenstein as gesturing 
towards ineffable truths-ineffable characteristics or features of language and the world, 
maybe. 1 29 It is simply not clear that what Wittgenstein is trying to get us to see or what he 
is drawing our attention to are truths. Conant attributes to many "commentators . . . the 
conclusion that the early Wittgenstein draws limits to language in order to point to the 
ineffable truths beyond language (that can only be indicated with the aid of language but 
can never be embodied in language)" ("Must We Show What We Cannot Say?", p. 248). 
But Conant never considers that perhaps Wittgenstein's propositions are an 
attempt to get us to look at language and the world differently. Nor does he consider that 
Wittgenstein's propositions or elucidations are geared towards making perspicuous the 
connection between language and the world, and that it is the agreement or disagreement 
of representational language with the world that is shown by Wittgenstein's 
129 Hacker and Rhees, for example, take Wittgenstein to be showing us that there must be certain features 
that are shared by representational language and the world in order for us to be able to say ( describe, 
represent) anything about the world. These shared features can be named, but they cannot be explained or 
described at all. Names and the objects that they denote are on this reading, transcendental conditions for 
language and the world. But these shared features are hardly "truths" about the world given that they do not 
represent the world at all, but make representational language possible. 
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propositions. 1 30 Here we need not speak about ineffable "truths" at all. In short, Conant 
never considers that perhaps Wittgenstein's propositions are meta-linguistic instructions 
- not a part of our ordinary descriptive language at all - and that their nonsensicality 
results from Wittgenstein's applying his picture theory criterion of meaning to the 
propositions that serve to illuminate that criterion, and much else besides. 1 3 1 On such a 
13
0 Indeed, a plausible interpretation of what Wittgenstein is trying to bring to our attention with his talk 
about the connection between representational language and the world amounts to "showing" us what truth 
is. On such a view, "truth" cannot be said at all, but is made manifest or depicted by what is involved in the 
picturing relation. Here Wittgenstein can be interpreted as directing us to a pure correspondence theory of 
truth that is shown. This is close to Hintikka's  idea that Wittgenstein is putting forward an "ineffability 
theory" of semantics. On this view, one of the things we are left with, once the ladder has been discarded, is 
a crystalline correspondence relation between language and the world that cannot be said, but is made 
manifest by Wittgenstein's picture theory. It also meshes nicely with Rhees suggestion (in Discussions of 
Wittgenstein, pp. 3-4) that Wittgenstein shows the meaning of"semantical concepts" (such as "truth" and 
"firoposition") by getting us to see a proposition as a picture of a possible fact. 1 1 Though what else "besides" is very hard to say: It should be clear by now that I interpret Wittgenstein 
main ethical task as one involving an attempt on his part to get us to see the world under the aspect of 
eternity. This is to bring about in us an attitude toward the world as a limited whole. It involves 
appreciating the greatest mystery of all - namely, that there is a world. Brian McGuiness writes: "The 
reading of the book, then, has a purpose: it is like an initiation into the mysteries, and when they are 
reached it can be forgotten" (Wittgenstein: A Life; Young Ludwig, 1889-1921, p 303). This is suggestive but 
rather vague (as so many hints at what Wittgenstein is trying to get us to appreciate must be). Still, 
McGuiness is on the right track here. Wittgenstein brings us to the brink of mystery or "mysteries": The 
sense or meaning of life and the world, any understanding of absolute value, the logical form of language 
and the world, etc. These might be called "ineffable truths", but I cannot see why one must think of them as 
such. Indeed, it seems to me that labeling them as 'truths' only gives the advantage to those who propound 
the austere reading: (Indeed, how can we say that any statement is true unless we can also say, at least in 
principle, what the conditions for the truth of the statement are? This seems to be their starting point. This 
is different from saying that there are truths about the universe that we have not yet discovered. Here one is 
only saying that there are very many truths about which we are presently in the dark - and might always be 
in the dark. But none of these truths are in principle ineffable.) At any rate, it is far easier for proponents of 
the austere view of nonsense to attack the 'theory' that there are truths that cannot in principle be stated, 
than it is to refute the claim that there are ultimate mysteries that no amount of philosophical analysis can 
lay bare. This seems to be what Wittgenstein is driving at when he writes in the last line of his preface: 
" . . .  The second thing in which the value of this work consists is that it shows how little is achieved when 
these problems are solved" (p 4). Wittgenstein is intimating that the most important areas are left 
untouched; that the mysteries of life cannot be plumbed by analysis. But for Conant (and Diamond) there 
can be no mystery here, only the illusion that there is more to life and the world than can be captured in 
language. For my part, it is the height of hubris to think that there are no real mysteries - only confused talk 
or nonsense. Yet something very close to this is present in austere readings. Here it is exceedingly difficult 
to defend Conant and Diamond, for they allow only the preface, 6.54 and 7 to count as having meaning, 
and only insofar as these remarks clarify how we are to read the TLP. But perhaps we might say, in their 
defense, that the point of Wittgenstein's  remarks at 6.5 and 6.52 1 ,  where he says in effect that the "riddle of 
life" or the "problem of life" "does not exist" or "vanishes" - that this realization results from our seeing 
that there can be no way to state what it is we are trying to get at when we blather on about the meaning or 
"problem" of life. And where no question can be asked, there can be no answer either (6.5). Thus, there is a 
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view as this, Wittgenstein's propositions fail to meet his own criterion, and are thus 
nonsense. But this does not render them pure nonsense. Nor need we interpret them as 
sentences that only appear to be intelligible. Indeed, we do understan� Wittgenstein, and 
that is why we can see what he is driving at when he tells us that, in the end, his 
propositions "serve as elucidations", and should be finally discarded as nonsense. 
The only alternatives to silence are, according to Conant, the following three: "( I )  
plain ordinary effable speech, (2) unintelligible though apparently intelligible chatter (in 
this he is following Cora Diamond), and (3) mere gibberish" (p 249). 1 32 Conant 
continues: "the latter two alternatives differ only in their psychological import: one offers 
the illusion of sense where the other does not. Cognitively, they are equally vacuous. My 
interlocutory commentators, on the other hand, insist on a fourth alternative: the 
possibility of speech that lacks sense while still being able to convey volumes" (Ibid.). 
First, one should note the similarity to Diamond's breakdown of sense and 
nonsense. Just as Diamond reduced "sentences that are nonsense but would mean these 
things if they could count as sense" to statements of "mere nonsense", so Conant follows 
sense in which the unmasking of nonsense is an ethical deed for it frees us from thinking that we can 
discover the sense or meaning of life. When we see that any talk of"life 's meaning" or the "problem of 
life" is nonsense, we will stop blathering and henceforth cease to be vexed by such questions. We will then 
realize that "the man who is fulfilling the purpose of existence [is he who] no longer needs to have any 
purpose except to live" [Notebooks (1914-1916), p 73]. The idea that the unmasking of such ethical 
questions as nonsense leads to a kind of existential freedom is not altogether wrong as an interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's point in the sixes, but unfortunately it is not an option that is open to austere readings since 
the very idea that Wittgenstein is expressing a kind of existential solution to nonsensical questions is itself 
an ethical attitude or stance that cannot be countenanced on austere readings: For it requires attributing 
some meaning to what Wittgenstein says about questions that deal with the meaning and sense of life. And, 
as we are seeing, there can be no understanding of what Wittgenstein is trying to get at with his talk of 
ethics and value in the Tractatus except to show us that we have been speaking nonsense. This is why I said 
it is so hard to defend austere interpretations, especially when it comes to Wittgenstein's remarks in the 
sixes. 
132 "Must We Show What We Cannot Say?" in The Senses o/Stanley Cavel/, edited by Richard Fleming 
and Michael Payne, Bucknell Univ. Press; PA: 1 989 
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her lead here and wants to reduce sentences that appear to have sense or seem intelligible 
to "gibberish." 
Second, Diamond talks about "imaginative" nonsense: sentences that are "pure 
nonsense" from a logical perspective, but are, from a psychological perspective, 
meaningful. She interprets Wittgenstein as engaging in such nonsense to win those 
philosophers over - the ones still speaking nonsense but who are unaware of it - to his 
way of seeing matters. Third, both regard the idea that sentences wholly lacking sense 
can "say volumes" (my italics) or point to "ineffable truths" as the wrong way to read 
Wittgenstein. 
And, framed in this way, I agree with them both. But we must ask: is there not a 
better way to understand how Wittgenstein could take himself to be illuminating 
something important with nonsensical sentences? If my view is correct ( or at least more 
plausible than austere readings) we can. 
Notice that Conant stresses that both the "chatter" that "appears to be intelligible" 
and the "mere gibberish" are "equally vacuous" in terms of cognitive content. But if 
Wittgenstein is applying his picture theory of meaning - that those and only those 
propositions that picture facts in the world have meaning - then we should expect those 
propositions that are about the relation between language and the world to be cognitively 
vacuous. 1 33 For according to Wittgenstein propositions that have cognitive content are 
133 Here I am using the expression "cognitively vacuous" in a rather narrow way. I mean only that the 
propositions of the Tractatus do not picture facts in the world. They are, in this sense, "cognitively 
vacuous." As we have seen (in chapters two and four), Wittgenstein's remarks are better characterized as a 
higher-order language that both directs us to the relation between language and the world and invites us to 
see or look at the entire world and language from a perspective outside the world. Wittgenstein's Delphic 
pronouncement that opens the work (''the world is all that is the case") is an excellent example of both his 
aim to project us out of the world and to direct our attention to the connection between descriptive language 
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propositions that agree or disagree with reality - propositions that represent, truly or 
falsely, facts in the world. By hypothesis Wittgenstein's higher-order propositions cannot 
represent a way in which the world might be, and so lack cognitive content. But this does 
not imply that they are gibberish. 
Putting aside my interpretation of how w_e are to understand the point and purpose 
of Wittgenstein's propositions, it remains to be seen what Conant takes to be the point of 
Wittgenstein's work. Thus far, Conant's Wittgenstein is only concerned with "unmasking 
nonsense". One is tempted to say, if this was all Wittgenstein was concerned with, then 
the point hardly seems worth all the effort. Let us see if there is something more to 
Conant' s position than this. 
James Conant on Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard: An Ironic Reading of the 
Tractatus 
Conant argues against the usual parallels that are drawn between Wittgenstein and 
Kierkegaard. 134 In "Must We Show What We Cannot Say?" ( 1 989) and "Kierkegaard, 
Wittgenstein, and Nonsense" 135 ( 1 993), Conant draws what he regards as the correct 
parallel between the TLP and Kierkegaard's "Concluding Unscientific Postscript." 136 
and the world: the facts - and there being all the facts - constitute the world. But anyone would be hard­
pressed to give the cognitive content here. 
134 In a footnote (#3) in his paper "Must We Show What We Cannot Say?", Conant claims that he "take(s) 
issue with virtually all of the secondary literature on both Kierkegaard and the early Wittgenstein", with the 
exception of . . .  "Henry Allison and Stanley Cavell" (p 270). 
135 I will restrict my comments to the first article, for much of what I say here applies to the other article. 
136 Conant draws heavily on Kierkegaard's work as a way of illuminating Wittgenstein's final message to 
"remain silent". It is true that Wittgenstein admired Kierkegaard very much, and even told Drury that he 
thought "Kierkegaard was by far the most profound thinker of the last century" (Maurice O'C. Drury, 
"Some Notes on Conversations with Wittgenstein, in Ludwig Wittgenstein: Personal Recollections ( 1 98 1 ), 
p I 02), and, in a letter to Norman Malcolm, Wittgenstein remarked "Kierkegaard is far too deep for me" 
(Ludwig Wittgenstein; A Memoir, by Norman Malcolm ( 1984), p 1 06. But, as is so often the case with 
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Perhaps we can discover if there is anything more to Conant's resolute reading by first 
examining what he regards as the usual parallels between the two thinkers, and then 
investigate why he thinks such interpretations go wrong. 
What emerges is an interpretation of the Tractatus in which Wittgenstein never 
really means what he says; a view that is, to my mind, contrived, ironic, and tongue in 
cheek. Indeed, P.M.S. Hacker has said: "Conant represents the book as an exercise in 
Kierkegaardian irony" ("Was He Trying To Whistle It?", p 359, published in New 
Wittgenstein, 2000). 
In "Must We Show What We Cannot Say?", Conant lists "five similarities" that 
other "commentators (he doesn't say who) believed they noticed . .  . in these two famous 
works" (p 243): 
( 1 )  Both [Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard] were concerned to draw a distinction 
between sense and nonsense ( or between what can and cannot be objectively 
comprehended) and to relegate matters of importance ( ethics, religion) to a realm 
beyond the limits of sense; (2) both works attempt to show what cannot be said ( or 
directly communicated) and what can only be shown (or directly communicated); (3) 
both works attempt to show what cannot be said (or thought) by drawing limits to 
what can be said (or thought); (4) both works consistently climax in a final moment 
of self-destruction in which we are asked to throw out the ladder we have just 
climbed up ( or to throw away the pseudonym named Johannes Climacus or John of 
the Ladder); (5) both works end with a proclamation of silence and with the 
implication that silence is the only correct form that an answer to their questions can 
take (pp. 243-244) 
Conant does not discuss the merits or demerits of these parallels, but instead claims that 
"he has never seen anyone perspicuously lay out these five similarities" as clearly as "he 
has just done" (p 244 ). Indeed, he draws our attention to these parallels only to mention 
Wittgenstein, it is impossible to determine just where and how the influence shows up (save for those cases 
where Wittgenstein explicitly mentions certain thinkers (Russell, Frege, Schopenhauer, etc - and even here 
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that "these apparent parallels are symptomatic of deeper affinities between the writings of 
these two authors" and that "what exactly those deeper affinities . . .  [ amount to] . . .  is one 
of th� many things [his article] never arrived at a satisfactory formulation of' (Ibid. ). 1 37 
But for all his hemming and hawing, Conant does tell us what he thinks the 
deeper affinities are and why other philosophers have missed them. First, Conant' s 
dissatisfaction with other commentators - excluding Henry Allison and Stanley Cavell -
is that they imply a pregnant, profound, and heavy silence. It is the old problem of 
attributing, in this case, to bot� Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein, the view that their 
"indirect communications" or "elucidations" point to something ( or things) that language 
cannot capture: ''I wanted to instruct them to read these texts in a different light and to 
say to them: there is no particular thing that cannot be said. The "what" in "what cannot 
be said" refers to nothing" (p, 244) at all .  Now Conant feared that such a view of both 
Kierkegaard and Wittgenstein would meet with the usual objection that goes something 
like this: "aren't you just wanning up logical positivism?" But on Conant's view there 
can be no such thing as deep and significant nonsense ( and put like this who could 
argue?). Once again he is objecting to there being two different categories of nonsense: 
genuine nonsense and profound nonsense. I will come back to this. 
the influence is hard to ferret out). 
137 This article begins in rather dramatic fashion: it is written as an "obituary" for an article that Conant 
found impossible to write (this I understand only too well). In the article that he couldn 't write he meant to 
say what the real parallels are between the two authors. In  this article - the obituary to the one he didn 't 
(couldn't) write - he attempts to explain the deeper affinities by explaining why he couldn 't write the 
original. In short, he felt that he could not make his thoughts transparent to those who disagreed with him, 
and that his article would be "intelligible to someone who already shares [his] dissatisfactions with these 
commentators" (p 245). This idea of course echoes what Wittgenstein says in his preface to the TLP, and 
Conant intends this. 
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What about the apparent parallels which are enumerated but never discussed by 
Conant? I want to restrict my comments to parallels (2) and (5). The idea that Johannes 
Climacus is indirectly communicating what, strictly speaking, cannot be directly 
communicated regarding what it is to be a Christian does indeed have some affinities 
with Wittgenstein's attempting to say via the propositions of the Tractatus what can only 
be shown. The method, but not the content, is similar. But with respect to both authors it 
is far from clear how this parallel is to be further developed: that both Wittgenstein and 
Climacus, through there oblique comments, are pointing to something that cannot be said, 
and that this is what is really important is just a start. What is it that is so important? 
Well, for Kierkegaard it is none other than what is means to be a Christian - the 
essence of Christianity. Kierkegaard, through his pseudonym "Climacus", regards what 
he "says" about what it means to be a Christian (which needn't concern us here) as a 
subjective truth (Conant gives "ethics" and "religion" as examples of "subjective truths", 
p. 248.) This is indeed paradoxical; and much ink has been spilled trying to make sense 
of truth being "subjective." But the silence is supposed to come as a result of our reason 
or intellect reaching its limits, of our seeing that nothing we could say, to quote 
Wittgenstein, could ever count as "the thing" (LE, p. 67). Then, and only then, can one 
silently be a Christian. (I do not pretend to understand how this works - perhaps that is 
part of the point). 
One might argue that just as Kierkegaard thought that the question "what does it 
mean to be a Christian?" could only be indirectly communicated, Wittgenstein thought 
that the right ethical perspective on the world could only be shown. And that just as we 
cannot describe what it means to be a Christian so we cannot describe the right ethical 
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perspective on the world. But here is where the parallels end on my view. Wittgenstein, 
unlike Kierkegaard, thinks that far more can be "indirectly communicated" (shown) than 
just the mystical. Furthermore, nowhere is it suggested that the mystical, which "makes 
itself manifest" ( 6.522), is a "subjective truth". Such an ironic expression as this is never 
hinted at in the Tractatus. There is no evidence that Wittgenstein is being deliberately 
paradoxical when he writes: "there is indeed the mystical, it shows itself' (Ogden, 6.522). 
But even more importantly, Wittgenstein's distinction between saying and showing does 
a great deal more work than bringing into relief the correct ethical stance toward the 
world as a "limited whole". 
According to Wittgenstein (if I am correct), the very distinction between saying 
and showing is made apparent by the higher-order propositions of his TLP. Thus, contra 
Conant, the 'propositions' that are about the saying/showing distinction do say a great 
deal. Wittgenstein is not just concerned with leading us to the right stance or attitude 
toward the world - the view "sub specie aeternitatis" ( and notice here that we need not 
talk about ineffable truths of ethics, but only an attitude or a Weltanschauung - or is it a 
meta-Weltanschauung?) - but is also concerned to show the connection between 
language and the world, the nature of truth, and the nature of the proposition (to name a 
few). 
Thus, Wittgenstein thinks that much is "shown" in his work. Conant, like 
Diamond, thinks that the distinction between saying and showing is just more nonsense 
that Wittgenstein is trying to expose. He interprets Wittgenstein as suggesting that the 
distinction between saying and showing is not the cure, but a "diagnosis of the problem" 
("Must We Show What We Cannot Say?" p. 248): Commentators ''tend . . .  to mistake the 
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views that are under scrutiny in the Tracatatus for the view the author wishes to espouse" 
(p. 248, Ibid.). Presumably, one of the views under scrutiny is the view that some things 
can be shown and not said. Admittedly, what Conant says here is pretty vague, but he 
does make reference to commentators who think that some features of reality are 
"revealed" (P. 248). But in the end it doesn't matter ifwe cannot say which views Conant 
thinks are under "scrutiny" and which are being "espoused" because his position seems to 
border on being incoherent. How can nonsense, disguised or otherwise, be espoused or 
scrutinized? 
Let me leave the reader with the real parallel that Conant thinks he sees in 
Wittgenstein and Kierkegaard. Just as there can be no such thing as indirect 
communication, there can be nothing that is shown and not said: both authors are only 
concerned to unmask disguised nonsense. They both use language in a way that makes it 
appear that what they say has some meaning or significance, but it doesn't. And so what 
we are ultimately to draw from their work is the impossibility of communicating anything 
other than what can be said or "directly communicated". My objection here is the same as 
it was before, and can be put in the form of a question: "why on earth would anyone go to 
all the bother to make just this point?" The motto of Wittgenstein's Tractatus is 
instructive here: " . . .  And whatever a man knows, whatever is not mere rumbling and 
roaring that he has heard, can be said in three words" - Kiirnberger (preface). It seems 
very bizarre that Wittgenstein would end his treatise with remarks about value, aesthetics, 
ethics, and God, if his main point begins and ends with the unmasking of nonsense. Why 
all this "rumbling and roaring"? 
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Before turning to a restoration of the old Wittgenstein, I want to investigate a 
third and final player on the resolute field, Warren Goldfarb. Gorldfarb, though not as 
significant a contributor on the topic of nonsense as Diamond and Conant, gives a clear 
explanation of what he thinks is right in "resolute" readings. 
Goldfarb on Resolute and Irresolute Readings: Revisiting Diamond 
In "Metaphysics and Nonsense: On Cora Diamond's  The Realistic Spirit" 
( 1 997) 138 Goldfarb is primarily concerned with explicating the important role played by 
nonsense in Diamond's work. In part, Diamond is concerned to undercut interpretations 
of early Wittgenstein as realist and the later Wittgenstein as an anti-realist. She thinks 
that this way of approaching Wittgenstein is mistaken because it fails to bring out the real 
similarities and the differences between his early and late work. 1 39 It is misguided to read 
the Tractatus as realist, and interpreting Wittgenstein's propositions as plain (albeit 
disguised) nonsense demonstrates why this is so. 
Now what is so misguided about attributing to Wittgenstein an ontology that is 
realist? 140 Doesn't Wittgenstein write: "objects make up the substance of the world" 
(2.02 1 )  and "substance is what subsists independently of what is the case" (2.024)? This 
138 Journal of Philosophical Research, Vol. XXII 1 39 Obviously a comparison of early and late Wittgenstein goes weJJ beyond the scope of my work here. 
However, l want to spend a little time seeingjust how austere/resolute readings help deal with the 
"intractable problems ofrealism" in the early work (Goldfarb, p. 57). I want to see, once again, what role 
nonsense is supposed to play according to Goldfarb and Diamond. 
140 In correspondence Gary Levvis told me that at an AP A meeting "Goldfarb and a contingent of his 
Harvard buddies nearly had seizures" when Levvis described the austere interpretations as "anti-realist". 
Goldfarb said: "we don't affirm OR deny an ontology". Levvis's retort (to me): "Fine, so they are 
Dummettian anti-realists. Big deal !" Diamond is non-committal here as well, hence the title of here book 
The Realistic Spirit ( I 99 I). 
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looks and feels like realism. 1 4 1  According to Goldfarb, the difficulty with interpreting the 
Tractatus as propounding a realist conception of the world is that any such reading lends 
itself to, what Goldfarb calls, "irresolute" interpretations of the work (p 64 ). This is what 
Conant would call a "substantial nonsense" reading and what Diamond would call a 
"chickening out" interpretation of the early work. The reason is plain: Realist 
interpretations lend themselves to the idea or intuition that something or things, some 
characteristics or aspects of language and the world, only what they are we cannot say, 
are being pointed toward with Wittgenstein's  propositions. Thus, the silence that ensues 
at the end of the work is pregnant with meaning (in terms of reference at least). Realism 
and substantial nonsense are a nice fit in that the nonsense is taken as gesturing to 
features of language and the world that cannot be said, but only shown. 
And hence we are left with a series of questions that cannot be answered at all : 
What are these 'things' ?  Are they truths? Are they features of the world? And if they are 
one or the other, then why can't we say anything about them? The reason both Goldfarb 
and Diamond shy away from ascribing any ontological commitments to early 
Wittgenstein is best captured by a comment Wittgenstein made many years later in his 
PI: a something about which nothing can be said is as good as nothing. The thorny 
problem of just what is being gestured towards is avoided, according to Goldfarb and 
Diamond, if one reads the Tractatus as engaging in disguised nonsense - a ''transitional" 
language - to enable us to see that all metaphysics is real nonsense. And of course if all 
1 4 1  I think that the sort of realism one gets in the Tractatus is ineluctably tied to the world-as-pictured. I 
even tried to argue that Wittgenstein's simple objects are logical objects that must be posited in order for 
the sense of contingent propostions to be determinate. Indeed, I toyed with the idea of attributing to 
Wittgenstein a kind of transcendental idealism a' la Schopenhauer. But such a project is well beyond the 
scope of this work. 
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metaphysics is real nonsense, then Wittgenstein cannot be thought of as either a realist or 
an anti-realist. Indeed, nonsensical propositions cannot give us any type of ontology. 
Hence the re�list/anti-realist issue is moot on their reading. Perhaps the problem is 
avoided, but at too great a cost. Goldfarb and Diamond avoid having to say anything 
about what' s shown by treating all of Wittgenstein's  'propositions' as disguised or 
imaginative nonsense. 
According to Goldfarb, the problem with irresolute (what Conant call "sunstantial 
nonsense") readings is that they appear impossible. Goldfarb points out that Ramsey was 
perhaps the first to be sensitive to this, as the latter' s comment makes plain: "If you can't 
say it, you can't whistle it either" (p. 64). 
According to Goldfarb, Diamond thinks that ascriptions of realism to 
Wittgenstein are the result of commentators ( all those I have mentioned) failing to grasp 
that when Wittgenstein says his propositions are nonsense, he means real nonsense. And 
sentences that are resolute/austere/plain nonsense cannot have reference, 142 and thus 
cannot point to ( or show) anything. Goldfarb quotes the later Wittgenstein as a way to 
142 Diamond uses Frege's context principle to explain the kind ofnonsense she claims Wittgenstein is self­
consciously making use of. Frege thought that only in the context of a proposition does a word have 
meaning (that is, reference). Diamond, according to Goldfarb, takes this maxim ''very seriously" (p 59). 
She thinks (following one interpretation ofFrege's principle) that expressions or terms cannot refer on their 
own, but have meaning only in a proposition (sentence). Whatever meaning we think they have on their 
own is parasitic on the meaning of the proposition in which they occur. Goldfarb gives a Fregean type 
example to illustrate this: consider the expression "Is a horse is a mammal". These two categories "clash" 
because what we need in the subject place is an object and "is a horse" does not introduce an object, but is 
rather a predicative expression that introduces a concept. Goldfarb point out that one way to deal with this 
problem is let the first predicative expression "is a horse" mean (refer to) "man-o-war''. Now we have a 
first order concept that refers to an object, and thus the proposition makes sense. This is where Diamond's 
approach is different. On Diamond's reading of the context principle, it is impossible to give a meaning to 
the first predicative expression because no expression can have meaning independent of its role in a 
sentence. According to Goldfarb, "we can see expressions as referring only in sentences" on Diamond's 
view (p 59). The implication here is that we cannot give a predicative expression a meaning in a 
nonsensical sentence such as "Is a horse is a mammal", for that would be to admit that we can see what the 
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illuminate just the kind of thing that we think we can do with Tractarian nonsense on an 
"irresolute" reading: "The great difficulty here is not to represent the matter as if there 
were something one couldn 't do" (Pl, 374). The idea here is that it is wholly 
wrongheaded to think that the propositions of the Tractatus come as close as any 
propositions can to revealing logical form, the nature of the proposition, or even an 
aesthetico-ethical perspective on the world, but that they all ultimately fail to "say" 
what's being gestured towards. Anything that we take to be shown by the propositions of 
the Tractatus is an illusion on our part, according to Diamond and Goldfarb. The idea 
that there is something that the propositions of the Tractatus cannot do - namely, say 
what it is that is shown - is to miss the entire point of Wittgenstein's work. 
Of course, on my view Diamond, Goldfarb, and Conant have missed the point. 
For if we take Wittgenstein' s  propositions as metalinguistic assertions about the 
connection between language and the world - an impossible metalanguage - then it is 
Wittgenstein's assertions that show us a great many things about language and the world. 
They do so by 'saying' in a higher order language what cannot be said with ordinary 
contingent propositions. 
Other than helping us resist the temptations of realism in the Tractatus, if that is 
what we are inclined to do, what else is this nonsense good for? What does it 
accomplish? Why did Wittgenstein think it was so important? We have already seen (in 
all of the austere interpretations), that Wittgenstein uses this disguised or "transitional" 
(as Diamond also calls it) language to unmask the nonsense philosophers speak. Closely 
first expression is trying to mean, which is to say that we can see it as attempting to (unsuccessfully) 
function as a concept. But, on this reading of the context principle we cannot do this. 
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related to this is an awareness of the proper role for philosophy, to clarify our ordinary 
language (though it is still not at all clear to me how this is accomplished on austere 
readings). But can it do anything more positive or particular than this? 
Goldfarb takes a stab at demonstrating how we are to unpack the remark 
"Propositions cannot represent logical form" on a resolute reading of Wittgenstein's 
work. He puts this challenge to the austere interpretation very honestly when he writes: 
"Can we arrive at a position where we have discarded his propositions about logical 
form, yet not feel that there is a feature of states and affairs and propositions, a feature 
that they have in common, but one we cannot represent?" (p. 66) Here he suggests, 
following Diamond, that if we think of 
Logical form [as] what we discern in a proposition over and above the names it 
contains, [ and that] it is the contribution (if I may put it thus) to the sense of the 
proposition made by the juxtaposition of those names, then it obviously makes no 
sense at all to think that one can see a name going proxy for that, or a complex of 
names representing that" (p 66). 
And thus "all we are doing is noting that names have to be put together in one way or 
another in order to make sentences" (Ibid.). 
Several points are in order here. First, keep in mind that this disguised bit of 
nonsense ("Propositions cannot represent logical form) is a tool in getting us to 
appreciate all of what Goldfarb has just said. I am not convinced that nonsense ( disguised 
or otherwise) can shoulder this burden. Second, and far more damaging, is Goldfarb' s 
leaving out what is essential to any explanation of logical form (whether on an austere or 
substantial reading of nonsense); namely, any analysis of "logical form" seems to require 
a discussion (or at least an explaining away) of how propositions are connected to the 
world; for logical form is, at minimum, what proposition and world have in common in 
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order for the former to be able to "picture" the latter (2. 1 8  and 4. 1 2 1  ). Perhaps what I 
have just said is more disguised nonsense. Sill, if disguised nonsense cannot account for 
this, then I would rather attribute more sense to Wittgenstein propositions. My final 
objection to the role played by nonsense in explicating Wittgenstein's talk of logical form 
is Goldfarb's rather suspicious use of the term "discern". What is being "discerned" "over 
and above the names [the proposition] contains"? (p. 66) To "discern" is to see 
something that is shown, something, perhaps, that is not apparent. What I am suggesting 
here is that, at the end of the day, the "transitional language" or the "disguised nonsense" 
seems to be showing us a relation between language and the world. Thus, 
notwithstanding all the talk about the propositions of the Tractatus being pure nonsense, 
they seem to show quite a lot. Indeed, with the help of Wittgenstein's propositions we are 
able to "discern" what he is trying to get us to see. 
Restoring the Old Wittgenstein: Jakko Hintikka and P.M.S. Hacker 
Both of these thinkers regard the saying/showing distinction as absolutely 
essential for a proper understanding of Wittgenstein' s  logical or semantic theory in his 
TLP. They also regard the "showing" theme as vital, albeit in different ways, for a proper 
understanding of Wittgenstein's pronouncements concerning ethics and value generally. 
Finally, both think that Wittgenstein was committed to certain metaphysical 
presuppositions in his "picture theory" of language, and that the idea that one can draw a 
clear line between his theory of logic in the Tractatus and his metaphysics is absolutely 
hopeless. What this suggests is that Wittgenstein, contrary to Diamond, Conant, and 
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Goldfarb, doesn't regard all metaphysics as nonsense. Indeed, one of the things that 
Wittgenstein's  took himself to be showing in his account of logic is the absolute necessity 
of simple objects. For all these reasons, they regard the saying and showing distinction as 
anything but nonsense. 
Hintikka: Language as the "Universal Medium" 
Here it is necessary to see just what Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka have in mind 
when they say that Wittgenstein never abandoned the idea that language is the "universal 
medium" (Investigating Wittgenstein : 1986; pp. 1 -27). Their view makes clear that the 
real source of Wittgenstein's view that logic and Ethics are transcendental stems from 
such a view of language. Moreover, it makes perspicuous just what it means to say that 
some things can only be shown and not said. Our language is the only means by which 
we manage to say anything at all about the world. For Wittgenstein the idea of a "meta" 
language is impossible. This is simply to say that he regarded attempts to get outside 
language and the world, by saying what the logical relation is between the elements of a 
thought or proposition and the simple objects that they correspond to, as absolutely 
hopeless. For Wittgenstein, the model ''theory" of language is itself shown to be correct, 
and what he says in terms of laying the foundation for an appreciation of his picture 
theory is not, by his lights, what demonstrates its "unassailable" truth. The basic idea of 
language as the "universal medium" is that there can be no method for further explaining 
how language corresponds, hooks - up, or connects with reality. For in order to say how 
we use language to mean anything about the world we have to use language in order to 
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explain and further elucidate that relationship. In other words, we end up using the 
language-world relation in order to explain that very relation. It is like using reason to 
critically examine and analyze reason. At some point it becomes obvious that further 
analysis can never get off the ground. In short, we can never get outside our mode of 
presentation (language) in order to say anything further about it. The idea of language as 
a "universal medium" is simply the idea that the way in which language connects with 
the world can only be shown, and cannot be further analyzed within language. The idea 
of language as the universal medium is a position that the Hintikkas attribute to all of 
Wittgenstein' s work. 
My own example of language as the universal medium, if one is needed, is the 
failure of the "correspondence" theory of truth. As a theory it is, in my opinion, quite 
vacuous. But what it shows is quite correct, if not obvious. The correspondence theory 
shows a proposition is true if and only if it corresponds with reality. What is it for a 
proposition to correspond with reality? We might begin by saying that a true proposition 
picks out, denotes, or corresponds with a fact. But what is a "fact"? Well, the standard 
answer here regards "facts" as "objects standing in relation to one another". A true 
proposition is, then, a proposition whose elements or parts correspond to those objects 
that stand in relation to one another. Still we have the correspondence relation rearing its 
head, and it is still essentially undefined and (on Wittgenstein's view) indefinable. 143 It is 
this pure "correspondence relation" that Wittgenstein was trying to show. Witness: "A 
proposition shows its sense. A proposition shows how things stand ifit is true. And it says 
143 There are Philosophers, Tarski being one, who regard the correspondence theory of truth as definable. 
But it is only definable in a meta-language. 
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that they do so stand" (4.022). At bottom, one of the most important things that 
Wittgenstein is trying to show (by 'saying' it in a higher order language) is that there is 
can be no tertium quid that explains how the elements of a proposition "correspond" 
(connect) with objects in the world. 
To say that the proposition "grass is green" is true if and only if it corresponds to 
the fact ( the reality) that [grass is green] is to say nothing, according to Wittgenstein's 
lights. One might just as well, and more fruitfully, hold up a picture of green grass ( or a 
token of the sentence "Grass is green") and compare it will reality. It is important to note 
that for Wittgenstein the token sentence "Grass is green" and the picture show the same 
thing. If the picture and what is pictured share the same logical form ( and they must if the 
former is to be a picture of the latter), and if the picture agrees with reality, then the 
proposition "is true." Here it is absolutely vital to see that the addition of "is true" adds 
nothing to what is indicated by saying that a proposition "corresponds" or "agrees" with 
reality. A theory of truth is one of the things that cannot be defined, articulated, or 
described according to Wittgenstein. However, the truth of a contingent proposition is 
shown - not said - in virtue of its agreement with reality. (I leave out a discussion of 
negative facts. Note that the same reasoning applies. Only here we would talk about 
"disagreement" with reality). This failure of the correspondence ' theory' of truth to say 
more about the nature of the correspondence relation is but another example, I think, of 
what Wittgenstein means when he says that some things cannot be articulated, but that 
what they show is quite right. What the correspondence theory attempts to say cannot be 
said because we cannot describe the relation of language to the world from an extra­
perspectival point of view; but, for all that, what it shows is correct according to 
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Wittgenstein. And thus we can now say that a correspondence 'theory' of truth is 
nonsense only in so far as what it tries to say cannot be a picture of a possible way in 
which the world might be, but is instead shown to be right by his picture theory of 
descriptive or representational language. 
Keeping in mind Jaakko Hintikka's startlingly simple view that it is the 
universality of logic, semantics, and language generally, that Wittgenstein regarded as 
beyond articulation, we are now in a better position to determine the consequences of 
such a view regarding the treatment of ethics. How is language, understood as the 
universal medium, related to the ethical? For Hintikka there is no positive answer here, 
only a kind of via negativa. Specifically, because Hintikka's interpretation of 
Wittgenstein's logico-philosophical perspective focuses almost exclusively on how the 
saying/showing distinction works with respect to the logic of our language, his 
interpretation is silent on how an aesthetico-ethical perspective is shown, and how value 
is related to the world more generally. Hintkka' s  interpretation mainly justifies the 
saying/showing theme as central to understanding Wittgenstein' s  concern with how 
language in general is connected to the world (which of course is central to my 
demonstrating that the saying/showing theme is anything but nonsense). It leaves 
unsettled just how ethics and value generally is related to the world, and hence offers 
little in the way of illuminating Wittgenstein's comments on ethics, value, and the 
mystical .  Now let us move on to Jaakko Hintikka's objections against the "new 
Wittgensteinians." 
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The Austerity of Wittgenstein's Logical Theory 
In Jaakko Hintikka' s  work on Early Wittgenstein (from Investigating Wittgenstein 
with Merill Hintikka to his paper "What Does the Wittgensteinian Inexpressible 
Express"?) his focus is on Wittgenstein's work as a "logico-philosophical" theory about 
language and about its relation to thinking and to reality" (p. 9). He has relatively little to 
say about Wittgenstein's pronouncements on ethics, aesthetics, the meaning of life, and 
value generally. What he does do in the above paper is provide a critical account of the 
"new Wittgensteinians" based on Wittgenstein' s theory of logic and language. I shall 
now summarize his argument. 
Jaakko Hintikka charges the "new Wittgensteinians" with "misinterpreting 
the Tractatus in a radical way. He begins his assessment of their view with a 
consideration of 6.54: 
My propositions are elucidatory in this way: he who understands them eventually 
recognizes them as senseless [unsinnig], when he has climbed out through them, 
on them, over them . . .  
He must surmount these propositions; then he sees the world rightly (Hintkka; 9). 
First, note that Hintikka here translates "unsinnig" as "senseless", not as 
"nonsense". The German adjective "unsinnig" literally means "nonsensical", so either 
"senseless" or "nonsense" captures the meaning, though the latter is more literal. 
Interestingly, Ogden also translates "unsinnig" as "senseless", not as "nonsensical". The 
German "sinnlos" is best translated as "senseless". I suspect that both Ogden and 
Hintikka use "senseless" because it does not carry the negative connotation that 
"nonsensical" or "nonsense" does. Moreover, "senseless" better contrasts those 
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propositions that have sense, i .e., propositions of natural science, with those that are 
without sense, such as the propositions of the Tractatus. Second, he does not have 
Wittgenstein saying that "he who understands me", but instead he who understands 
"them" (the elucidatory propositions) . . .  recognizes them as senseless". This, in itself, 
gives a different spin on Wittgenstein' s overall position. 
Recall that Diamond has made a lot of hay from interpreting Wittgenstein as 
saying those who understand "me". Now the German is "mich vesteht", which literally 
means he who "understands me", so we can see how it is that Diamond is able to interpret 
Wittgenstein in a less natural but more literal way than Hintikka. Hintikka's 
interpretation, however, while not as literal as Diamond' s, is a more natural reading of 
6.54. To understand "me" is to understand what I have said, and not, rather bizarrely, to 
understand me, the person. By "understanding me" Wittgenstein means understanding 
what he has said in his work. How else are we to understand him, independent of his 
position in the Tractatus? Hence, Diamond's  interpretation of this passage is ambiguous 
between understanding Wittgenstein the man (me) and what he is saying. Her rather 
unnatural interpretation ignores the more obvious way to take him, as Hintikka' s 
interpretation, though less literal, does not. At any rate, Hintikka' s main objection against 
the new Wittgensteinians assumes this more natural reading. 
Philosophers such as Diamond, Conant, and Goldfarb go wrong in thinking that 
there is a great tension in Wittgenstein's  work as a whole. The "new" Wittgensteinians 
say that we must take what Wittgenstein says at 6.54 as literally as possible. And when 
we do so, they maintain that it is not at all clear how we are to take any of the so-called 
propositions that occur prior to 6.54, other than making them out to be pure nonsense. 
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There is now this huge problem as to how we are to make any sense of 
Wittgenstein's  treatise at all . Diamond says that we must take Wittgenstein to mean what 
he says: that the entire work is nonsense. Diamond, Conant, and Goldfarb then attribute 
to Wittgenstein the design of writing sentences that only appear to make sense or only 
seem to be intelligible, but that, on closer inspection, are just as nonsensical as "piggly 
wiggle tiggle." This, as we have seen, is the "austere" or "resolute" reading of his early 
work. As Hintikka succinctly puts it: "If what Wittgenstein said before proposition 6.54 
is literally nonsense, we apparently cannot understand his book at face value. And . . .  this 
face value is that of a treatise in logical semantics. Hence primarily a different 
interpretation has to be given to the entire work - or so it has been claimed" (Ibid, p. 9). 
Hintikka thinks that such an interpretation is a complete "misinterpretation" of 
Wittgenstein. According to Hintikka, a "doubly resolute" reader sees that the nonsense of 
which Wittgenstein speaks is a result of his theory of how language is connected to the 
world. We therefore need not worry about how to interpret what came before 6.54 as 
nonsense in some sense. Indeed, what comes before 6.54 is the bulk of his theory, a 
theory that leads to the conclusion that certain so-called 'propositions' are nonsensical. 
Hintikka does not examine any of the different interpretations that the "new 
Wittgensteinians" put forward. His objection is far more sweeping. He argues that the 
very idea that Wittgenstein' s logico-philosophical view is itself nonsense (and with it the 
"saying/showing" distinction) is a "naive, not to say simpleminded" reading of 
Wittgenstein's  Tractatus (p. 1 0). As a treatise on how the logic of our language is 
connected to the world, Wittgenstein' s book is not nonsense. He asks: "What . .  . is the 
correct reading of Wittgenstein's confession of Unsinnigkeit? And where do the not-so-
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new New Wittgensteinians go wrong?" (p. 1 0) .  They err in thinking that Wittgenstein is 
confess�ng that everything that he has said in his treatise is nonsensical independent of 
what his logico-philosophical theory commits him to. Hintikka says it better: "The New 
Wittgensteinians are not asking what the criteria are according to which the Tractarian 
theses are nonsense. Yet the answer is embarrassingly obvious. They are Wittgenstein' s 
own criteria" (p. 1 0) .  And here the main criterion for determining what is to count as 
nonsense and what is not is the picture or model theory of language. Whatever fails to 
picture some portion of reality, whether truly or falsely, is nonsense according to 
Wittgenstein's theory. Falling under this general criterion are specific attempts to 
articulate what cannot be pictured or modeled in reality, but are only shown. Such failed 
attempts to say what can only be shown result in nonsense. Hence it is not required of an 
interpreter to rescue Wittgenstein' s  logico-philosophical view from collapsing into 
nonsense. One needn't find some other meaning of nonsense in order to salvage 
Wittgenstein's view from coming to nothing. Hintkka's interpretation is, as he says, 
"doubly resolute". He takes Wittgenstein to be propounding a position about language 
and the world, where the net result o/Wittgenstein's position is that we cannot say 
anything at all about the ultimate semantic relations between language and the world ( and 
much else besides). It is Wittgenstein's theory that leads to the conclusion (in 6.54) that 
much of what we attempt to say is, strictly speaking, nonsense. But how does he get there 
if he has been speaking nonsense throughout the Tractatus? Hintikka' s point is that no 
such conclusion could be reached unless most of what he says in his treatise makes sense. 
According to Wittgenstein's thesis "meaningful discourse is restricted to truth-functions 
256 
of elementary propositions about the world" (p. 1 0). In summing up his rejection of the 
new Wittgensteinian reading of the Tractatus, Hintikka writes: 
Hence what Wittgenstein is saying in 6.54 is nothing more and nothing less than a 
simple corollary.to the main doctrines of the bulk of the Tractatus. For a truly 
perceptive reader, proposition 6.54 does not come as a surprise, for it follows in 
the most literal sense from what he had said earlier in the book. In other words, 
what statements like 6.54 add up to is not that in the bulk of the Tractatus 
Wittgenstein is expressing something different from the logic-semantical theory 
that he seems to be expounding. What Wittgesntein is assuming is that semantics 
is - literally - inexpressible, and that for this reason his attempt to express it is 
stricto sensu nonsensical . Thus, there is no contradiction in maintaining both that 
Wittgenstein's statements in 6.54 have to be understood literally and that what he 
put forward earlier in the book is a logico-semantical theory (pp. 1 0- 1 1 ,  my 
emphasis). 
Misunderstanding The Tractatus: Hintikka on James Conant 
Central to both James Conant's and Cora Diamond's  "austere" (or "resolute") 
reading of Wittgenstein is their interpretation of 6.54 as part of the "frame" of the work. 
Here Wittgenstein is providing us with instructions on how to read the work. Thus, 6.54 
ought to be taken as having real meaning, and not as being only apparently intelligible. It 
is this passage that James Conant thinks has been misunderstood by philosophers ever 
since Carnap (presumably Diamond thinks so too). Here' s Conant's translation of 6.54 144 
(which is close to Ogden's): 
My propositions serve as elucidations in the following way: anyone who 
understands me eventually recognizes them as nonsensical, when he has used 
them - as steps - to climb out through them, on them, over them. (He must, so to 
speak, throw away the ladder after he has climbed up it). 
144 From Conant's "Throwing Away the Top of the Ladder", The Yale Review, p. 332 
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Conant thinks that Carnap got this penultimate section totally wrong because the 
latter failed to see a very important distinction between two notions of "erliiutern" (to 
elu9icate ): According to Conant, corresponding to the two different notions of nonsense, 
substantial nonsense and austere nonsense, are two different ways of interpreting the term 
"elucidation", there is the "substantial" conception of elucidation, which goes along with 
the substantial conception of nonsense, and there is the "austere" conception of 
elucidation, which is connected to an austere or resolute conception of nonsense. To 
understand "elucidation" in the substantial way is to think that Wittgenstein is saying that 
there are things that can only be shown or "elucidated", but cannot be said, whereas to 
take "elucidation" in an "austere" way (which Conant thinks is the way Wittgenstein 
intended "elucidation" to be taken), is to "show that we are prone to an illusion of 
meaning something when we mean nothing" ("Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and 
Early Wittgenstein", printed in New Wittgenstein : 2000, pp. 1 76- 1 77). 
Conant reckons that Carnap mistook Wittgenstein's eludications as substantial 
instead of austere, and that this is why so many philosophers have thought that 
Wittgenstein is really trying to show us something ( or things) that cannot be said, but that 
can be shown, instead of seeing that all Wittgenstein is elucidating is that "we are prone 
to the illusion of meaning something when we mean nothing" (Ibid). And Conant thinks 
that getting clear on this distinction is essential in demonstrating the correct "method" of 
the Tractatus ("Elucidation and Nonsense in Frege and Early Wittgenstein", p. 1 75). 
Now aside from the fact that there is absolutely no evidence that an "austere" 
conception of "elucidation" is even implied in the Tractatus, we will see that such a view 
does not j ibe at all well with Wittgenstein's  violent reaction to a paper written by Carnap. 
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Wittgenstein's reaction to Carnap's ideas, as we shall see, only makes sense if we 
interpret elucidation in the more usual way - as a way of showing that there are features 
of language (semantical terms) that cannot be said, but only shown; what Conant call 
"substantial" elucidations. If indeed the right way to interpret Wittgenstein's term 
"elucidation" is to give it the "austere" meaning, then Carnap's ideas would have been 
very wide of the mark, and Wittgenstein would have been angry only because his ideas in 
the Tractatus were so badly mangled, not because he thought ( as he did) that Carnap was 
essentially stealing his ideas. I will come back to this point. 
We have already seen that the correct "method" or way of reading the TLP is, 
according to Diamond and Conant, to attribute to it a resolute view of nonsense, and that 
Wittgenstein is imploring the reader to "understand him", not his propositions, and that 
many have missed this important point. This is all with a view, on Conant' s part, to 
demonstrate that it was all down hill from there: Scores of commentators failed to see 
that nothing is shown by Wittgenstein's propositions since all the propositions are, 
strictly speaking, nonsense. Thus, poor Carnap got Wittgenstein so wrong when he 
thought that Wittgenstein was attempting to elucidate features of language and the world 
that cannot be said, but only shown. Instead, the right way to take elucidation -
Wittgenstein's intended meaning according to Conant - is that we are under the illusion 
of thinking that we mean something when we really mean nothing. This is what is really 
being elucidated in the Tractatus. 
What is so striking about Conant's conviction that Carnap misunderstood 
Wittgenstein is the evidence that Conant adduces in support of this claim: "Wittgenstein 
says of Carnap that he failed to understand the passage (6.54), and therefore failed to 
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understand 'the fundamental conception of the whole book"' (Conant, p 1 75). Hintikka 
persuasively demolishes the idea that Carnap radically misinterpreted Wittgenstein's 
point in the last few lines of the TLP by demonstrating that Conant quotes Wittgenstein' s 
letter to Schlick totally "out of context" (Hintikka, 1 45 p 1 3). Hintkka makes clear that 
Wittgenstein is being ironic when he says Carnap did not understand the "fundamental 
conception of the whole book". If we look at the comment in context this is obvious: 
You know very well yourself that Carnap is not taking any step beyond me when 
he is in favor of the formal and against the 'material mode of speech' ;  and I 
cannot imagine that [he] has misunderstood the last few propositions of the 
Tractatus - and hence the basic idea [ Grundgedanken] of the entire book - so 
completely [as not to realize it himself] (my emphasis, Hintikka, p 14; quoting 
Wittgenstein 's  letter to Schlick; printed in Ranchetti and Nedo: 1 983). 
What made Wittgenstein so angry was that he thought Carnap was borrowing his 
ideas without giving Wittgenstein due credit. Carnap sent Wittgenstein a paper on 
"physicalist language as the universal language of science" (Hintikka, p 1 3), and, when 
Wittgenstein read it, he "flew into a rage"(Jbid. ). Some of the points in the paper - as the 
excerpt of Wittgenstein's letter to Schlick shows 1 46 - were prevalent themes of the 
145 "What Does the Wittgensteinian Inexpressible Express?" (2002) 
146 One of the themes in Carnap's paper that Wittgenstein thinks is pilfered from the Tractatus is the 
distinction between a "formal mode" of speech and a "material mode" of speech. The best explanation of 
this distinction is seen in another of Carnap's essay's "Empiricism, Semantics, and Ontology" (Revue 
Internationale de Phi/osophie, 4, 1950, pp. 20-40; reprinted in New Readings of Philosophical Analysis; 
pub. By Feigl, Sellars, and Lehrer, Meredith Corp., New York: 1 972). The purpose of a formal mode of 
speech is to make syntactical and semantical assertions about language. For example, to say "sentences 
consist of subjects and predicates" is to use the fonnal mode. For here we are talking about the meaning of 
certain linguistic terms. Now on Carnap's  view the formal mode of speech is totally acceptable as a way of 
defining syntactical rules and semantic terms. The material mode of speech is the metaphysical (and thus 
illusory) way of putting things. For example, to say "the world consists of objects and their properties", is, 
to Carnap's way of thinking, nonsense (a point he took from the Tractatus). Talk of abstract entities (such 
as 'objects', 'properties', or 'relations' is unnecessary according to Carnap, since we can just as easily and 
less confusedly talk about the meanings of linguistic terms like "subjects" and "predicates" without 
supposing that the world is composed of objects and properties that correspond to such terms. Two 
important points come out of this. First, almost everything Wittgenstein says about language and the world 
is said in the "material mode" of speech in the Tractatus. And it is this mode that Wittgenstein uses to show 
260 
Tractatus (prevalent, at least, according to Wittgenstein). Indeed, Carnap's Logical 
Syntax of Language, if it betrays any misunderstanding of Wittgenstein's early work, is, 
according to Hintikka, a misunderstanding that results from Carnap's taking Wittgenstein 
to be saying "that we cannot even speak of the syntax of our language" at all and that 
"Carnap "took Wittgenstein to deny in the Tractatus all self-referential use of language, 
not just to deny semantic self-reference" (Hintikka, p 1 5). But still the point remains: 
Carnap took Wittgenstein to be suggesting that there are certain things that we cannot say 
in our material language, but that can, according to Carnap, be said in a formal or "meta" 
language. Of course, Wittgenstein would deny that anything can be said in a meta­
language-such things can only be shown. 
But Carnap did not get Wittgenstein as wrong as Conant claims he did. If Carnap 
had, the very distinction between an object and a meta-language, would have been 
viewed by Wittgenstein as plain nonsense, and not a mistake or misunderstanding on the 
part of Carnap. We might say "for a blunder that is too big." Wittgenstein wrote to 
Schlick, saying "Carnap is not taking any steps beyond me when he is in favor of the 
formal mode and against the material mode" (letter previously quoted). 
a great many things, but rejects in the end as "nonsensical": "The world is comprised of facts, not of 
things" ( 1 . 1 )  is a perfect example. Second, Carnap takes Wittgenstein's point about "showing" to mean that 
there is another language - a formal mode of speech - that we can use to say a great deal about our 
language. Carnap developed Wittgenstein's point about showing in a direction that Wittgenstein did not 
want to go, but not because Carnap got Wittgenstein all wrong, but rather because the idea of a formal 
mode of language does not accomplish anything more than what Wittgenstein took himself to be showing 
in the Tractatus. This is why Wittgenstein says to Schlick: "You know very well yourself that Carnap is not 
taking a step beyond me when he is in favor of the formal mode and against the material mode of speech." 
In Wittgenstein's view, Carnap was simply calling Wittgenstein's method of showing a "formal mode of 
speech". And whether or not Wittgenstein is correct here, it explains why he was so angry. Wittgenstein 
thought that his work was simply being re-packaged. A final, and very important point, comes out of all 
this. IfHintikka and I are correct here, then there is even more support for my view that Wittgenstein's 
propositions constitute an impossible meta-language. The formal mode of speech, which, as we have seen, 
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It is important here to see that whether or not we agree with Hintikka's  version of 
where and how Carnap misunderstood Wittgenstein, such misunderstandings do not 
"help Conant in the least" (Ibid, p 1 5). They do not help because Wittgenstein's letter to 
Schlick demonstrates that Wittgenstein thought that Carnap was (at least minimally) 
extrapolating the main ideas in the Tractatus without formally recognizing Wittgenstein's  
contributions. And Wittgenstein's main contribution to Carnap's work is, according to 
Hintikka, the idea that the "formal mode" of language is another way "of emphasizing the 
inexpressibility of semantics" (Ibid). 
It is pretty obvious that Conant is, as Hintikka notes, "Resolute(ly) misreading" 
Wittgenstein (Hintikka, p. 1 3). The fact that Carnap was developing Wittgenstein' s  work 
farther, showing how there could be a pure syntax for the language of science, and that 
Wittgenstein took this to be a kind of plagiarism, indicates that there was ( and is) more to 
the Tractatus than the simple ( and oversimplified) aim of unmasking nonsense. On 
austere or resolute readings no explanation can be given as to why Wittgenstein was so 
angry with Carnap other than the (false) claim that Carnap genuinely misunderstood 
Wittgenstein, and was talking plain nonsense. 
Showing and the Inexpressible 
Hintikka never explicitly connects the "inexpressible" with what Wittgenstein 
thinks is "shown" by his logico-philosophical theory, but it is pretty clear that the two 
is according to Wittgenstein a re-tooling of what's shown, is a higher order language. And it is a language 
that Wittgenstein rejects in the end as nonsense. 
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coincide (at least this is true for Wittgenstein). Hintikka, however, carefully avoids 
identifying the inexpressible with what is shown, and instead more conservatively puts 
the inexpressible in the same camp as what cannot be said. We do not get anything 
positive about showing from Hintikka. Hintkka does, however, provide a laundry list of 
different areas that Wittgenstein regards as inexpressible: "rules of inference (5 . 1 32), 
truth (in the form of Frege's the true 4.4442), logical forms (4. 1 2), tautology (5 . 1 362), 
and above all the limits of language (preface, paragraphs 3-4)" (p. 1 0). What Hintikka 
says about Wittgenstein ' s  showing theme is this :  "The Tractatus is an exercise in logical 
semantics, but it does its job by means of showing rather 'than saying. And, according to 
Wittgenstein, that very unsayability is a consequence of his logico-semantical theory" (p. 
1 1  ). Although Hintikka has little to say about what he thinks Wittgenstein shows us 
regarding Ethics, Value, etc., he makes clear with this last statement that the very notion 
of "showing" is anything but nonsense, according to Wittgenstein. Indeed, the 
consequences o/Wittgenstein's semantic theory are the things that are shown. Hence, to 
say that "nothing is shown", as the "new Wittgensteinians" do, is completely 
wrongheaded. 
Even on Hintikka' s reading of Wittgenstein 's  Tractatus as primarily a work in 
logic and metaphysics, putting to one side the admittedly cryptic remarks about value, the 
meaning of life, etc., what we see is that a "doubly resolute" interpretation of the work is 
one that "take[ s] the main content of Wittgenstein' s  book at its obviously intended 
normal meaning" (p. 1 1  ). And this is to say that whatever falls outside the purview of 
Wittgenstein's logico-semantical view is nonsensical in the technical sense that it cannot 
be said, and is thus ineffable. But this is a far cry from saying that the above things (in the 
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laundry list) are shown. We still do not learn anything about "showing" on Hintikka' s 
view. Perhaps this is why he thinks of his interpretation as being "doubly resolute." At 
minimum, the contrast between what can be said and what cannot be said (what's 
ineffable) raises the question: How is the ineffable illuminated, clarified, or brought into 
relief? And it is in wrestling with this question - a question that Hintikka leaves alone -
that the notion of showing rears its slippery head. 
What I have added to Hintikka's critique of the new Wittgensteinians is a way of 
characterizing how the propositions of the TLP show anything: as a higher-order 
language, they show or elucidate in virtue of what they 'say' ,  but what they say is said in 
a higher-order language; a language that does not meet the criterion of Wittgenstein's 
picture theory, and thus cannot, for this reason, count as meaningful. Furthermore, 
Hintikka never gives an account of the remarks about ethics, value, and the mystical in 
the Tractatus in the way that I do. Moreover, it is not clear that he can. Wittgenstein's  
directive and evocative use of language has no place in Hintikka's account because the 
mystical goes quite beyond the scope of an ineffability theory of semantics. I am able to 
make better sense of the idea that Wittgenstein 's  invitational and evocative use of 
language is supposed to cause us to "feel" the world as a "limited whole. '' 
The "Ineffability of Semantics" 
I believe that Hintikka is correct in attributing to Wittgenstein something like an 
"ineffable" semantic theory. It makes sense of Wittgenstein' s general distrust of anything 
that smacks of the "meta"; any attempt to say what must be the case in order for 
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descriptive language to connect with the world or to articulate the foundations of the 
logic of our language. If there is any real tension in Wittgenstein' s Tractatus concerning 
how we are to take the meaning of his propositions leading up to 6.54 it has to do with 
how we can reconcile a logico-semantic theory that has as its conclusion the "ineffability 
of semantics". Hintikka puts it well: "In a systematic perspective there nevertheless 
seems to remain a problem if one maintains that semantics is inexpressible while at the 
same time one puts forward logico-semantical views" (p. 1 1  ). Hintikka does a nice job of 
showing that this is a problem for Wittgenstein, "not his interpreters"' (p. 1 1  ). "Language 
as the universal medium", the "ineffability of semantics", "lingua universal is", and "a 
universalist view of logic and language" ( all discussed in Hintikka: 1 997) are all views 
that are opposed to the notion of a meta-language. All of these approaches regard the 
logic of our language - the Sprachlogik - as ineffable. 
Moreover, we must not forget that the logic of Frege and Russell, which 
Wittgenstein was steeped in, was a kind of proto-metalanguage; a higher order language 
about the logic of our language and its connection with the world that Wittgenstein did 
not consider legitimate because any attempt to say something about its structure required 
using Sprachlogik. It required positing the very same conditions required for contingent 
propositions to picture the world. In Wittgenstein's mind, there was no way to get outside 
of these conditions. And of course meta-logic and meta-language had not yet been 
invented (there was no theory of meta-language until Tarski). Russell ' s  theory of types is 
merely an attempt to distinguish between different types or properties - properties that 
belong only to objects from properties that belong only to classes of objects - and should 
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not therefore be thought of as a hierarchy of languages per se. If anything, what Russell 
puts forward is a hierarchy of properties ( see chapter two). 
At any rate, the very idea that one could use a higher order language to say 
something more about the relation of any descriptive language to any possible world was 
anathema to Wittgenstein. Because Wittgenstein did not think that we could get outside 
language and the world with a higher order language he is committed to something like 
an ineffability view of semantics. But of course Wittgenstein's theory is a semantic 
'theory' .  The picture theory ' says' that the nature of contingent propositions is that they 
picture reality in virtue of a shared logical form. But how can any theory that is, by its 
own lights ineffable, say or show anything about the ultimate connection between 
language and the world? If all semantic theories are ineffable, and any attempt to 
articulate them nonsensical, then what is the status of Wittgenstein's own semantic 
theory? This is not as big a problem as it appears. 
The Verifiability Criterion of Meaning and Wittgenstein's Semantic Theory: A 
Reductio Ad Absurdum of Austere Interpretations of the Tractatus 
No one has ever argued that the logical positivists' verifiability criterion of 
meaning is plain nonsense, even if it does not satisfy itself. No one has argued that the 
theory is outright nonsense or that it is unintelligible: Yet just such a move is made by 
those who argue that Wittgenstein's propositions are out and out nonsense. 
The 'propositions' of the TLP that are used to build the picture theory do not meet 
the criterion of the theory, and are thus nonsense if the scope of the theory is unlimited. 
Wittgenstein' s picture theory of meaning does not satisfy itself. And this is why 
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Wittgenstein says that those who "understand me eventually recognizes [ that my 
propositions] are nonsensical."( 6.54) 
What I want to suggest is that the 'propositions' of the TLP, just like the 
'propositions' that express the verifiability criterion of meaning, are not nonsense in a 
larger sense. Moreover, ifwe are prepared to say that Wittgenstein's pseudo-propositions 
are plain nonsense, then we are committed to saying the same thing about the verifiability 
criterion of meaning as well. But it is a mistake to say of the verifiability criterion of 
meaning that it is out and out nonsense. Thus, Wittgenstein's picture theory of meaning is 
not out and out nonsense. 
The verifiability criterion of meaning goes as follows: meaningful propositions 
are ones that are either analytic ( definitions, etc.) or synthetic ( empirical propositions). 
The former are necessarily true by definition or logic or both; for example, in a sentence 
such as "all bachelors are unmarried men" we need only understand the meanings of the 
terms to determine that it is necessarily true. Empirical propositions, on the other hand, 
are meaningful because we could say what would need to be the case in order for them to 
be true. We can say what would in principle verify them. We could likewise say what 
would falsify them. For example, the proposition "Mice live on the moon", thought 
obviously false, is meaningful because we can say what need to be the case to make it 
true. 
Now, certain "metaphysical propositions" fail the verifiability test of meaning in 
that they are not true by definition nor can we say under what conditions such 
propositions would be true-we do not know what would verify them. Similarly, we 
cannot say what would falsify them. For example, the 'proposition' "God is Love" is a 
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piece of nonsense on this view for it is neither true by definition nor can we say what 
would verify ( or falsify) it. 
But then it might be argued that the very propositions that purportedly express the 
verifiability criterion of meaning are nonsense or meaningless (this is different from 
saying that it is not true or absurd, which is plausible): "Propositions are meaningful 
either because ( 1 )  they are true by definition, and so necessarily true, or because (2) we 
can state what would need to be the case in order for them to be true". Now if we ask 
about this very criterion: "Is it true by definition"? The answer is "no." If we ask of this 
proposition: "Can we in principle state the conditions that what would make it true - that 
is, the conditions in the world that would verify it"? Again the answer is "no." This shows 
that the verifiability criterion of meaning does not satisfy itself and is thus ultimately 
rendered false or, at best, untrue. The criterion is self-defeating, but it is not meaningless. 
Indeed, if we take the verifiability criterion of meaning to be programmatic and 
forward looking, we can perfectly well see how it is to be applied to some specified set of 
propositions because we understand it! We need not apply the criterion to the theory 
itself; we can limit its scope. If we do apply the theory recursively, we end up saying 
something self-defeating, but not nonsensical in a larger sense. We can perfectly well see 
how the theory is to be applied. The logical positivists might have said that after one 
understands how to apply the verifiability theory of meaning, the view itself can be 
discarded. Indeed, they might have gone farther by applying the theory unrestrictedly, 
dismissing it in the end as nonsense (as Wittgenstein does in the penultimate sentences of 
the Tractatus). But whether the criterion is or is not applied to itself, we are not in the 
position of having to invent some way to find the criterion intelligible. 
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There are a host of problems with the verifiability criterion of meaning, but I do 
not think that inventing a way to make it intelligible to us is one of them. We might say, 
following Wittgenstein, albeit in a dir�ction that he wouldn't want to go, that what the 
verifiability criterion "shows" cannot be stated. (Again, it matters little whether one 
thinks what it shows is correct or not.) The main point I am trying to make is that it is a 
mistake to conclude that the verifiability test of meaning, notwithstanding the fact that it 
does not satisfy itself, is itself a piece of plain nonsense. Of course, if we do apply it to 
itself the theory does fail to be meaningful by its own criterion. But this does not mean 
that the criterion itself does not show us something important. We can still see and 
appreciate what it is trying to say even if we think that the theory itself is false, or without 
meaning if the scope of its application is unrestricted. If the theory was meaningless in 
some larger sense, then the objection that it fails its own test could not even be 
understood by anyone! 
I think that a similar mistake is going on when philosophers believe that it is nigh 
impossible to reconcile what Wittgenstein says at 6.54 with everything (that is, his 
logico-semantical view) that comes before it. For them, the entire foundation of the book 
has crumbled underneath them, and they are left with a vertiginous feeling that whatever 
meaning they thought they gleaned from his work is now lost. To remedy this they go to 
great lengths to define "elucidations" as propositions that only seem to have meaning -
but that are really disguised bits of plain nonsense (like "piggly wiggle tiggle"). On my 
view "elucidations" are simply those higher-order propositions ( or invitations to see and 
feel the entire world differently) that direct us to those features of language and the world 
that cannot be "said" because they are not descriptions of states of affairs. They are thus 
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not propositions proper ( contingent propositions) whose business is to describe the ways 
in which the world might be. Hence, all the 'propositions' of the Tractatus are, in this 
sense, "elucidations" on my view. The "new" Wittgensteinians (James Connant 
especially) and Michael Hodges in his book Transcendence and Wittgenstein 's Tractatus 
( 1 990) agonize over what sense is to be attributed to Wittgenstein' s 'propositions' ( or 
"elucidations") because they apply Wittgenstein' s own criterion of what makes a 
proposition meaningful (that it must be a picture of reality) to Wittgenstein' s picture 
theory itself, and then conclude that his propositions must be, in the end, genuine 
nonsense that only appears to be meaningful. They fail to see that propositions can be 
meaningful in a larger sense than that circumscribed by Wittgenstein' s  picture theory of 
meaning. Such contortions are not, on my reading, necessary. Wittgenstein himself was 
well aware of the fact that his account of what made propositions meaningful, if applied 
to the 'propositions' of his work, would show them to be nonsensical - that's what 6.54 
means in part! But this does not mean that his 'propositions' are nonsense simpliciter. 
My interpretation makes much more sense than the view that Wittgenstein is only 
showing us that we (philosophers) speak disguised nonsense, and that Wittgenstein must 
speak nonsense himself in order to help us to see that this is what philosophers do, and 
need to stop doing it. This makes Wittgenstein' s project so pointless. James conant, for 
example, attributes this paltry task as the main desideratum of Wittgenstein's work (both 
early and late). 
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Throwing Away the Ladder, but Keeping the Perspective 
What I am suggesting is that what we say about the verifiability criterion of 
meaning we can say about Wittgenstein's picture theory of language: that, if applied to 
itself, it is self-defeating, absurd, or certainly false. But just as we do not say ( and should 
not say) that the verifiability criterion is meaningless or unintelligible, even when it is 
applied to itself, so too we need not worry over how to save Wittgenstein's propositions 
from devolving into genuine nonsense. Both the verifiability criterion of meaning and 
Wittgenstein's picture theory fail to meet their own criterion. But Wittgenstein's  picture 
theory of meaning, like the verifiability theory of meaning, is intelligible. Wittgenstein's 
propositions are not pictures of states of affairs in the world. But this does not mean that 
they are disguised nonsense or that he is engaging his reader in imaginative nonsense. 
Rather, the lesson we should draw is that Wittgenstein's 'propositions' are non-sense if 
we grant his picture theory. Wittgenstein might have said that his propositions, once one 
has "climbed over them", are nonsense because they fail to meet his criterion of what is 
to count as a meaningful proposition. And although Wittgenstein was not as direct as 
this, it is implied by his dismissal of his propositions as nonsense. At any rate, we are free 
to reject his picture theory of meaning and so reject that meaningful discourse is limited 
to propositions that depict possible situations in the world or accept his picture theory and 
thereby regard what he says as nonsense given that it does not satisfy itself. In either case 
we need not conclude that his picture theory is unintelligible nonsense. 
Thus, both the verifiability criterion of meaning and Wittgenstein's picture theory 
of meaning are reduced to absurdity by their own criterion of meaning. But on the other 
27 1 
hand, and far more importantly, it would seem to require a very deliberate obtuseness to 
claim that the verifiability criterion of meaning is itself meaningless in the sense that we 
cannot understand it. It is not a piece of disguised nonsense . And no philosopher that I am 
aware of has argued that it is. Even if we think, as most philosophers now do, that the 
verifiability test of meaning is false or just plain wrong-headed, it is a mistake to think 
that it does not show us how to set up a test for determining what counts as a meaningful 
proposition. Yet this is just what the new Wittgensteinians do with early Wittgenstein: 
"How can we possibly understand Wittgenstein given that he dismisses everything he has 
said in his book as 'nonsense'?" They then set themselves the task of figuring out how 
something can be pure nonsense but seem intelligible ! On my view this simply is not 
necessary. 
Indeed, if we take Wittgenstein's propositions at face value - as higher-order 
propositions about language and the world - we can at once see that they do not meet the 
conditions of his picture theory of meaning. But we can still follow his thinking without 
attributing to him a pretend, imaginary meaning: without attributing to him what 
Diamond sometimes calls a "transitional" language (The Realistic Spirit: 1 99 1 ). We can 
accommodate the idea that the 'propositions' in the Tractatus elucidate what 
Wittgenstein took to be the ultimate nature of the language-world relation. This approach 
is far less bizarre than supposing that all his talk about "simples", "names", "states of 
affairs", and "propositions" . . .  that all of it is carefully designed to get us to see that 
Wittgenstein is disguising nonsense as sense so that we can, in the end, throw away his 
work with the conviction that philosophy only ever unmasks nonsense. On my view we 
throw away the ladder, but not the view that the arduous climb affords us. 
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If I am correct in thinking that Wittgenstein' s view of both semantics and value 
requires a transcendental perspective - quite literally a meta-view - then the perspective 
itself is impossible to articulate given his picture theory, and so , is in this sense 
nonsensical for it fails to satisfy itself. (Of course, if the picture theory is false, then such 
a view might not be impossible to articulate.) However, on my view such a perspective is 
shown by the 'propositions' of the Tractatus. lfwe interpret Wittgenstein as propounding 
a transcendental perspective on how language connects with the world we do have a kind 
of meta-view. It is a meta-view that shows not only the ultimate nature of the language­
world relation, but it explains why he thought that the logic of our language cannot be 
"said", and is instead made manifest by his higher-order "elucidations." 
Before tying the logical and the ethical aspects of the transcendental perspective 
together, I would like to finish with just a bit more evidence against austere readings. 
P.M.S. Hacker: The Incoherence of Resolute Readings 
Hacker amasses so much evidence against resolute readings that even 
summarizing it would take a chapter. 147 Here I will focus mainly on why he regards such 
readings of the text as basically incoherent. Here the evidence he gives is what he calls 
"internal" in that he doesn't look at what Wittgenstein or others have said about the text, 
but sticks to what's in the book. (Although he has a whole section of"external" evidence 
as well). 
147 In his excel1ent paper "Was He Trying to Whistle it?" Published in New Wittgenstein (2000), edited by 
A. Crary and R. Read 
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Hacker argues that Wittgenstein' s  objections against Frege and Russell, as well as 
Wittgenstein's conception of how philosophy should be carried on, illustrate the very 
serious problems faced by resolute or austere readings. I will confine my discussion to 
these two points as I have already spent some time ( chapter two) explaining what 
Wittgenstein took to be mistaken in Russell 's type theory, and have discussed briefly the 
nature of philosophy in the Tractatus. Hacker's points here further support my view. 
Hacker reminds us that one of Wittgenstein's important insights: "the logical 
constants do not represent" (4.03 1 2). Thus, there are no "logical objects" (Hacker, p 368). 
As Hacker rightly points out, this is Wittgenstein's "Grundgedanke" (Ibid.). This 
fundamental idea casts a pretty wide net: there are not objects corresponding to Frege's 
"true" and "false", Russell is mistaken in thinking that logic describes "the most general 
constituents of the universe", and both "Frege's and Russell 's 'primitive signs of logic' 
are not primitive signs at all (5 .43) and can be dispensed with in the T/F notation" (pp 
368-369). 148 Hacker rightly notes that such objections to the views of Frege and Russell 
( whatever their final merit) are made by what Wittgenstein says. Hacker points out that 
"Diamond and Conant" (p 369) would undoubtedly urge that Wittgenstein' s 'claims' here 
148 Hacker refers to the wrong number here. At 5.42 Wittgenstein talks about "primitive signs", not at 5.43. 
(At 5.43 Wittgenstein talks about "propositions of logic.") At any rate, according to Hacker's interpretation 
of 5.42 the truth table method allows us to see that the "logical constants" do not refer to anything; they are 
not names or "primitive symbols" on this view, for they are all "interdefineable" (5 .42), and thus do not 
refer to "relations" (like "right and left" Ibid.) at all. For example, '-v' has the same truth conditions as 
'->' ,and that it does can be seen by inspecting truth table definitions for each. The logical equivalence of 
the signs is shown, and there is no need to suppose that 'v' or '->' refers to anything like a relation (or a 
logical object more generally) I think Hacker's interpretation is basically correct. Incidentally, at 5.44 
Wittgenstein writes: "truth functions are not material functions". And by this I take him to mean that there 
is nothing in the world that the logical operators refer to. Witness: "the proposition -p is not about 
negation, as if negation were an objecf' (my emphasis, 5.44). This lends more support to Hacker's view 
that truth tables are a way for Wittgenstein to show what the logical operators mean without supposing that 
the symbols are "primitive signs". This is not the only role played by truth tables; they show that the 
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are to be discarded as nonsense. On my view we can discard what he says as nonsense, 
but only in a very technical sense (viz., Wittgenstein's propositions do not picture facts in 
the world) and only at the end of the work, once we have grasped the points that 
Wittgenstein is making with his remarks. Hacker sums up Wittgenstein's "fundamental 
idea" and why it is so implausible to regard what he 'says' about it as "plain nonsense": 
"All of [Wittgenstein ' s  remarks on this central idea] involve formal concepts, and by the 
lights of the Tractatus they are illegitimate in as much as they try to say something that 
can only be shown. Is it really credible that the author of the Tractatus regarded these 
hard won insights into the nature of logic as 'plain nonsense' ?" (p 369) The answer can 
only be a resounding "no." 
Finally, Hacker takes issue with Diamond's and Conant' s designating certain 
propositions of the work - the "frame" (the preface, 6.54, and 7) - as meaningful, and all 
the rest being nonsense because certain of the ' ideas' in the body of the book are very 
similar to the ideas in the frame of the text. For example, Hacker points out that 4 . 1 1 2  
( which deals with the nature of philosophy as the "clarification" of  our thoughts) is close 
in meaning to the point made in 6 .53 ,  but Diamond says that 4 . 1 1 2  is "transitional"149 
language and should not be read as part of the "frame". But surely if points made in the 
"frame" are similar to some of the points made in the body of the text, there can be no 
good reason to make such a distinction. There seems to be a flagrant inconsistency in 
propositions of logic do not refer to fundamental truths about the world, but instead that they are senseless 
(5.43). 
149 By "transitional" language Diamond seems to mean that the language in question is self-consciously 
disguised nonsense. We imagine that when Wittgenstein says "a philosophical work consists essentially of 
elucidations" or that "philosophy does not result in 'philosophical propositions', but rather in the 
clarification of propositions" ( 4. 1 1 2), that what he has said makes sense; but, since it is not part of the 
"frame" of the book, 4 . 1 1 2  is disguised nonsense, and not to be taken at face value. 
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saying that the frame instructs the reader on the methodology of the work when some of 
the same points on the method of reading the work appear in the body of the text too! The 
choice of what is to count as frame and what is to be excluded appears rather arbitrary. 
Lastly, no real explanation is given as to why we should not take seriously 
Wittgenstein's remark about the "mystical" or the "unsayable" "manifesting itself' 
( 6.522). Wittgenstein may be completely wrong here, but that is different from saying 
that what he says is ultimately plain nonsense that he wants to see unmasked. 
Both Hacker and the Hintikkas do a masterful job of demonstrating the very 
serious flaws that any austere interpretation must face. The Hintikkas make a strong case 
for reading Wittgenstein as putting forward an ineffability theory of semantics and Hacker 
does a nice job of proving that Wittgenstein's saying/showing distinction is anything but 
nonsense. Indeed, Hacker's suggestion that Wittgenstein' s propositions are attempts to 
say what can only be shown fits well with my view that the function of language in the 
Tractatus is of a higher-order, and that Wittgenstein's assertions are the vehicle for 
showing certain features of the language-world relation. 
Unfortunately, they do not offer any kind of analysis as to what Wittgenstein 
might be getting at with his remarks about ethics and value, and how a treatise on what' s  
shown about language and the world manifests the "mystical" (6.522) in  the world. 
Although it is true that Hacker traces Schopenhauer's  influence on Wittgenstein' s 
remarks about timelessness, solipsism, and the identity of ethics with aesthetics in the 
early Notebooks (1914-1916) and the Tractatus, 1 50 he never connects this together in a 
150 Hacker's Insight and lllusion ( 1 972), pp. 71-76 
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way that sheds light on why Wittgenstein regarded his project as ushering in the mystical 
or why the Tractatus is an "ethical deed." 
And Jaakko Hintikka, as we have already seen, likens Wittgenstein's ethical point 
to a Krausian silence. And perhaps they are right to leave this alone for fear of uttering the 
unutterable. 
Still, I believe that I have not transgressed the bounds of what can be uttered by 
arguing that the Tractatus expresses a transcendental perspective with respect to language 
and the world that, according to Wittgenstein, carries with it an aesthetico-ethical aspect. 
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CONCLUSION 
In chapter one I argued that the roots of Wittgenstein's saying/showing distinction 
most likely began with the influence of Karl Kraus, and, to a lesser extent, Leo Tolstoy. 
Kraus was preoccupied with keeping factual language distinct from ethics, value, or, as 
Wittgenstein would say, anything "higher" (6.42). Indeed, Kraus made his ethical points 
not by talking, but simply by placing the words of another person in the right context. The 
main point here is that Kraus used words (the words of others) to gesture towards what he 
regarded as the right way to see some issue, and never said what constituted the right 
perspective, ethically speaking. 
On my view, Wittgenstein turned this Krausian practice, which was at best 
piecemeal, into a philosophical method that logically demanded silence about anything 
higher ( ethics and value). Wittgenstein attempted to forge a vision of representational 
language that was stripped of all adornment so that the value of the world would not be 
lost in all the "gassing". He wanted a way to safeguard value from the encroachment of 
the world of facts. 
Wittgenstein's saturation in Kraus's approach to indirectly communicating what's 
significant or important made him sensitive to the idea that value could be shown. 
Wittgenstein took it a step farther by attempting to show that the nature of descriptive 
language is such that anything of value is forever shrouded in mystery: in Das 
Mystische. 
I also argued that Tolstoy's A Confession, insofar as it shows how nothing that we 
could ever say could be the answer to the meaning of life and the world, lends support to 
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the idea that there is value in reaching the limit of what can and cannot be expressed in 
language. For in seeing the limit, we also see that the felt "problem" of life dissolves 
when we stop looking for anything in the world to 'answer' this problem. 
In chapter two I argued that Wittgenstein's perspective on the logic of any 
descriptive language is a perspective that transcends the world of facts and the very 
language that we use to represent the facts. Indeed, his propositions do not themselves 
picture facts in the world, but are instead metalinguistic assertions that show the relation 
between any representational language and its connection to any world from a standpoint 
that is at the very limit of the world and language. Such a perspective cannot be 
articulated with the ordinary propositions of natural science, and so cannot count as 
having sense. But for all that Wittgenstein's metalinguistic assertions are intelligible; we 
can see what he is doing with them. This is similar to Jaakko and Merrill Hintikka's views 
that semantics is, for Wittgenstein, ineffable. Much, then, is shown with Wittgenstein's 
higher-order propositions: e.g., that the logical constants do not refer to abstract entities, 
the details of the picture theory of meaning, and even the nature of the proposition. 
Ultimately, however, I have been at great pains to demonstrate that the metalingusitic 
assertions of the Tractatus help to pave the way for out seeing the world sub specie 
aeternitatis. 
In chapter three I showed how Schopenhauer's influence shed light on the 
aesthetico-ethical perspective of Wittgenstein's perspective by comparing and contrasting 
Schopenhauer's view of the "pure" and "purely knowing subject" with Wittgenstein's talk 
about a "metaphysical" and "willing subject" being at the limit of the world. We 
discovered that Schopenhauer's purely subject of knowing is detached from will in the 
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world, and that the aesthetic way of seeing something is to see it from a disinterested 
perspective. We also saw that Wittgenstein' s perspective has a timelessness about it that is 
closely linked to Schopenhauer's characterization of timelessness in aesthetic 
contemplation. I then suggested that perhaps Wittgenstein' s willing subject (which he 
says is an "attitude to the world") is best interpreted as a detached view of the world. 
Finally, I argued that Wittgenstein need not be taken as suggesting that there is some sort 
of noumenal subject that stands at the limit of the world, and that we should instead take 
Wittgenstein's  talk about a willing subject as a dramatic way to express an attitude toward 
the world as a "limited whole." 
In part (b) of chapter three we saw that Wittgenstein does have a way to express 
ethical claims in the world, but that all such claims can only express a relative value. 
Ethical judgments can be said or represented because they are ultimately reducible to facts 
in the world. Here I argued that Philippa Foot 's  view of moral claims as disguised 
hypothetical imperatives helps to make sense of how ethics in the world can be said on 
Wittgenstein's view. Her view also helps to show why there cannot be claims of absolute 
value made about facts in the world, for there can be no logical compulsion as to why this 
or that fact is good absolutely. 
In chapter four I argued �hat Wittgenstein' s remarks about ethics, value, and Das 
Mystische - his propositions in the "sixes" - are best thought of as directives whose main 
purpose is to draw our attention to the world as a whole. I also fleshed out the identity of 
ethics and aesthetics as an identity of perspective alone. This enabled me to deal with 
commentators who wrongly assume that ethics is fundamentally about actions in the 
world whereas aesthetics is essentially about our seeing something in the world. Instead, 
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what Wittgenstein offers us is an aesthetico-ethical perspective on the world. This identity 
of perspectives gives us a way to handle those commentators (Collinson for example) who 
see an unbridgeable gap between absolute value and <?Ur actions in the world. For on my 
view ethics is not about our actions in the world according to Wittgenstein. Finally, I 
argued that the closest we can come to characterizing what it means to say "there is 
indeed the mystical" and that it "makes itself manifest" or "shows itself' (6.522) is to 
examine Wittgenstein's characterizations of certain mystical experiences, such as "feeling 
absolutely safe" or "wondering at the existence of the world." I suggested that such 
experiences are the result of our coming to see the world "sub specie aeterni", and are not 
simply or only psychological facts about us on Wittgenstein's view. 
Finally, in chapter five I did my best to decimate austere readings of the Tractatus 
by arguing that it is wildly implausible to regard the fundamental tenet of Wittgenstein's 
work - that what can be shown cannot be said - as a bit of plain, albeit disguised, 
nonsense. Indeed, I have argued that a great many things are shown by Wittgenstein' s  
metalinguistic assertions. For example, the main problem with Russell ' s  theory of types, 
the building of his picture theory of meaning, and the nature of logical form are all shown 
by Wittgenstein' s  metalinguistic assertions. The 'propositions' dealing with value and 
ethics can be taken as an evocative and directive use of language, not as metalinguistic 
assertions, as I have already suggested. Thus, we need not attribute to Wittgenstein the 
bizarre view that the only way to make sense of his pseudo-propositions is to read them as 
having sense in only an "imaginative" way or as a "transitional" language that is, in the 
end, plain nonsense. I also argued that to interpret Wittgenstein's Tractatus as doing 
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nothing more than drawing the line between sense and-nonsense is to seriously 
impoverish his work. 
The Tractatus is an "ethical deed" because it brings us to a transcendental 
perspective on the world. This perspective has an aesthetico-ethical aspect to it that 
Wittgenstein thought permits us to feel the world as a limited whole. In the final analysis, 
the ethical message or point of the Tractatus can only be appreciated from the limit of the 
world and thus the limit of language. From such a vista we are invited to see that the 
miracle is that the world exists - that there is a world is the mystical (6.44). It is our 
experience of the world "as a limited whole" or "sub specie aeternitatis" that is, in the 
end, "the mystical." 
There are, to be sure, more than a few unresolved issues in my work. But I think 
that the chief among them is that there can be no logical entailment between seeing the 
world as a limited whole and "feeling" it as such. Put another way, it is simply not the 
case that the world must be felt as having absolute value as a result of the transcendental 
perspective on language and the world. Nor do I think that there is any kind of causal 
connection between seeing the world from this perspective and our feeling it in the 
peculiar way characterized by Wittgenstein. 
At the end of the day, the most that can be said about the transcendental 
perspective with respect to language and the world ' leading to' the aesthetico-ethical 
apprehension of it is this: It was true for Wittgenstein and so it might well be true for 
others. Perhaps this is why Wittgenstein is so cautious in his preface: "This book will 
perhaps only be understood by those who have themselves already thought the thoughts 
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which are expressed in it - or similar thoughts. It is therefore not a textbook. Its object 
would be attained if it afforded pleasure to one who read it with understanding" (p. 27). 
We can better understand Wittgenstein's reservations about getting his message 
across if we take him to be carrying a message that cannot be communicated via abstract, 
conceptual knowledge, but instead interpret him as gesturing towards a view of the world 
that is more direct, immediate, and quite mystical . Am I one of the few that has read the 
Tractatus with "understanding" according to Wittgenstein? I have no idea. But I am sure 
that this work systematically connects Wittgenstein' s thoughts on the limits of language 
and the world with the mystical in a way that no other work has been able to do. 
Finally, as far what research projects my dissertation has engendered, I think 
further examination of Schopenhauer's influence on Wittgenstein is worth pursuing. 
Specifically, I think that one could make a pretty strong case that Wittgenstein is neither a 
realist nor an anti-realist, but a transcendental idealist. I will just hint at how I think such a 
story could be told. 
The Tractatus and Transcendental Idealism 
Given that Wittgenstein never bothered too much about letting his readers know 
where he got certain ideas, the fact that he never discusses transcendental idealism 
shouldn't surprise us: "Indeed what I have here written makes no claim to novelty in 
points of detail; and therefore I give no sources, because it is indifferent to me whether 
what I have thought has already been thought before me by another" (TLP, preface, p. 
27). What is "transcendental idealism"? 
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Transcendental idealism is much maligned in the history of philosophy. It is 
opposed to realism in a very particular way, and claims not to deny empirical reality at 
all .  For Schopenhauer there exists a dualism of subject and object: the one being 
correlative of the other. There is both the knower and the known: we cannot possibly 
make any sense of the one without the other. Whatever can be known is representation, 
and presupposes a knower. A world of representation has as a precondition a knower and 
a knower presupposes something known; i .e., a world of representation. The one vanishes 
with the other. It makes no sense, on Schopenhauer' s view, to suppose that there is any 
positive notion of objects or an objective world that is independent of the phenomenal 
world or the world of representation. He holds that "we must absolutely deny to the 
dogmatist the reality of the external world, when he declares this to be its independence 
from the subject" (WWR, Vol. I., p. 1 5, my emphasis). Indeed, the "external world" just is 
the world of representation. Transcendental idealism, then, is quite simply the view that 
"the whole world of objects is and remains representation, and is for this reason wholly 
and for ever conditioned by the subject; in other words, it has transcendental ideality" 
(Ibid, p. 1 5). Magee puts it more perspicuously when he writes: "This whole world of 
experience is perfectly real, just as real as it presents itself as being, but it is 
unconceptualizable in any terms other than such as presuppose the existence of a subject. 
This is, in a nutshell, what transcendental idealism means" (The Philosophy of 
&hopenhauer, p. 1 1 6). 1 5 1 
151  Interestingly, in his fascinating book World and Life as One: Ethics and Ontology in Wittgenstein 's 
Early Thought (2002), Martin Stokhof argues that Wittgenstein's  position in the Tractatus requires that "it 
be read in a distinctly nonrealistic way" (p.2). But when he explains what he means by this it is apparent 
that he, too, has failed to appreciate that if we interpret Wittgenstein's theory of language as falling within 
the framework of transcendental idealism, then there is nothing anti-realist about it. This is what Stokhof 
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I suspect that Wittgenstein's ontological commitments are closer to transcendental 
idealism than to realism. This Schopenhauerian influence shows up in his picture theory 
of meaning and is hinted at in 5 .471 1 :  "To give the essence of proposition means to give 
the essence of all description, therefore the essence of the world". Here it is clear that it is 
Wittgenstein's picture theory - the "essence of all description" - that determines the 
"essence of the world", not the other way round. We could think of the "essence of 
description" as the essence of representation or depiction. What's clear is that it is the 
logic of our language that determines the nature of the world qua pictured. And this just 
is the "world as representation." There is no other world that we can think of or talk 
about. Recall that Wittgenstein takes himself to be drawing a limit to what can be 
"expressed" in language, which amounts to drawing a limit to what can be thought as 
well . He does not frame this limit in terms of what we can know or understand, like 
Schopenhauer does. For Wittgenstein the logic of our language shows us how the world 
must be represented, not how it is in itself. 
Ultimately, Wittgenstein' s  interest in ontology extends only to his view of how 
language is able to picture the world: "The proposition is a picture of reality. The 
proposition is a model of the reality as we think it is" ( 4.0 1 ). Such remarks strongly 
says: "[Wittgenstein's] . . .  ontology is not intended as a theory of the fundamental components and structures 
of reality per se, but rather as a description of the structure of reality that is presupposed by language and 
thought. It does not characterize reality as it ultimately is, but rather how reality appears in the medium of 
human language and thought. To put it differently, the Tractatus deals with reality so far as it can be 
accessed by the discursive mind' (my emphasis, p. 2). Implicit in his characterization of Wittgenstein's 
project is the dichotomy of the way the world really is and the way it presents itself to a "discursive mind". 
This is just what the transcendental idealist rejects. There is no other way to represent reality other than 
through our language. Hence, we see naive dogmatic realism rearing its head. Now if we attribute to 
Wittgenstein something like transcendental idealism, we can claim that his ontology is determined by his 
theory of language without getting embroiled in the debate over whether Wittgenstein's theory is best read 
as an example of realism or anti-realism. What I am suggesting here is simply that one needn't suppose that 
the world as representation (as "pictured") is something different from the real world. 
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suggest that Wittgenstein's model theory of meaning is what determines the existence of 
objects or simples, not the other way round. He begins with the nature of the meaningful 
proposition and how' it reaches out to picture the world. How is it that language can 
represent facts in the world? This is the question before his mind; not, what are the 
ultimate constituents of reality as such? Hence, we needn't bother about the question of 
whether or not Wittgenstein's approach is realist or antirealist. 1 52 Transcendental 
idealism allows Wittgenstein to give an account of how language connects with the world 
without embroiling us in debates over what the nature of his "objects" or "simples" are, 
independent of the world as pictured. 
1 52 Just as Pears does in his False Prison, vol. I. In fact, he argues that Wittgenstein should be read as a 
realist regarding Wittgenstein's mysterious "simples". If this were true, one would think that Wittgenstein 
would have taken more care to discover what these material simples in fact are. But he seems to regard the 
question as to the ultimate nature of simples as almost irrelevant. My suggestion is that Pears' approach is 
wrongheaded because it presupposes the realism vs. antirealism controversy. If we interpret Wittgenstein as 
working within the framework of transcendental idealism, the issue does not come up. Unless, of course, 
one wants to say that my view is antirealist. My interpretation is anti-realist in this sense: Wittgenstein does 
not set out to discover what the ultimate constituents of the world are prior to developing his semantic 
theory. He does not seek to discover what simples infact are, and then work out his picture theory to 
accommodate his ontology, but rather begins with his picture theory of meaning and then posits the 
existence of simples as logical objects that are necessary for sense to be determinate. Hence, one could say 
that my view is anti-realist only in the sense that it makes no sense to talk about the existence of simples 
independent of Wittgenstein's theory of meaning. On the other hand, as logical objects they are required for 
any language to be able to say anything at all about the world. So in the sense that Wittgenstein is giving us 
an a priori condition for any language to be able to represent any world, the simples are part of 
Wittgenstein's ontology. They are logical objects that must be presupposed in order for reality (which is not 
independent of Wittgenstein's picture theory) to be pictured or represented at all. It is my hope that 
interpreting Wittgenstein as a transcendental idealist avoids the worry over whether or not his early work is 
realist or (following Diamond, Conant, and Goldfarb) anti-realist. 
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